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	<title>Comments on: Airline Market Shake-Out II</title>
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		<title>By: Ravi</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31397</link>
		<dc:creator>Ravi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Jan 2005 21:07:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31397</guid>
		<description>But you&#039;re looking at only half the cycle. I&#039;ll admit no rational investor wants to start an airline today (though the guys behind Independence Air [November 2003] seem not all that rational). But look a few moves ahead... Suppose a bunch of airlines go out of business. The remaining ones expand service on the profitable routes of the departed airlines, but overall capacity contracts, prices go up and airlines start turning a profit again. What happens next?

Well there&#039;s some bean-counter over at GE Capital who&#039;s thinking about all these planes they have just sitting out in the desert (remember, capacity contracted and Boeing and Airbus haven&#039;t stopped building planes). And he&#039;s thinking that wouldn&#039;t it be nice if these planes were bringing in some money rather than no money. But the existing, profitable airlines don&#039;t want to expand capacity. On the other hand, there&#039;s this upstart guy who thinks that if he just &quot;cherry picks&quot; a few profitable routes and some underserved markets he might be able pull together a small network that turns a profit. And if he could lease a few planes cheaply, his business plan looks that much better. And so the incumbent airlines start cutting prices to compete. And the cycle starts all over again... 

The issue isn&#039;t that no one wants to start an airline today. The issue is that the economic reality implied by high fixed costs, low marginal costs and low barriers to entry means that the next time the airlines start making money someone will want to start an airline (see: JetBlue 1999) or a small airline will want to expand service (see: Southwest in the 90s). It shouldn&#039;t surprise anyone that the airline industry is not stable.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>But you're looking at only half the cycle. I'll admit no rational investor wants to start an airline today (though the guys behind Independence Air [November 2003] seem not all that rational). But look a few moves ahead... Suppose a bunch of airlines go out of business. The remaining ones expand service on the profitable routes of the departed airlines, but overall capacity contracts, prices go up and airlines start turning a profit again. What happens next?</p>
<p>Well there's some bean-counter over at GE Capital who's thinking about all these planes they have just sitting out in the desert (remember, capacity contracted and Boeing and Airbus haven't stopped building planes). And he's thinking that wouldn't it be nice if these planes were bringing in some money rather than no money. But the existing, profitable airlines don't want to expand capacity. On the other hand, there's this upstart guy who thinks that if he just "cherry picks" a few profitable routes and some underserved markets he might be able pull together a small network that turns a profit. And if he could lease a few planes cheaply, his business plan looks that much better. And so the incumbent airlines start cutting prices to compete. And the cycle starts all over again... </p>
<p>The issue isn't that no one wants to start an airline today. The issue is that the economic reality implied by high fixed costs, low marginal costs and low barriers to entry means that the next time the airlines start making money someone will want to start an airline (see: JetBlue 1999) or a small airline will want to expand service (see: Southwest in the 90s). It shouldn't surprise anyone that the airline industry is not stable.</p>
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		<title>By: James Joyner</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31246</link>
		<dc:creator>James Joyner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Jan 2005 14:48:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31246</guid>
		<description>Ravi,

But the market would take care of this problem absent government bailouts.  No rational investor would start up a new airline in today&#039;s environment and many of the current carriers would go out of business.  Those who survive would be in a position to charge what&#039;s necessary.  The problem now is that the carriers try to sell seats at a loss to underprice their competitors, presumably trying to make it up on volume.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ravi,</p>
<p>But the market would take care of this problem absent government bailouts.  No rational investor would start up a new airline in today's environment and many of the current carriers would go out of business.  Those who survive would be in a position to charge what's necessary.  The problem now is that the carriers try to sell seats at a loss to underprice their competitors, presumably trying to make it up on volume.</p>
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		<title>By: Ravi</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31227</link>
		<dc:creator>Ravi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Jan 2005 03:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31227</guid>
		<description>This post, to me, displays a shocking ignorance of economics. The fundamental problem the airlines have is that the marginal cost of flying someone from point A to point B is far, far less than the average cost of flying them (since airlines have large fixed costs like planes, gate leases and the like). If you&#039;re at all familiar with &quot;space available&quot; travel you realize that, at the end of the day, the marginal cost of flying someone on a flight that is not sold out is very close to zero. The extreme disconnect between marginal cost and average cost means that airlines are pushed to price discrimination schemes so that they can simultaneously: (a) maximize the incremental profit (or minimize the incremental loss) of each flight by selling as many seats as possible (b) extract enough average revenue from the seats they sell to cover (or exceed) the average cost of flying the plane. 

The problem is that since airlines compete their price discrimination schemes are unstable. And they have only gotten more so now that Internet travel sites make it easier to compare fares, change routings to avoid high-cost itineraries and the like. So far, the only airline model that has proven it can make money over the long (i.e. decades) run is that of the &quot;flag carrier&quot; where a captive audience of travelers (in the home market) make an airline&#039;s price discrimination schemes more stable (and even plenty of flag carriers run into trouble - see Air Canada and Swissair, for example). I&#039;m not saying airline deregulation hasn&#039;t been wonderful for the US air travel consumer, but I am saying that without additional pricing power (which seems hard to achieve given all of the planes out there) no one should expect US airlines to make money in the aggregate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This post, to me, displays a shocking ignorance of economics. The fundamental problem the airlines have is that the marginal cost of flying someone from point A to point B is far, far less than the average cost of flying them (since airlines have large fixed costs like planes, gate leases and the like). If you're at all familiar with "space available" travel you realize that, at the end of the day, the marginal cost of flying someone on a flight that is not sold out is very close to zero. The extreme disconnect between marginal cost and average cost means that airlines are pushed to price discrimination schemes so that they can simultaneously: (a) maximize the incremental profit (or minimize the incremental loss) of each flight by selling as many seats as possible (b) extract enough average revenue from the seats they sell to cover (or exceed) the average cost of flying the plane. </p>
<p>The problem is that since airlines compete their price discrimination schemes are unstable. And they have only gotten more so now that Internet travel sites make it easier to compare fares, change routings to avoid high-cost itineraries and the like. So far, the only airline model that has proven it can make money over the long (i.e. decades) run is that of the "flag carrier" where a captive audience of travelers (in the home market) make an airline's price discrimination schemes more stable (and even plenty of flag carriers run into trouble - see Air Canada and Swissair, for example). I'm not saying airline deregulation hasn't been wonderful for the US air travel consumer, but I am saying that without additional pricing power (which seems hard to achieve given all of the planes out there) no one should expect US airlines to make money in the aggregate.</p>
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		<title>By: DC Loser</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31214</link>
		<dc:creator>DC Loser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2005 23:18:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31214</guid>
		<description>http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/05/10/daily38.html

Southwest fuel strategy paying dividends

&quot;Kelly told conference attendees that Southwest has tapped into the futures market to save hundreds of millions of dollars in fuel costs.&quot;

Not exactly chump change.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/05/10/daily38.html" rel="nofollow">http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2004/05/10/daily38.html</a></p>
<p>Southwest fuel strategy paying dividends</p>
<p>"Kelly told conference attendees that Southwest has tapped into the futures market to save hundreds of millions of dollars in fuel costs."</p>
<p>Not exactly chump change.</p>
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		<title>By: DC Loser</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31212</link>
		<dc:creator>DC Loser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2005 23:13:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31212</guid>
		<description>Yes, fuel is the ONLY variable, but what flexibility does the airlines have to unilaterally raise prices to cover fuel costs?  Southwest was sitting on tons of cash and therefore was able to buy into fuel at lower prices on the futures market to lock in the lower rate.  The big airlines couldn&#039;t do that since they pissed away their cash after 9/11, so they had to pay for the gas at market prices.  So Southwest had a huge competitive advantage and the big airlines just couldn&#039;t afford to raise fares.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, fuel is the ONLY variable, but what flexibility does the airlines have to unilaterally raise prices to cover fuel costs?  Southwest was sitting on tons of cash and therefore was able to buy into fuel at lower prices on the futures market to lock in the lower rate.  The big airlines couldn't do that since they pissed away their cash after 9/11, so they had to pay for the gas at market prices.  So Southwest had a huge competitive advantage and the big airlines just couldn't afford to raise fares.</p>
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		<title>By: James Joyner</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31178</link>
		<dc:creator>James Joyner</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2005 17:23:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31178</guid>
		<description>I suppose one could headquarter the airlines only in Right to Work states.  That probably wouldn&#039;t help much with baggage handlers and whatnot who work at local airports, though.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I suppose one could headquarter the airlines only in Right to Work states.  That probably wouldn't help much with baggage handlers and whatnot who work at local airports, though.</p>
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		<title>By: M. Murcek</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31171</link>
		<dc:creator>M. Murcek</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2005 16:57:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31171</guid>
		<description>A lot of the mismanagement was a simple case of knuckling under to every union demand every time, no matter how uncompetitive or absurd.  Knowing that your customers are going straight to your competitor for a service they need RIGHT NOW if your people go on strike makes prudent management of personnel costs very difficult.

And no, I don&#039;t know what the answer to that is...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A lot of the mismanagement was a simple case of knuckling under to every union demand every time, no matter how uncompetitive or absurd.  Knowing that your customers are going straight to your competitor for a service they need RIGHT NOW if your people go on strike makes prudent management of personnel costs very difficult.</p>
<p>And no, I don't know what the answer to that is...</p>
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		<title>By: mariage</title>
		<link>http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/the_airline_market_shake-out_ii/comment-page-1/#comment-31158</link>
		<dc:creator>mariage</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Jan 2005 16:05:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">/?p=8696#comment-31158</guid>
		<description>&quot;Delta&#039;s top fares are $499 one way for economy seats and $599 one way in first class. It cut the number of fares available on a flight to six from as many as 20. The variety of fares, based on demand and the timing of purchase, results in wide disparities in prices paid by customers sitting next to each other on a flight.&quot;

Very interesting !!!!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>"Delta's top fares are $499 one way for economy seats and $599 one way in first class. It cut the number of fares available on a flight to six from as many as 20. The variety of fares, based on demand and the timing of purchase, results in wide disparities in prices paid by customers sitting next to each other on a flight."</p>
<p>Very interesting !!!!</p>
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