Check out Dellingers memo he wrote in 1994 to a judge that has even more substance.

Given the nature of modern legislation, however, it's quite arguable that an entire bill needn't be vetoed because 1 provision out of 5,000 pages is of questionable constitutionality. The signing statement then becomes a Big Hint by the President for any interested party to challenge the law.

I'd previously inclined to JJ's "duty to veto" theory, so thanks much for linking the article.

Here is the link to the paper written by Dellinger. A search should bring up that sentence real quick.

But could you please cite the page with the "no duty to veto" quote? I've skimmed text and notes, and Adobe search isn't finding it either. Merci ...

We don't know the constitutional impact of the 'signing statement'. You could make a case for it and against it. There is supposed to be a certain amount of tension between the branches that forces them to pull against each other.

In light of our constitutional history, we do not believe that the President is under any duty to veto legislation containing a constitutionally infirm provision, although of course it is entirely appropriate for the President to do so.

I guess it's more subtle than that. What I see the gimmick as being is, "I endorse this law to the extent that it may be interpreted as constitutional, while reserving the right to reject any unconstitutional interpretation of it."

So, with e.g. the McCain anti-torture bill, Bush would simply interpret it consistent with his lawyers' sweeping notion that Article II provides exceptions whenever Bush deems them necessary. No duty to veto, because Bush will enforce it, except when it's actually needed.

(Looking forward to reading Jane Mayer's bit on Addington in the New Yorker this week ... oh, and on unrelated topics of OTB interest, Greg Sargent finds the administration tongue-tied when he asks why they're not going ballistic on the Wall Street Journal for its "treason." Heh, as they say.)