Shinseki did not fall on his sword "for America." He contradicted the OSD in order to protect the institutional interests of the U.S. Army.

To put this in it's proper context, don't forget that both he and Sec of the Army White were "fired" (Shinseki was given early retirement) for insubordination in the case of the Crusader artillery program.

A good guy and an inspired choice for the VA, but the reality of his SASC testimony has been willfully distorted for partisan political purposes.

FWIW, not just a few believe that his SASC testimony in early '03 was less an honest assessment of OIF force levels than an attempt to "gold brick" the Army out of the mission as directed by the NCA. Wars are bloody, costly and play havoc with future procurement budgets, you know.

Still a good pick for Veterans Affairs.

How is that exactly???

1 - I AM A REGISTERED DEM - HAVE BEEN SINCE 1974.

2 - I HAVE VOTED GOP A FEW, MAYBE THREE TIMES IN MYU LIFE.

2- I HAVE BEEN VERY CRITICAL OF BUSH ON MANY ISSUES INCLUDING THE IRAQ WAR AND THE POST-WAR - WHICH HE WAGED IN A HALF-ASSED MANNER.

3 - THE LINKS IN MY POST ARE ALL FROM OTHER SOURCES - INCLUDING LEFT-WING SOURCES LIKE THE HUFFINGTON POST.

BOTTOM-LINE: SHINSEKI WAS WRONG ABOUT TROOP LEVELS, HE WASN'T FIRED.

"The surge, of course, involved an increase in the number of troops in Iraq."

But not to the levels advocated by Shinseki.

There is, though, an internal conflict in his logic. Shinseki said it would take more troops to pacify Iraq. Reliapundit, I'm sure, would claim "the surge" worked wonderfully. The surge, of course, involved an increase in the number of troops in Iraq.

Can't have it both ways, Reliapundit.

facts here - in a link rich post.

read the truth if you dare.

On February 25, 2003, four months before the end of his term as Chief of Staff of the Army, Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he thought an occupying force of several hundred thousand men would be needed to stabilize postwar Iraq. He was pressed to provide a range by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI). Below is an excerpt from the exchange:

SEN. LEVIN: General Shinseki, could you give us some idea as to the magnitude of the Army's force requirement for an occupation of Iraq following a successful completion of the war?

GEN. SHINSEKI: In specific numbers, I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think --

SEN. LEVIN: How about a range?

GEN. SHINSEKI: I would say that what's been mobilized to this point -- something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We're talking about posthostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant, with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so it takes a significant ground-force presence.

In a public rebuke to Shinseki, Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, called Shinseki's estimate "far off the mark" and "wildly off the mark". Wolfowitz said it would be "hard to believe" more troops would be required for postwar Iraq than to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Specifically, Wolfowitz said to the House Budget Committee on February 27, 2003:

DEP. SEC. WOLFOWITZ: There has been a good deal of comment - some of it quite outlandish - about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq. Some of the higher end predictions we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark. It is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army - hard to imagine

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