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	<title>Comments on: Reconstruction in Iraq</title>
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		<title>By: cian</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/reconstruction_in_iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-109959</link>
		<dc:creator>cian</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2007 12:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Hard to get to stage 1 when an example of the present administration&#039;s &#039;best practice&#039; initiatives was to promote privatization of Iraqi state owned factories rather than provide the funds to get them up and running as soon as possible.

Tens of thousands of Iraqis could have been back working within weeks of the invasion if Bremer&#039;s CPA had listened to people like Timothy Carney, brought in as part of Jay Garner&#039;s &#039;reality based&#039; team.

The question of who exactly would be prepared to purchase a business in a war zone was not one that interested Bremer or the white house. Crazier still is the fact that this policy remained in place for the next three years.

In the meantime the factories remained closed and this, coupled with de-Baathification, denied hundreds of thousands of Iraqi men and women the means to provide for their families, driving many into the arms of those conducting the insurgency against American troops.

Carney, a man of immense experience in the reconstruction of war torn countries, having worked in Vietnam, Phnom Penh, and Mogadishu, was reduced to spending his days checking to make sure those being hired had not belonged to the Baath Party.

It&#039;s no surprise that he resigned after two months. That he has now been appointed to head up reconstruction in Iraq as part of Bush&#039;s new &#039;Way Forward&#039; is sad beyond words.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hard to get to stage 1 when an example of the present administration's 'best practice' initiatives was to promote privatization of Iraqi state owned factories rather than provide the funds to get them up and running as soon as possible.</p>
<p>Tens of thousands of Iraqis could have been back working within weeks of the invasion if Bremer's CPA had listened to people like Timothy Carney, brought in as part of Jay Garner's 'reality based' team.</p>
<p>The question of who exactly would be prepared to purchase a business in a war zone was not one that interested Bremer or the white house. Crazier still is the fact that this policy remained in place for the next three years.</p>
<p>In the meantime the factories remained closed and this, coupled with de-Baathification, denied hundreds of thousands of Iraqi men and women the means to provide for their families, driving many into the arms of those conducting the insurgency against American troops.</p>
<p>Carney, a man of immense experience in the reconstruction of war torn countries, having worked in Vietnam, Phnom Penh, and Mogadishu, was reduced to spending his days checking to make sure those being hired had not belonged to the Baath Party.</p>
<p>It's no surprise that he resigned after two months. That he has now been appointed to head up reconstruction in Iraq as part of Bush's new 'Way Forward' is sad beyond words.</p>
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		<title>By: legion</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/reconstruction_in_iraq/comment-page-1/#comment-109895</link>
		<dc:creator>legion</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2007 19:50:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Unfortunately, what we have seen in Iraq is political necessity driving the implementation of stages 3 and 4 long before 1 and 2 are actually in-place. This is complicated by the fact that the total lack of safety &amp; security in the area means lots of things simply can&#039;t be done - &lt;a href=&quot;http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/01/just_what_baghd.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here&#039;s &lt;/a&gt;an example courtesy of ObWi about the recent failure of the Baghdad sewer system. The immediate failure was due to recent torrential rains, but it&#039;s been impossible to do repairs or even basic maintenance on the system due to the ongoing violence. Here&#039;s a telling quote:
&lt;em&gt;“We can’t do our job because of the insurgents’ attacks against our employees. The insurgents are targeting the municipal workers and their cars in the streets,” Mowafaq Kittan, a media officer at Baghdad Municipality, said.

“About 600 of our workers were killed by insurgents over the past nine months. We need to be protected to do our job properly,” &lt;/em&gt;

Basically, reconstruction can&#039;t happen until there&#039;s some level of security. To paraphrase South Park, our strategic plan has no &quot;step 2&quot;.

In fact, trying to push the Development-in-a-Box folks into work before the area is secure creates its own problems. Aside from the human tragedy that occurs when they get attacked, there&#039;s also the impact on the military that&#039;s currently working its own mission there, as they now have to work security issues for the civilian teams as well as their own units...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Unfortunately, what we have seen in Iraq is political necessity driving the implementation of stages 3 and 4 long before 1 and 2 are actually in-place. This is complicated by the fact that the total lack of safety &amp; security in the area means lots of things simply can't be done - <a href="http://obsidianwings.blogs.com/obsidian_wings/2007/01/just_what_baghd.html" rel="nofollow">here's </a>an example courtesy of ObWi about the recent failure of the Baghdad sewer system. The immediate failure was due to recent torrential rains, but it's been impossible to do repairs or even basic maintenance on the system due to the ongoing violence. Here's a telling quote:<br />
<em>“We can&rsquo;t do our job because of the insurgents&rsquo; attacks against our employees. The insurgents are targeting the municipal workers and their cars in the streets,” Mowafaq Kittan, a media officer at Baghdad Municipality, said.</p>
<p>“About 600 of our workers were killed by insurgents over the past nine months. We need to be protected to do our job properly,” </em></p>
<p>Basically, reconstruction can't happen until there's some level of security. To paraphrase South Park, our strategic plan has no "step 2".</p>
<p>In fact, trying to push the Development-in-a-Box folks into work before the area is secure creates its own problems. Aside from the human tragedy that occurs when they get attacked, there's also the impact on the military that's currently working its own mission there, as they now have to work security issues for the civilian teams as well as their own units...</p>
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