Saddam’s supply of yellowcake has been secretly sold to a Canadian energy firm and flown safely to Montreal.

The last major remnant of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program – a huge stockpile of concentrated natural uranium – reached a Canadian port Saturday to complete a secret U.S. operation that included a two-week airlift from Baghdad and a ship voyage crossing two oceans. The removal of 550 metric tons of “yellowcake” – the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment – was a significant step toward closing the books on Saddam’s nuclear legacy. It also brought relief to U.S. and Iraqi authorities who had worried the cache would reach insurgents or smugglers crossing to Iran to aid its nuclear ambitions.

[...]

While yellowcake alone is not considered potent enough for a so-called “dirty bomb” – a conventional explosive that disperses radioactive material – it could stir widespread panic if incorporated in a blast. Yellowcake also can be enriched for use in reactors and, at higher levels, nuclear weapons using sophisticated equipment.

[...]

Tuwaitha and an adjacent research facility were well known for decades as the centerpiece of Saddam’s nuclear efforts. Israeli warplanes bombed a reactor project at the site in 1981. Later, U.N. inspectors documented and safeguarded the yellowcake, which had been stored in aging drums and containers since before the 1991 Gulf War. There was no evidence of any yellowcake dating from after 1991, the official said.

Daniel De Groot notes that “this uranium a) was not weapons grade and b) was well known to the UN and IAEA and was being stored legally by Saddam’s government. It was legally in Iraq according to international law.” Barbara O’Brien adds, “The critical point is that Saddam Hussein couldn’t do anything with this uranium because he lacked the equipment and technology to enrich it. So it had been sitting around for years in drums sealed by the IAEA. No nuclear program.” Here’s an extensive listings of IAEA Key Findings on Iraq’s Nuclear Program, listing extensively the materials we knew about before the invasion.

I’d add that the key line from the AP report is, “There was no evidence of any yellowcake dating from after 1991.” So, while Joe Wilson may have lied about many things, the movement of yellowcake from more than a decade before his infamous fact finding trip isn’t evidence of a new one.

At 11:22, after a lengthy dispute over documents, the prosecution called Cathie Martin, a 1993 Harvard Law graduate who became a senior public affairs official in the Office of the Vice President from 2001 to 2004. She’s now Deputy Communications Director in the White House.

Live blog below the fold.

Government questioning:

Nearly daily contact with Libby during time in OVP.

Practice at OVP was to run all press inquiries through commo shop.

Discussion of distinctions between on-the-record (attribution by name), background (sourced by job description), and deep background (no direct reference can be made, merely provided for reporter’s information) discussions with press.

Libby generally spoke on background and then required specific requests for quotes to be released.

Libby had a practice of not reading his email, so any emails were sent to Jenny Mayfield, his assistant.

Entry into evidence of Nick Kristoff column “but not for the truth of the matter.” (Exhibit 401)

“Can you describe your reaction when you first read the column?” “Is it fair to say that it was viewed by the White House as a negative article?” Yes, but it’s not like “everyone was running around talking about it.”

“How much attention was paid at the time?” “Not that much.”

Was the issue of the Niger trip in the news at all before the May 6 Kristoff piece?” “Not to my knowledge.”

How did you learn Joe Wilson’s name? “From Bill Harlow at the CIA.” “He’s there equivalent of the public affairs or communications director.”

Can you give a precise date? No. Can you approximate? Sometime between the Kristoff piece and Wilson’s MTP appearance on July 6. “I knew his name already” when he appeared on MTP.

“Were you directed to speak to Mr. Harlow by anyone else?” Once by “press aide at National Security Council” and “another occasion” where Libby told her to pursuant to a telephone call with someone from CIA.

First instance was directed by Michael Anton, high press official in NSC. Normally talked to his boss, Anna Perez. Recollection is that “Anna wasn’t around” because she was with president and his team was in Africa.

What was gist of conversation with Mr. Harlow? Press accounts that VP had sent this guy to Africa, OVP knows nothing about, so who sent him? Harlow relayed that Wilson was sent. Also mentioned that Mrs. Wilson had some role in sending.

Later that day, she went to meet Libby and relayed Joe Wilson’s name and mentioned “apparently his wife works at the CIA.” She “doesn’t remember any specific response.”

Second call to Harlow to find out “who was continuing to call on this story.” OVP worried that press continued to tie Wilson’s trip to OVP even though not true. Harlow “a little less friendly and a little more reluctant.” Relayed that Andrea Mitchell and working on stories about this.

What was ordinary practice in OVP to keep track of news stories? Staff did search and cut-and-pasted stories into Word document with highlights and table of contents.

Did people generally cut things out of print papers? Not often.

At some point “on or before July 9,” Cheney ordered to start keeping track of television commentary on the matter. (Collecting transcripts) Libby was present.

Especially paying attention to “Hardball with Chris Matthews” because “he had been talking about it a lot.” MSNBC was typically slow to provide transcripts.

They also had the ability to capture “shadow clips” for viewing on their computers of various news programs.

She was paying especial attention at that time to the “16 words” controversy.

July 7 talking points from Martin to Arie Fleisher:

-VP’s office did not request mission
-VP office not informed of mission
-VP office not briefed upon return
-VP office not even aware of mission until recent press reports

Second, more expansive talking points list handwritten and undated. Basically say same thing. No reference to “the wife.”

A third, typed version complied from the handwritten version. Apparently from July 8, 2003. Still no mention of “the wife.” Has scribble from Scooter Libby saying “Wilson” and some scribble. Martin relayed that it said “Wilson 3 Points.”

Scooter was going to call reporters, at behest of Cheney, to get OVP’s story out. She thinks that might have happened July 8 but it seemed like a question rather than a statement.

Were there conversations about declassifying the NIE? She had urged that it be done but was not present at any meetings where doing it was ordered.

Break for lunch at 12:20 with court to resume at 1:40.

Sidebar discussions with lawyers commenced at 12:22 with jury out of room. Audio not made available to the press.

Trial recommenced at 1:43.

Judge Walton issued a cautionary instruction that by July 8, 2003 certain portions of the NIE had been declassified and neither side disputed that fact.

Were you aware of a conversation on July 8 between Cheney and Judith Miller? No.

Stephen Hadley raised a report by Mitchell suggesting WH was pushing blame toward CIA in a meeting. Libby was in the room.

From that point on, she was “not involved” in any conversations with senior officials about the matter. Her understanding from colleagues was that most were “in the dark” at that point.

Govt Exhibit 541 is a “very rough draft” of “someone’s notes” about a statement drafted for George Tenet to clear up the origins of the Wilson trip. It has handwritten notes from Martin on how to best utilize the information.

Several references to putting VP on MTP and the pros and cons on so doing that:

Pro: VP best on that show
Con: Could get VP into weeds, look desperate, and raises the bar

Another option was to leak or give to Walter Pincus, David Sanger, or a newsmagazine. Basically, to deal head-on with a reporter working on the story.

Another option a Condi or Rummy press conference.

Final option writing or ghost writing an op-ed.

Recounting of trip to christen USS Ronald Reagan involving Libby, Cheney, and others the day TIME’s Matt Cooper called. On return trip, Scooter came to back of plane to see her and coordinate on press responses. She relayed that Glenn Kessler of Post and Matt Cooper had questions.

She had email from Cooper, admitted into evidence. She had handwritten some notes on the email, as had Libby. Libby took the email up to front of plane to talk to Cheney. Returned and said Cheney had ordered him to give an on the record statement, which Libby had written out on a card.

That card admitted into evidence as 528A. She verified the handwriting as Libby’s.

She typed that up for dissemination. Entered as 528B. She verified this.

Parts are On the Record and parts on Deep Background (as Administration Official).

Once they landed back at Andrews, Libby made a call to Cooper in her presence. Not on speaker phone, so she only heard Libby’s side.

Cooper new to WH beat, so had not previously spoken. No discussion about Amb. Wilson’s wife.

Then decided to call Evan Thomas at Newsweek and did so shortly thereafter during van ride home. Left voice mail.

Also returned call to WaPo’s Kessler during van ride. Doesn’t recall content precisely but thinks it had to do with 16 words controversy.

None of the calls was about “the wife.”

Prior to the newspaper article by Novak, had any reporters contacted you about Mrs. Wilson’s working at CIA? No.

Had Libby ever told her that any reporters had asked him about Mrs. Wilson? No.

When Cooper’s article came out Monday, she found it had been shortened considerably and taken out of context. Had discussion with Libby about how to fix this. She also called Cooper and expressed her displeasure that she had put him on the phone with Libby and he’d screwed up the quote. Cooper offered to put the full quote on the Web.

Subsequently, VP held luncheon with conservative columnists at his house, to which she and Libby were invited. This was on the 18th. Bruce Bartlett and Steve Hadley wanted to get word out about how 16 words made it into the SOTU.

Did she ever discuss the criminal investigation with Libby. Yes.

Defense Cross Examination commenced 2:29.

Were you there for whole conversation with Cooper? No, she had gotten a phone call with Jennifer Miller Wise and missed part of it.

You usually listen in on both sides of such conversations? Yes, when we’re at the White House.

Mr. Libby made it clear he wasn’t happy at having to make phone calls because it was his son’s birthday? Yes.

He only made the calls because you were nagging him? Yes. “We needed to decide affirmatively whether to be in the story or not.”

Except for 10 or 20 seconds when you recollect you told Mr. Libby and VP Cheney about Wilson’s trip and his wife’s role, you had no other discussions with either of them about Mrs. Wilson?
“Not that I recall.”

At no time during the talking points discussion, did you mention Mrs. Wilson? No.

You wanted to get the whole story out? Yes.

But you didn’t think the wife was part of that whole story? “I didn’t think it was helpful to us.”

Your understanding was that Vice President Cheney’s intention was to get all the truth out about Wilson’s trip? Yes.

Is it correct that “at no time IN YOUR ENTIRE LIFE” did the VP indicate to you that Mrs. Wilson or her status was part of getting that story out? Correct.

“Do you have any knowledge of Libby EVER discussing with ANY reporter information about Mrs. Wilson and her employment status?” No.

Did the conversations with Andrea Mitchell or deal with Mrs. Wilson? No.

With respect to your conversation with Bill Harlow, there are notes (Govt Exhibit 521A) but they are not dated? That’s correct.

You wrote “married to CIA agent” but Harlow didn’t use that language, right? Correct. He just said she was a CIA employee.

Do you call FBI saying phone records said there was a call between your office and Harlow’s on June 6 or 7? (Defense Exhibit 1640) The log shows three calls:

6/10 5:25 pm lasting 30 seconds

6/10 6:21 pm lasting 4 min 24 sec

6/11 5:27 pm 5 min 18 secs

Would you agree that the calls may have happened on one of those days? Correct.

Do you recollect that Pincus article came out June 12th? Yes.

Do you recollect that your call with Harlow was before that article? I don’t recollect.

Shows her copy of her FBI interview from October 2003 to help refresh her memory.

Do you recollect speaking to Mr. Harlow about the article? She can’t date it. But it “makes sense” that that’s the way it would have happened.

Short recess.

Questioning resumed at 3:12.

Presented with Exhibit 1541, email from Martin to Jennifer Mayfield, dated Wed June 11, 2:37 PM.

Subject: “I need to talk to Scooter this afternoon re: the Pincus stuff and Niger”

Does that help refresh your memory on the Harlow conversation? Not really. “I remember in pictures” and this doesn’t help.

Shows Govt Exhibit 701, phone record from 6/11 of call to Marc Grenier from Scooter Libby.

Still doesn’t refresh her memory.

“Based on all the materials you’ve reviewed” . . . “you would agree 6/11 appears to be the date you talked to Mr. Harlow?” “It appears that way, yes.”

“When you first talked to the FBI in Oct 2003, you hadn’t had the benefit of reviewing all these documents, correct?” Correct.

“I first thought everything happened the week of July 7″ but months later realized it couldn’t have happened that way because recognized Wilson’s name on MTP.

2nd FBI interview January 2004 continued to say you thought you’d told Mr. Libby on July 7? Yes.

During grand jury testimony, you told you realized you must have known Wilson’s name before?

“Would it be fair to say that when you took over from Mary Matalin, you didn’t have a great deal of experience” in that area? Yes.

Inexperienced in handling major crises? Yes.

Around this time, several key figures in press office left in early June 2003? Yes.

“It was not a regular part of Mr. Libby’s job to be dealing with the press, is that correct?” Yes.

Was Eric Edelman, who left in June, the one handling reaction to the May 6, 2003 Kristoff piece? Yes.

Wells read virtually the entire Kristoff column back to her and asked some questions she had no way of answering, boring all concerned to tears. Certainly me.

Is it fair to say that the next time the Wilson allegations were given some degree of prominence was around June 8, 9, or 10 when Mr. Pincus called?

Pincus article of June 12 entered as exhibit.

It was this article that kind of sharpened the focus in the Vice President’s office? Correct. Although I recall Ms. Rice being asked about it a little earlier. Counsel says it was June 8. She says it was really then that attention was focused.

Second Kristoff article, from June 13, admitted. It’s a response to Condi Rice’s response to his column. It was mocking the administration’s response.

Is it fair to say the media wasn’t listening to what you had to say?

Extensive revisiting of the talking points emails and whatnot.

This thing is spinning out of control during a pre-planned trip to Africa, with all the president’s top communications people out of the country? And you had to take on more responsibility than you would have had they been at home? “I believe so.”

On June 9, Chris Matthews has some unkind comments on “Hardball”? No specific recollections, but he was saying a lot of harsh things over a long period.

On July 10 you learn that decision made by senior communications team for DCI Tenet to publish statement on how 16 words came to be in the SOTU. “I learned from Scooter.”

When the communicators were cut out of the loop, did you think Mr. Hadley was blaming you personally for the Andrea Mitchell mess? Yes. Did Cheney tell you not to worry about it? Yes.

Did you work late into the night on the 10th working on the Tenet statement? Yes.

Was this a contentious issue? “It seemed delicate, is how I’d put it.” “We didn’t want to embarrass Mr. Tenet, just get the facts out.”

Introduction of Tenet statement of 11 July 2003 into evidence.

“It was your personal position that the Tenet statement didn’t go far enough?” “I didn’t think it was detailed enough.”

“And Mr. Libby had the same view as you?” Yes.

Introduced 24 January 2003 document saying White House made aware Iraq had large yellowcake supply and acquisition program. This was four days before SOTU.

Neither you nor Mr. Libby were successful in getting this mentioned in Tenet statement? No.

Introduction of Martin’s hand-written notes on draft of Tenet statement made on July 10. She noted that the CIA’s only notation in the NIE that there were any doubts on the yellowcake report was buried in a footnote 50 pages later.

You wanted the January 24 document mentioned in the Tenet statement, right? Yes.

Is it right that Amb. Wilson’s trip took place in Oct 2002, BEFORE the NIE? Yes.

Questioning ended around 4:40. No trial on Fridays, so Martin will resume Monday. I won’t however, as the MBA baton passes to others.

_________________

FDL’s emptywheel breaks her liveblog of this into three pieces: One, Two, Three. They’re quite detailed.

The first full day of trial resumed with the continued cross-examination of Marc Grossman by Scooter Libby’s chief counsel, Ted Wells. Live blog below the fold, with any breaking news getting separate posts as well.

“You have no notes that you had such a meeting?” No.

“No emails?” No.

The emails were destroyed before investigation because the State Dept had a policy of destroying emails after 90 days.

Defense Exhibit 71: The INR report on the Wilson trip generated per Grossman’s inquiry pursuant to Libby’s question. Carl Ford, INR’s director, wrote the memo.

Paragraph one addresses “allegation” that INR had played a role in Wilson’s trip. “It is clear, however, that INR was not Amb Wilsons’ point of contact in either the Dept. or the intelligence community.” Nor was State a direct recipient of the report.nn”The reporting we have from his trip makes no mention of documents, fraudulent or otherwise.”

Another paragraph indicates that “Two CIA WMD analysts seem to be leading the charge on the issue” and that INR and State took strong issue with their dismissal of the Niger issue.

This launches a lengthy line of questioning about yellowcake and the nature of intelligence on Iraqi WMD, presumably with the intent of dispelling the notion that Cheney and company were intentionally distorting said intelligence. I’m quite surprised that the government is not objecting that this inquiry is irrelevant to whether Libby lied to the FBI or the grand jury about disclosing Valerie Plame Wilson’s CIA ties.

After several minutes, however, the prosecution called for a sidebar after which the judge ruled that the document is hearsay from the standpoint of establishing the truth of the assertions contained therein.

Defense Exhibit 428 is a different memo that says essentially the same thing.

“Your first interview with the FBI was on Oct 17, 2003, is that correct?” Yes.

“Is it correct that on June 9, 2003 Mr. Wilson placed a telephone call to you in which he complained that he had seen Condoleeza Rice on MTP on June 8 and he was very upset about her comments?” Yes. “He told you that he was furious?” “Yes sir. He was really mad.” The substance was “He was mad at the way he had been described . . . as a very low level person and he was upset about that, sir.”

You made no mention about this in the June 11 conversation to Libby? “You kept those comments to yourself. You didn’t tell anybody, did you?” “No sir, I did not.”

Elmo is broken, impairing PowerPoint usage. Wells is now scribbling dates on a piece of paper and projecting them on an overhead projector.

Grossman can’t recollect specific dates and the prosecution has stipulated that events occurred on those dates. Judge Walter explains to the jury that they “may consider such facts as undisputed evidence.”

Oct 17, 2003: 1st FBI interview

Feb 24, 2004: 2nd FBI interview

Mar 12, 2004: Grand Jury appearance

“Do you deny that you told the FBI on Oct 17, 2003 that you two or three telephone conversations with Mr. Libby during which you gave him information” about the Wilson matter “and that you did not make any reference to a face-to-face meeting?” Witness does not recall.

Wells refers him to page 2, paragraph 1, of the FBI interview memorandum to “refresh your memory.”

“I don’t know what to tell you.”

“Does it refresh your recollection that you told the FBI a different story than you’ve told the jury today?”

The night before your Oct 17 FBI interview, you had a private meeting with Mr. Armitage? Yes. “You knew he was a subject of that investigation, correct?” “I knew he had been interviewed with the FBI, correct.”

Prosecution Redirect: (Commenced 11:23)

Clarified the nature of his relationship with Armitage. Noted that he had met with defense counsel before trial as part of discovery process.

Why did you have INR come up with a report on “unnamed ambassador” if it was so unimportant? “To answer Mr. Libby’s question.”

Judge opens to written questions from jury. (11:28)

Did State have anything to do with sending Wilson on trip to Niger? No.

Who sent him? CIA as far as I know.

What documents did you review in preparation for your testimony here? The grand jury documents.

Witness excused at 11:30. Court in 10 minute recess.

The government’s first witness will be former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman who, as Matt Apuzzo sums it up, was allegedly asked on May 29, 2003 for information about the Joe Wilson’s travel to Niger.

There was a heated discussion between Peter Fitzgerald and Ted Wells about the scope of questioning, with Wells arguing that everything should be fair game in cross-examination because there is reason to believe that Grossman and Richard Armitage met the night before Grossman’s FBI testimony to “cook the books.” Judge Walter is inclined to agree that such questioning would be appropriate. Fitzgerald argues that conversation is not relevant to the line of questioning. Walter says it speaks to “where his loyalties lie.”

The witness was called at 3:58, which has the media room groaning.

Government questioning:

Grossman is now in the private sector but spent 29 years “as a Foreign Service Officer.” He finished up as the #3 man in the State Department, right below Colin Powell and Richard Armitage.

He interacted with Libby “several times a week” as part of the Deputies Committee (of the National Security Council). Maybe 10-12 people sat at the table and around 20 others sat in chairs around the room.

Government Exhibit #6 is a page from Grossman’s calendar for Thursday May 29, 2003. At 11:30, he attended a Deputies Committee meeting on Iraq at the White House situation room. His “best recollection” is that he talked to Libby either before or after either the 11:15 or 11:30 meeting and that Libby asked “if he knew anything about” a former ambassador’s trip to Africa and yellowcake. He didn’t but was embarrassed that he didn’t but would report back to him.

Upon returning to his office, he immediately asked Mr. Armitage to make sure he didn’t “get myself into any trouble.” Armitage “said he didn’t know anything about it either.” Grossman than sent emails to the Asst Sec for Research and for African Affairs to find out what State knew. Both said “they knew all about it.”

He took this information back to Armitage and asked if it jogged any memories and was answered in the negative. He then went to Libby and told him “yes, people at the State Dept knew about such a trip” and that Wilson had reported back to the government. He promised “a fuller report when I had it.”

He also contacted Wilson by phone to get more info. They were both longtime professional colleagues and members of the same university alumni association. Wilson “told me all about it.” His “recollection” is that he had talked to Wilson before Libby and relayed the info, including that Wilson though the Office of the VP had ordered the trip.

Grossman ultimately got a report on Wilson’s trip on June 10 or 11 from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). That report mentioned that “Valerie Wilson was employed at CIA.” The context for this was that “Mrs. Wilson” chaired WMD panel and organized her husband’s trip. “I though this was pretty interesting. Kind of odd and remarkable that A) she worked at the Agency and B) she was involved in the organization of the trip.” He thought it was “inappropriate” that one spouse would arrange another’s trip.

He discussed this with Libby at the next Deputies Committee (”my recollection”) meeting, June 11 or 12 (there are meetings just about daily). “There’s one other thing you oughta know…his wife worked at the Agency.” Libby “listened to me and he thanked me.” He doesn’t recall the precise words of the conversation on either side. Grossman felt that “because he was senior to me” Libby deserved to “know the whole context.” Libby told him that the Office of the VP had nothing to do with the trip.

Armitage told him that he had told Novak about the Wilson-Wilson connection the night before his FBI testimony. Grossman was “shocked” but “appreciated the professional courtesy.”

Wells’ cross-examination:

You had one conversation with Libby about “the wife” that “lasted maybe 30 seconds”? “Yes, that’s correct.”

“You need the calendar to identify when you met with Mr. Libby?” Yes.

“Except for looking at the calendar and reasoning backward, you don’t have any recollection when the date was?” Yes.

“You have no present recollection” aside from this “reconstruction”? Yes.

Several questions about whether Grossman read a May 6 article by Nicholas Kristoff. He hadn’t and still hasn’t. No interest in “looking in the rearview mirror.”

“Do you find it strange” that neither he not Armitage read such a critical article about the State Dept? “I had about a billion things to do” and “couldn’t be troubled” to find out what happened in the past because he was so occupied by Iraq and other issues. (That’s Libby’s whole defense, of course.)

Grossman thought that the whole Wilson matter was a non-story at the time and the matter of “the wife” only “an interesting tidbit.”

There was no indication at the time that her status was covert or classified, much less conveyed to Libby as such.

Court recessed at 4:55 to resume at 9:30 tomorrow morning.

The government started its opening arguments at 1037 am. Live blog below the fold. As always, major breaking news will get separate posts.

They take us to the day (July 6, 2003) Joseph Wilson’s NYT op-ed came out and argues that it was a devastating attack. He also appeared that day on “Meet the Press,” questioning the WMD argument and “igniting a media firestorm.” A day later, “the White House admitted” some things “should not have been said.” White House then “began to push back.”

This case is about Scooter Libby’s “obstruction of the search for truth” by “repeatedly lying” to both the grand jury and the FBI. Using the word “lie” or variants repeatedly.

Calendar as prop to hammer home time line. Can’t find something startling Thursday that you learned on Tuesday.

Repeated references to Iraq, the State of the Union, the Niger yellowcake controversy, and so forth as “background.”

Vice President learned from Marc Grossman on June 11, 2003 about the Joe Wilson-Valerie Plame relationship. Bob Grenier told Scooter Libby that Plame worked in the unit responsible for sending Wilson on trip to Niger. He also got separate confirmation from Cathie Martin, most likely in June.

Libby also got morning intel brief from Craig Schmall on Saturday June 14, which included a discussion of Wilson, Plame, and the trip to Niger.

Monday June 23rd, Libby complained about unfair CIA leaks with Judith Miller, mentioning that Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA on background, attributable only to “a senior administration official.”

ALL OF THIS OCCURRED BEFORE the Joe Wilson op-ed. This was a direct attack on the integrity of the president and vice president about the most important matter of public policy.

Scooter Libby cut the column out and marked it up. Frustrated by what Wilson was saying. VP’s “right hand man” as both chief of staff and national security advisor.

Libby focused on this controversy “day after day after day.”

Timeline:

6 July: Wilson op-ed and MTP appearance
7 July: Libby tells Ari Fleischer Wilson’s wife works for CIA
8 July: Libby meets with Judith Miller again at St Regis Hotel dining room, defending Iraq intel and asks to be identified as “former Hill staffer” with regard to Joe Wilson wife story.
8 July: Libby talks with David Addington, WH lawyer, and asks vague question about CIA officer sending husband on trip
10 July: Libby calls Tim Russert to complain about Chris Matthews’ unfair treatment on “Hardball,” hoping Russert would intercede
11 July: CIA Director George Tenet
12 July: Makes on-record statement to Matt Cooper and Judith Miller at Cheney’s direction. Cooper asks “what have you heard about Wilson’s wife sending him on a trip?” and Libby answers “I heard that, too.” This was a confirmation of what Cooper had already heard.

“It should be noted, Novak relied on two sources, neither of which was the defendant.”

Late September: Criminal investigation announced about the leaks.

Grand jury had two missions: Find the facts of who leaked Plame’s CIA status to the press and to investigate whether a cover-up had occurred. Defendant swore an oath promising to tell the truth.

Fitzgerald played tape recorded testimony and displayed the court reporter’s transcript from Libby during the grand jury about his conversation with Tim Russert, saying that Russert had ASKED HIM about it. He says he answered “No I don’t know that.”

Fitzgerald interprets this as Libby lying to the grand jury and claiming he learned it from Russert. My take was that Libby was just lying to Russert in order not to be on the record confirming Plame’s status.

After another 10 minute break, Fitzgerald played a tape recording of Libby telling a grand jury that he had heard about Wilson from reporters. Which would appear to be true. He didn’t FIRST hear it there, though.

A third tape has Libby saying that he had told Matt Cooper that he didn’t know Joe Wilson had a wife. Which, again, doesn’t strike me as the same as lying to the grand jury.

Fitzgerald closed by saying that “this case is not about bad memory” and that “having a bad memory is not a crime.” It’s about lying under oath.

Well, it certainly isn’t a slow news day:

The CIA officer whose identity was leaked to reporters sued Vice President Dick Cheney, his former top aide and presidential adviser Karl Rove on Thursday, accusing them and other White House officials of conspiring to destroy her career.

In a lawsuit filed in U.S. District Court, Valerie Plame and her husband, Joseph Wilson, a former U.S. ambassador, accused Cheney, Rove and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby of revealing Plame’s CIA identity in seeking revenge against Wilson for criticizing the Bush administration’s motives in Iraq.

Several news organizations wrote about Plame after syndicated columnist Robert Novak named her in a column on July 14, 2003. Novak’s column appeared eight days after Wilson alleged in an opinion piece in The New York Times that the administration had twisted prewar intelligence on Iraq to justify going to war.

The CIA had sent Wilson to Niger in early 2002 to determine whether there was any truth to reports that Saddam Hussein’s government had tried to buy yellowcake uranium from Niger to make a nuclear weapon. Wilson discounted the reports, but the allegation nevertheless wound up in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address.

It’s hard to imagine that Plame has a case considering that special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald couldn’t even bring charges against any of the individuals named in her suit. But then again, O.J. is walking the streets right now, so who knows.

UPDATE: Believe it or not, JPod is celebrating.

UPDATE: According to Wilsons’ lawyer, “this lawsuit concerns the intentional and malicious exposure by senior officials of the federal government of [Plame].” And, despite the lower burden of proof in a civil case, there still hasn’t been one shred of evidence that indicates an “intentional and malicious” effort by anyone to specifically “out” Plame.

UPDATE: The Complaint is available here (hat tip: Anderson).

UPDATE: Allah’s quoting Glenn Close.

UPDATE: Sister Toldjah: “I guess this story had about run its course in the DC cocktail party circuit? As they say, it ain’t over til it’s over, and Joe ‘restoring honesty’ Wilson doesn’t want it to be over. It’s all about ‘getting Rove’ even though a special prosecutor found no evidence he was involved in any alleged wrongdoing regarding trying to discredit the liar.”

Former Secretary of State Colin Powell has told the BBC’s David Frost that the intelligence community never communicated their doubts about Iraqi WMD to the administration.

White House ‘never told’ of WMD doubts (Herald Sun)

THE US administration was never told of doubts about the secret intelligence used to justify war with Iraq, former secretary of state Colin Powell told the BBC in an interview to be broadcast on Sunday night. Mr Powell, who argued the case for military action against Saddam Hussein in the UN in 2003, told BBC News 24 television he was “deeply disappointed in what the intelligence community had presented to me and to the rest of us.” “What really upset me more than anything else was that there were people in the intelligence community that had doubts about some of this sourcing, but those doubts never surfaced to us,” he said.

The BBC’s account:

Questioned on the evidence held up by the US as proof that Iraq had a weapons of mass destruction programme, he said: “I was deeply disappointed in what the intelligence community had presented to me and to the rest of us, and what really upset me more than anything else was that there were people in the intelligence community that had doubts about some of this sourcing, but those doubts never surfaced up to us.”

On the one hand, the then-DCI, who was at least nominally in charge of the entire intelligence community as well as the CIA Director, infamously called the evidence “a slam dunk.” But we’ve certainly seen numerous contemporaneous memos since then. Could it really be that none of them made it to the top? That strikes me as incredibly unlikely.

Jeff Stein, writing for the San Francisco Chronicle October 2004, wrote:

At the time of the [Plame] leak, administration supporters of the Iraq war were determined to neutralize the CIA’s doubts about the White House case that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons.

[...]

Cheney began visiting CIA headquarters to challenge its analysts over their intelligence on Hussein’s weapons. To Richard Kerr, the former chief of CIA analysis who later studied the agency’s pre-war reporting on Iraq, Cheney displayed no anti-CIA animus at the time. “My experience was to the contrary,” Kerr said by e-mail. “He would not accept all our analysis without skepticism and believed we were better on some subjects than others. But those are the characteristics of a good customer.”

Over at the Pentagon, however, Rumsfeld was reprising Team B by creating his own intelligence shop. The Chalabi organization’s alarmist reports on Hussein’s nuclear weapons, which later proved to be false, bypassed the CIA and went directly to the White House. “That’s why they set up an intelligence unit in [Undersecretary of Defense Douglas] Feith’s office,” said intelligence historian James Bamford. “The whole purpose was to get that kind of information and send it to Cheney.”

In 2002, CIA analysts thought so little of a report that Hussein had obtained uranium yellow cake from Niger to build a bomb that they didn’t even include it in the president’s daily briefing, Bamford said. “The Pentagon got it and flagged it to get Cheney’s attention,” he added, riling the White House further. Then covert CIA officer Plame, a specialist on weapons of mass destruction, helped arrange for her husband, career diplomat Joseph Wilson, to investigate the yellow cake claim in Niger.

Perhaps Stein’s report should be viewed skeptically, since nobody was arguing that Saddam possessed nuclear weapons, merely that he was actively pursuing them?

A CBS story from July 2004 noted that there was indeed substantial evidence that Saddam had WMD and even multiple verification for the infamous “yellowcake” intelligence. It cited then-recent reports by Lord Butler and the Senate Intelligence Committee. But even contemporaneously, we know there were doubts about many of the claims made at the time. That’s not surprising, after all, most intelligence has to be interpreted and is subject to doubt.

Dafna Linzer and Barton Gellman had a front page story in April that’s begins:

As former secretary of state Colin L. Powell worked into the night in a New York hotel room, on the eve of his February 2003 presentation to the U.N. Security Council, CIA officers sent urgent e-mails and cables describing grave doubts about a key charge he was going to make. On the telephone that night, a senior intelligence officer warned then-CIA Director George J. Tenet that he lacked confidence in the principal source of the assertion that Saddam Hussein’s scientists were developing deadly agents in mobile laboratories. “Mr. Tenet replied with words to the effect of ‘yeah, yeah’ and that he was ‘exhausted,’ ” according to testimony quoted yesterday in the report of President Bush’s commission on the intelligence failures leading up to his decision to invade Iraq in March 2003. Tenet told the commission he did not recall that part of the conversation. He relayed no such concerns to Powell, who made the germ- warfare charge a centerpiece of his presentation the next day.

That was one among many examples — cited over 692 pages in the report — of fruitless dissent on the accuracy of claims against Iraq. Up until the days before U.S. troops entered Iraqi territory that March, the intelligence community was inundated with evidence that undermined virtually all charges it had made against Iraq, the report said. [emphasis added]

After several paragraphs describing an “echo chamber” on some other bits of intelligence used in various speeches to make the case for war, we are told:

“These views were expressed to CIA leadership,” the commissioners wrote, including to McLaughlin and his assistant. But they were also watered down as they moved up within the intelligence community, and were never shared with outsiders. “We found no evidence that the doubts were conveyed by CIA leadership to policymakers in general — or Secretary Powell in particular.” [emphasis added]

In his famous 1973 book on the Cuban Missile Crisis, “Essence of Decision,” Graham Allison described the ways in which flawed decisions are made in government. He created three models, all of them based on the nature of bureaucracies and the way they pass information up the ladder. Amazon reviewer Tansu Demir provides a concise and reasonable summary:

The analyst looking to Cuban missile crisis through the lens of “rational actor model” conceives of governmental action as a “choice” made by a unitary and rational nation or national government. In this model, national government is treated as if it is an “individual” identifying problem, producing solution alternatives and picking one of those alternatives up whose result would satisfy the expected utility function of the nation best based on the “purpose” of the nation. The rational actor model analyst generates hypotheses, for example, about why the Soviet Union decided to send nuclear missiles to Cuba: to defend Cuba, rectify the nuclear strategic balance, or provide an advantage in the confrontation over Berlin? The virtue of the model comes from its power of explanation especially in case it is able to expose the “purpose” of the nation/state. So all the puzzling pieces of the relevant issue under question are to be tied into a coherent and satisfactory story.

The rational actor model falls short of fully understanding of the issue under question in that it does not take account of other equally important considerations. Admittedly, the rational actor model neglects the organizational processes and capabilities that structure the issue or problem under question, and, limit or extend the policy alternatives available to “rational” policy actors. In final instant, it is manifest that policy executives have to decide policy alternative from the “menu” that current organizational technologies and capabilities write. In organizational behavior model, the analyst investigates, for example, the standard operating procedures (SOP) of government organizations in order to understand which policy alternatives are available to political actors and which one is chosen and why. So, the organizational behavior paradigm closes the gaps of the rational actor paradigm.

Finally, the governmental politics model conceives of governmental policy under question not as a rational actor choice or organizational output but as a “resultant” of bargaining along regular circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government. In this model, the political actors and their intentions, positions and interests, their relative power, the action channels through which the political actors input and exert their influence, decision rules and similar matters stand to the fore in analysis.

While we always presume that goverment works as a rational actor in major policy decisions, with the president and his key advisors receiving all information available, it is almost certainly the case that some combination of the organizational behavior and governmental politics models were in operation here. There is so much information filtered through an admittedly stovepiped and political bureaucracy that perfect information is not possible.

That Powell gave his speech to the U.N. thinking he was conveying the overwhelming consensus of the intelligence community is quite probable. While many of us have qualms about the job Powell did as Secretary, his integrity has never been in question. Still, it strikes me as highly implausible that the Secretary of State and other National Security Council principals had no inkling that there were dissenting views.

Hat tip: Mark Moore

The big news of the day is Bob Woodward’s claim that he was told by a White House official about Valerie Plame’s CIA status in June 2003, well before the current controversy broke out.

Woodward Was Told of Plame More Than Two Years Ago (WaPo, A1)

Washington Post Assistant Managing Editor Bob Woodward testified under oath Monday in the CIA leak case that a senior administration official told him about CIA operative Valerie Plame and her position at the agency nearly a month before her identity was disclosed. In a more than two-hour deposition, Woodward told Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald that the official casually told him in mid-June 2003 that Plame worked as a CIA analyst on weapons of mass destruction, and that he did not believe the information to be classified or sensitive, according to a statement Woodward released yesterday.

Fitzgerald interviewed Woodward about the previously undisclosed conversation after the official alerted the prosecutor to it on Nov. 3 — one week after Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was indicted in the investigation.

Citing a confidentiality agreement in which the source freed Woodward to testify but would not allow him to discuss their conversations publicly, Woodward and Post editors refused to disclose the official’s name or provide crucial details about the testimony. Woodward did not share the information with Washington Post Executive Editor Leonard Downie Jr. until last month, and the only Post reporter whom Woodward said he remembers telling in the summer of 2003 does not recall the conversation taking place.

Woodward said he also testified that he met with Libby on June 27, 2003, and discussed Iraq policy as part of his research for a book on President Bush’s march to war. He said he does not believe Libby said anything about Plame. He also told Fitzgerald that it is possible he asked Libby about Plame or her husband, former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV. He based that testimony on an 18-page list of questions he planned to ask Libby in an interview that included the phrases “yellowcake” and “Joe Wilson’s wife.” Woodward said in his statement, however, that “I had no recollection” of mentioning the pair to Libby. He also said that his original government source did not mention Plame by name, referring to her only as “Wilson’s wife.”

Woodward’s testimony appears to change key elements in the chronology Fitzgerald laid out in his investigation and announced when indicting Libby three weeks ago. It would make the unnamed official — not Libby — the first government employee to disclose Plame’s CIA employment to a reporter. It would also make Woodward, who has been publicly critical of the investigation, the first reporter known to have learned about Plame from a government source.

As is often the case with Woodward’s claims, though, there is some doubt about their veracity:

Downie said he could not explain why Woodward said he provided a tip about Wilson’s wife to Walter Pincus, a Post reporter writing about the subject, but did not pursue the matter when the CIA leak investigation began. He said Woodward has often worked under ground rules while doing research for his books that prevent him from naming sources or even using the information they provide until much later.

Woodward’s statement said he testified: “I told Walter Pincus, a reporter at The Post, without naming my source, that I understood Wilson’s wife worked at the CIA as a WMD analyst.”

Pincus said he does not recall Woodward telling him that. In an interview, Pincus said he cannot imagine he would have forgotten such a conversation around the same time he was writing about Wilson. “Are you kidding?” Pincus said. “I certainly would have remembered that.”

Steve Clemons believes Woodward has crossed some serious ethical lines:

Woodward’s celebrity-status has seriously blinded him and affected his judgment about quality journalism and his responsibilities to the public. He should never have been making such comments on television about the Plame case if he was, in fact, involved. He should have RECUSED himself in such discussion. Now, his revelations must become central to the Plame story — and they threaten significantly the direction that Fitzgerald takes in the investigation.

Tom Maguire thinks this revelation will make Fitzgerald’s case much harder, insomuch as it seems to establish that Libby was not the first to reveal Plame’s status to a reporter. Wizbang’s Paul agrees, adding, “This has to be an embarrassment for Fitzgerald. It really makes him look like a bumbling Inspector Clouseau.”

Since Libby is technically charged with crimes related to lying under oath, though, it’s not clear why that will matter. Maguire may be right, though, that the jury will consider the surrounding circumstances in making its judgment. Betsy Newmark has an interesting, if somewhat implausible, answer:

So, if Woodward and Pincus both testify to different memories of their conversations, how is that different from Libby and Russert both testifying to different memories of their conversations? If we can believe that the great Bob Woodward is misremembering when he told someone something, isn’t it possible that Tim Russert could misremember something, too? Or that Scooter Libby could? Why is one discrepancy worthy of indictment and the other one chalked up to “confusion about the timing”?

If the only evidence that Fitzgerald has of Libby’s crimes is inconsistency with Tim Russert’s testimony, he should be disbarred. That seems highly unlikely to be the case, however. Indeed, it seems the chief evidence is that Libby’s answers don’t jibe with his own answers over time.

Mark Coffey speculates as to who Woodward’s sources is here: “Just a random thought here: who gave Woodward the most access? Colin Powell’s State Department…second most: Rumsfeld’s team at Defense…”

Meanwhile, I once again find myself in agreement with Kevin Drum:

This is just bizarre. [...] I can’t begin to make sense of this. The only thing that’s clear is that Mr. X must have had some reason to suddenly come clean, and that reason must have had something to do with Fitzgerald’s ongoing investigation. Perhaps Mr. X is a cooperating witness, or perhaps he’s someone who started to feel some heat and decided to come forward because he got scared. Who knows?

Assuming Woodward’s account is accurate–and that’s not an automatic assumption–I can’t quite figure out why it much matters. It seems irrelevant to the Libby case aside from perhaps slightly bolstering the “everyone knew Valerie Plame worked for the CIA” meme.

Ed Morrissey–who’s much more excited about this, calling it “a stunning new development”– seems to think that’s the outcome:

So much for the covert status of Valerie Plame. Even the CIA didn’t think she worked under cover — a rather obvious conclusion, given that she went to work rather openly at the Langley facility. Someone will need to remind me why we’ve spent two years on this investigation, because at the moment it looks like a gigantic waste of time and money.

In an update, he adds:

The other point, which I missed in my first presentation of the story, is that Woodward doesn’t believe that the leak was malicious at all. According to Woodward, the administration didn’t even think Plame was covert at all — which eliminates the mens rea needed for the crime Fitzgerald’s investigation meant to uncover.

We’re in agreement. That’s been my take on the affair from the very early days.

Update (2152): Scooter Libby’s attorney, and apparently the AP, seem to be on the “this helps Scooter” bandwagon.

Woodward Claim on CIA Leak Disputes Charge

Bob Woodward’s version of when and where he learned the identity of a CIA operative contradicts a special prosecutor’s contention that Vice President Dick Cheney’s top aide was the first to make the disclosure to reporters.

Attorneys for the aide, I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, described Wednesday’s statement by the Washington Post’s assistant managing editor as helpful for their defense, although Libby is charged with lying to a grand jury and the FBI, not with disclosing the CIA official’s name. “Hopefully, as information is obtained from reporters like Bob Woodward, the real facts will come out,” lawyer Ted Wells said Wednesday.

[...]

Special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald, in announcing the charges, portrayed Libby as the first high-level government official to reveal Plame’s identity to reporters in summer 2003. Legal experts said Wednesday the disclosure that Woodward had a source — who was not Libby — could be used by Libby’s lawyers to bolster their claim that Plame’s identity was common knowledge among government officials and reporters. “Much was made of the fact that Libby set all of this in motion, that he was the first government official to reveal this,” said former Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., now a defense attorney in Washington. “As a defense attorney, I’d try to make as much of this as I possibly could to call into question the completeness of the investigation and raise concerns about a rush to judgment.” However, he said, “I’m not sure at the end of the day that it hurts the trial of this case.”

Robert W. Ray, a former independent counsel, said the Woodward disclosure won’t help Libby if his defense is that he wasn’t the only official leaking Plame’s identity. “The point was: Did you make false statements and perjure yourself?” Ray said.

In a strictly factual sense, Ray is right. In terms of persuading a jury, though, there’s somethng to Holder’s view. Presumably, jurors will be less inclined to convict someone of lying to a grand jury when they believe the topic at hand is less important.