Steve

And for the record, I supported both the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. And I also think we should, as a nation, continue to keep open the option of engaging in regime change if our national interests require it. Which is why I am so concerned that we seem to want to turn every intervention into a long, drawn out affair. If eliminating an enemy regime implies a 15 year occupation where we try to transplant democracy, end corruption, and build a thriving free market economy, I think it tends to discourage otherwise reasonable uses of force.

There is something to be said for going in, smiting our enemies, and coming home quickly.

The risks of a return to the status quo ante are just too high.

I am working up a longer version of my response to this elsewhere... but the short version is that we're probably wrong about the costs of the status quo ante.

Yes, AQ launched 9/11 while based in Afghanistan. But there was nothing inherent to Afghanistan that made the attack possible. Since 2001, U.S. forces have been attacked by over 81,000 IEDs. These IED networks have been built right under our noses, in countries we occupy.

If the "bad guys" can build a sophisticated enough network to deploy 81,000 IEDs, then what possible reason is there to believe that our presence in Afghanistan would prevent the implementation of a 9/11-level plot which was orders of magnitude simpler than the IED networks that still exist?

In short, if being in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot prevent massive IED networks from existing, then what makes anyone think that being there prevents a couple of dozen guys from prepping and perpetrating attacks like 9/11, Mumbai, London or Madrid?

The counter-terrorism argument for staying in Afghanistan is, in my opinion, by far the weakest of the arguments. Humanitarian obligations and the risk of destabilizing Pakistan (which I consider overstated as well) make a lot more sense -- though I agree with your assessment about the difficulty to removing the risk to Pakistan at all.