We lump Iraq and Afghanistan together because, regardless of the reasons we invaded either, withdrawing from either will have consequences.

This is not a convincing argument. Withdrawing our troops from Kosovo and removing our troops from Korea would each also have consequences yet we don't lump those together.

They are lumped together to add legitimacy to Iraq by tying it to the legitimate invasion of Afghanistan and to diminish criticism of Iraq policy by linking it to Afghanistan.

You also might want to check out the logistics of a force the size of the one we have in Iraq in Afghanistan.

What the US could get out of a stabilized Iraq is what the Bush Administration expected to get out of it.

A functioning, democratic government that would serve as an example for the region as to what is possible. It would also get a country, no longer hostile to its neighbors. That eases concerns (and prices) for oil, but it also lowers tension levels. That, in turn, means fewer US military and monetary assets would be required for the region as a whole. I like all of those things as an American. Oddly enough, most Arabs would like them, too.

But the question remains- win what? What will victory look like? Will America be stronger or weaker?

No one doubts that American troops will remain undefeated, that Al Qaeda affiliates, who were not there before we invaded, are finding it harder and harder to hit their targets, that eventually, at some unspecified time, Iraqi politicians may start seriously working to right their country, and save their people from further slaughter (If they're not prepared to take those steps themselves, why in the name of God should we?). But what does America get out of this other than mounting deaths and growing numbers of wounded and maimed?

The cost of these two wars may not bankrupt the country, but already leading economists and investors are predicting the twenty first century will belong to Asia, and to China in particular (and, boy, won't the Europeans have something to complain about then).

Mr Cordesman address none of this in his article, and does nothing more than repeat the usual administration talking points.

I don't know if he's hedging his 'bits' on the goalposts of withdrawal, but he certainly seems to be talking through them.

As long as progress is being made towards Iraqis resolving their political problems it certainly seems prudent to have forces there sufficient to provide some reasonable level of security but there's the danger of a sort of Zeno's Paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise in which progress is made but a resolution is never achieved.

I continue to believe that our policy in Iraq is one about which reasonable people can differ. Neither “side” is either all right or all wrong and we must form our policy by the messy, imperfect realities at hand which is what I see Dr. Cordesman urging us to do.

I'm getting the impression that the goal posts for "victory" have gotten so out-of-whack that now a permanent military presence in Iraq to sustain a fractured and ineffectual government, combined with lowered American casualties and continued occasional suicide bombings would be considered a "victory" by many.

I'm having a hard time being enthusiastic about this "victory".