Note: this piece fits into an irregular series that addresses the question of the role of institutional parameters in explaining political outcomes int he US. The first in the series was here: Are our Problems Based in Leadership or Institutions?.
The US political system simply does not allow for even the possibility of bold political proposal like Herman Cain’s 9-9-9 proposal. Forget for a moment about the merits of the proposal and concentrate on the significance of both a candidate who would campaign as if the plan is, in fact, politically feasible as well as supporters who would base following said candidate on the basis of such a plan.
I was listening to an excerpt (here) of Cain explaining his 9-9-9 plan in a radio interview and was struck by the sheer impossibility of accomplishing even a fraction of what he was proposing. As an evaluation of the candidate, the 9-9-9 plan indicates one (or some combination) of the following: Cain is a pie-in-the-sky idealist, an utterly cynical opportunist, or a person who simply does not understand the way the government works. In honesty, based on Cain’s views of governance, such as the importance (or lack thereof)of knowing stuff about foreign policy, I have to go with the last option as the most likely fit.
Beyond the candidate, this type of scenario (i.e, a candidate running on an utterly impossible platform) gets to a major problem in US politics: most of us really do not understand the complexities of the legislative process and, therefore, many are too willing to assume that a given president can actually be elected and then implement the policies that the candidate is promising. When it comes to domestic policy, this is manifestly not the way it works and even in foreign policy, where the president has a lot more leeway, it is never as easy as it looks. It is also why we are so frequently disappointed by presidents once elected.
By way of explanatory contrast, if we had a parliamentary system, wherein the party (or coalition of parties) that won the majority in the legislature could implement their policy vision, then the leader of that party could credibly campaign on a bold policy agenda. Because, of course, the only way to become the leader (and presumptive prime minister) is to have support of the party as it is. But of course, we have a system of separated powers wherein the executive and legislative branches have to negotiate one with another to achieve policy outcomes. This reality puts the notion of bold policy initiative into the rare, if not impossible, category.
Consider the following institutional facts about our system that utterly mitigate against a correlation between what a presidential candidate bases a campaign and what that president can deliver if elected, policy wise:
1) Presidential candidates are chosen by citizens adhering to a given party (through the labyrinthine caucus/primary process) and therefore their policy preferences do not necessarily reflect the policy preferences of the legislative manifestation of their party.
2) The president has only influence, not control, of the legislative agenda. While the president does have avenues to influence what is discussed in Congress, the bottom line remains that the actual agenda (from the committee level, to the legislative calendar, to the floor and beyond) are wholly out of the control of the president. Even if the president’s party controls either or both chambers, the ability of the president to control the process is nil. In other words: no member of congress takes orders from the president. The relationship is in no way hierarchical.
3) A list like this, of course, cannot ignore the additional level of complexity added to legislating that bicameralism introduces (passing a bill through two institutional actors is, by definition, harder than through one). And, of course, the Senate adds a plethora of other complexities, including constitutionally baked-in over-representation of numeric minorities, but also the fact that the chamber has become, for all practical purposes, a super-majority (60%) vote chamber for most business.
All of the above is not, by the way, a call to reform, but rather is a call to understanding both in terms of how the US government actually works as well as how to evaluate the probability of the claims of a given candidate.
It would be interesting, not to mention better for the country, if we ran presidential campaigns (both in terms of the behavior of the candidates and the media coverage thereof) with these types of things in mind. However, we instead tend to have campaigns wherein candidate run as political messiahs (in the sense that there election will somehow be transformative of politics in Washington) or, at a minimum, revolutionary leaders who will “take the country back.”
