Every once and a while there's a nice event in which the reactions sharply illustrate the differences between the left and the right. Today's example comes in the form of piercing criticism by Lt. Col. Paul Yingling. Please read Yingling's......

Armed Forces Journal just published Lt. Col Paul Yingling’s A Failure in Generalship. The article is critical of Army Leadership and indirectly critical of the President. While it is coolly analytical in tone, the article is evidently passionate. I w...

The essential problem with this rhetoric is that it obscures the military's role as advisors to the President. Obviously, he is the commander and chief and he has final say, but the military had a duty to give honest advise and it seems from the record that they were cowed into being yes men for this President. No one I think would be calling for a mutiny from the generals in ignoring orders, but they had a duty to voice their criticism and add their voices to the public debate and they don't seem like they did.

Personally, I think Donald Rumsfeld is 95% responsible for that, and Bush is 100% responsible for having Rumsfeld around for so long. Sure, the generals might have been wishy-washy on the subject, but what's the point of arguing with brick walls? However, I do disagree with you about them adding their voices to the public debate. A general attempting to sway the public against administration policy is an exercize in policy making which is strictly across the line.

I'm just pointing out that this type of friction between field grades and generals isn't unusual. The short-term lesson is for generals to realize that rank doesn't make you smart. The problem solves itself in the somewhat longer term, as today's field grades will become tomorrow's generals.

You're right. I agree. But it works both ways, i.e., being field grade doesn't make one smarter either. Tactical and strategic decisions require different mindsets. That's why I am wary of a Lt. Col. pontificating about something he's never done.

No, it's not crazy, it's the American system. Civilian leadership makes the policy, and the military implements it. Any other combination would lead to a military dictatorship. It is a necessary and fundamental (and so far successful) principle of American liberty. Our freedom will stand only so long as we adhere to it.

The essential problem with this rhetoric is that it obscures the military's role as advisors to the President. Obviously, he is the commander and chief and he has final say, but the military had a duty to give honest advise and it seems from the record that they were cowed into being yes men for this President. No one I think would be calling for a mutiny from the generals in ignoring orders, but they had a duty to voice their criticism and add their voices to the public debate and they don't seem like they did.

James Joyner:The current Armed Forces Journal features a devastating critique of America’s generals by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, deputy commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. Thomas Ricks runs down the highlights:An active-duty Arm...

Not at all. I'm just pointing out that this type of friction between field grades and generals isn't unusual. The short-term lesson is for generals to realize that rank doesn't make you smart. The problem solves itself in the somewhat longer term, as today's field grades will become tomorrow's generals.

D'Inger's comment that "Their job is to implement the policies of the administration whether they like them or not, yes, even if it means losing a war," is also crazy talk.

No, it's not crazy, it's the American system. Civilian leadership makes the policy, and the military implements it. Any other combination would lead to a military dictatorship. It is a necessary and fundamental (and so far successful) principle of American liberty. Our freedom will stand only so long as we adhere to it.

Majors and lieutenant colonels have enough experience, training, and education to fully grasp the moment, whereas too many generals are holding on to old ways.

So your solution is ...? If you think firing the generals and turning the army over to majors and colonels is the solution, I'm glad you're not C-in-C.

I've been growing increasingly worried by the current Democratic insistence on a timetable for leaving Iraq. Their plan ignores the likely carnage of post-withdrawal Iraq, and we are morally responsible for that carnage. Just as we are morally responsible for the ongoing carnage that has resulted from Rumsfeld-Frank's failure to do "any" post-war planning.

A fixed timetable for withdrawal is the best way to minimize carnage. There will be a civil war. We will not be there forever. The only question is how we can responsibly mitigate some of the horrors that are sure to come.

Without a fixed deadline, there is no incentive for the warring factions to separate, because they can continue to operate under the cover of an American presence that prevents full scale war but allows for low level sectarian violence.

With a hard deadline, it would be clear to the Sunnis that they have to withdraw from Sunni majority areas if they are to survive.

Yes, this means ethnic partition of Iraq. Unfortunately, this is the best option remaining after Bush's disastrous war.

William: LTC Yingling's qualifications are outstanding. From the article bio sketch:

He has served two tours in Iraq, another in Bosnia and a fourth in Operation Desert Storm. He holds a master's degree in political science from the University of Chicago.

Regards, C

General officers are appointees of the executive branch. Their job is to implement the policies of the administration whether they like them or not, yes, even if it means losing a war.

Also, general officers may testify before congress and may brief congresspersons, but they report to the chain of command. Lt. Col. Yingling seems to think the army is a department of the legislative branch. In my opinion, this reflects on Lt. Col. Yingling's poor leadership qualifications more than anything else.

For the purposes of full disclosure, I am a decorated, enlisted (E-5) combat veteran of the Vietnam War.