Dan Drezner and Megan McArdle are among those recommending Saturday Night Live’s opening sketch parodying a joint press conference with President Obama and Chinese President Hu.

Drezner quips that the sketch manages to convey the nature of the relationship much more succinctly than his own 40-page academic treatise.

Note that, although it appears that President Hu has the power because he is repeatedly berating Obama, the content of the skit suggests otherwise.  Hu’s repeated complaints that the United States is, er, “doing sex” to him demonstrates the very limited leverage China has over U.S. policy.

While $800 billion is indeed a lot of money, it’s not as large a chunk of U.S. public debt as widely imagined.  But it’s enough to virtually assure that China will keep lending us more money.

As an aside, I’m bemused that SNL has managed to get away with having a white guy playing Obama for this long, much less having a white guy playing Hu and a white woman affecting the broken English of a Chinese translator.

UPDATE:  Adam Serwer points me to this Jezebel post to let me know that “getting away is relative.”

As widely expected, the DPRK fired some missiles on the 4th of July. Apparently, however, they were not aimed at Hawaii.

North Korea fired seven ballistic missiles off its eastern coast Saturday, South Korea said, a violation of U.N. resolutions and an apparent message of defiance to the United States on its Independence Day.

The launches, which came two days after North Korea fired what were believed to be four short-range cruise missiles, will likely further escalate tensions in the region as the U.S. tries to muster support for tough enforcement of the latest U.N. Security Council resolution imposed on the communist regime for its May nuclear test.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said three missiles were fired early Saturday, a fourth around noon and three more in the afternoon. The Defense Ministry said that the missiles were ballistic and are believed to have flown more than 250 miles (400 kilometers). “Our military is fully ready to counter any North Korean threats and provocations based on strong South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a statement.

Maybe Kim heard that Americans like to shoot off illegal fireworks in celebration of our independence and wanted to join the party? It wouldn’t be any nuttier than anything else he’s done lately.

In an op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor Ted Galen Carpenter proposes a solution to our problems in dealing with North Korea that not only shocks me but puzzles me as well:

There is a final option that deserves consideration. It would amount to inducing (bribing) China to remove Kim Jong Il’s regime and install a more pragmatic government in Pyongyang, along with the explicit condition of keeping the country nonnuclear. Part of the bargain also ought to be a commitment from Beijing to promote the reunification of the two Koreas within the next generation. During my visit to China last year, policymakers there professed loyalty to Beijing’s longtime ally, but there was also a distinct undertone of exasperation with Pyongyang.

If the price were right, Chinese leaders might be bold enough to topple Kim with a palace coup. But the price would certainly not be cheap. At the least, Beijing would want a commitment from the US to end its military presence on the Korean Peninsula and, probably, to phase out its security alliance with South Korea. In all likelihood, Chinese leaders also would want US concessions on the Taiwan issue.

Final option, indeed. This approach is shocking because it would jettison the policies we’ve followed in the region for the last 50 years. But pursuing such a course would be puzzling as well. It’s an effective statement that North Korea’s nuclear program is sufficiently threatening that we’re willing to encourage whatever ambitions China has in regards to Asian hegemony and the consequences of a China-installed regime in North Korea for the South and, possibly, for Japan in exchange for the termination of that program.

Is North Korea’s program really that threatening? If so, we could prevent any North Korean nuclear proliferation by blockade. If we can’t trust the Chinese to prevent North Korean nuclear proliferation through Chinese territory, why can we trust them to install a regime that’s even minimally acceptable? Or, indeed, a regime that would abandon North Korea’s nuclear weapons program?

I think we shouldn’t underestimate the dangers posed by a North Korean nuclear weapons program but let’s not overestimate them, either. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is of little direct danger to the United States now and won’t be for the foreseeable future. As Galen acknowledges in his op-ed, the real danger is North Korea’s propensity to proliferate. And we can prevent that without abandoning all of Asia to China’s tender mercies.

A North Korea that doesn’t sell its nuclear weapons to any and all comers is in China’s interests as much as ours. We aren’t the only country with enemies and I see no reason to offer China extraordinarily generous encouragements to do what’s in their interests anyway.

Over the next three days, a high level delegation of U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani officials will meet to “seriously deal with the hard issues: how do the Afghans want to deal with [the insurgent activity on] their border, how to do this better, how to undermine those insurgents that run across their territory,” Laura Rozen reports for The Cable.

As I explain in my New Atlanticist piece, “Trust Deficit Undermines U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan Cooperation,” though, it’s a wee bit more complicated than updating tactics.  The bottom line is that the three countries don’t much trust one another.  And for good reason.

There’s an interesting quote and observation in the New York Times article about the failure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional organization consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to support Russia’s action in the Caucasus:

Although the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan fall within what Moscow considers its sphere of influence, and all seem to accept Russian hegemony to a certain degree, they nevertheless strive to limit Moscow’s reach and preserve their own independence of action.

“It would have been very important to have gotten direct support from these states, which very closely work and depend on Russia, but Moscow didn’t get any support aside from general statements,” said Nikolay Petrov, an expert in Russian politics with the Carnegie Moscow Center. He added that the Central Asian states’ refusal to overtly back Moscow was an indication of the “limits of Russia’s influence.”

In the tug of war between Russia’s desire to secure international backing and China’s fear of encouraging any separatist movements, the Chinese position apparently won out. Beijing is concerned not only about Xinjiang but also about an independence movement in Taiwan, which it claims as a renegade province, and the claims for greater autonomy in Tibet.

Russia’s influence in the region had been thought to be increasing but the cost of its invasion of the Caucasus may not only have been to reveal that its influence is limited but actually to curtail it. The message here would seem to be that Russia’s influence there is based mostly on the force of its arms. When comparing Russia’s economic might to China’s, China is clearly the strong horse.

The New York Times is reporting that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will be resigning within the next few days.

Faced with desertions by his political supporters and the unsettling neutrality of the Pakistani military, President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan is expected to resign in the next few days rather than face impeachment, Pakistani politicians and Western diplomats said Thursday.

His departure from office seems likely to unleash new instability in the country as the two main parties in the civilian government jockey for his share of power. It would also remove from the political stage the man who has served as the Bush administration’s main ally here for the last eight years.

The details of how Mr. Musharraf would exit, and whether he would be able to stay in Pakistan or would seek residency abroad, are now under discussion between representatives of Mr. Musharraf and the governing coalition, the politicians said.

Mr. Musharraf would probably leave in the “next 72 hours,” Sheik Mansoor Ahmed, a senior official of the Pakistan Peoples Party, the major party in the coalition, said Thursday.

Interesting, if this actually happens. What I’m most intrigued to see is who will succeed Musharraf. It’s pretty tough to speculate how this will affect the region until we know that.

(link via Dylan Matthews)

Regarding the situation in Georgia, Megan McArdle writes:

Another way to look at the question is: are we going to allow Russia to reassemble the old Russian empire? At its heart, that’s what this is about. Maybe we should; maybe it’s none of our business who Russia decides to invade, or what puppet governments they decide to prop up, so long as they don’t share a border with Germany.

I don’t mean that sarcastically–I can make all sorts of arguments in favor of this attitude. On the other hand, it has obvious, dramatic costs, including the fact that Russia’s imperial ambitions are unlikely to stop at the Georgian border. Also, as far as I know, Georgia controls the only major pipeline to Europe not owned by Russia or Iran–Russian control of Georgia would dramatically increase its negotiating power with the entire European Union.

There’s an old saying that I recall from my childhood: “You and what army?” The simple fact of the matter is that short of displaying a willingness to use nuclear weapons, Russia simply lacks the manpower and resources to expand its borders by force. Note that even right now, they are not invading Georgia proper–just the provinces in dispute. With a declining population, increasingly antiquated equipment, and a shaky economy outside of the energy sector, that’s about all they can do.

It’s also worth pointing out that, short of displaying a willingness to use nuclear weapons or engage in large-scale bombing of civilian populations, there’s not much that the United States could do right now to intervene in the situation in Georgia to any significant extent. Our manpower and resources are busy in Iraq and Afghanistan right now.

Via the BBC: China rights ‘worsen with Games’

This story is a few days old now, but Noah Shachtman’s post is the first I’ve seen it:

Chinese elite anti-terror police officers are wheeling into action ahead of next month’s Beijing Olympics on two-wheeled scooters.  Members of the country’s armed police unit practised on the Segway models that have been re-named ‘Anti-Terror Assault Vehicles’ in the eastern province of Shandong.

Officials have bought 100 Segways and painted some in military camouflage to patrol airports and sporting venues during the Games.

In one drill, police posing as terrorists held ten badminton audience members hostage, ’shooting dead’ four ‘hijackers’, capturing two and defusing a mock car bomb.

A picture is, they say, worth a thousand words.  Perhaps more in this case:

Noah quotes someone named RYP,  “Ya gotta love a country that turns a Segway into a tool of oppressing the masses.”  That’s a great line although, in this case at least, it appears that they’re actually providing necessary security services.   Even police states have a legitimate requirement for police, after all.

President Bush reiterated his intention to attend the opening ceremonies in Beijing and stated that doing otherwise would be an “affront” to the Chinese people.

President Bush said Sunday he does not feel the need to boycott the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics to state his opposition to China’s human rights record. Skipping the event would be an “affront” to the Chinese people, he said.

Bush spoke at a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who announced that he also plans to attend the ceremonies. Other world leaders have decided not to go as a rebuke to China’s violent crackdown on anti-government protests in Tibet.

I don’t feel strongly either way about this issue. My preference would have been not to award China the Olympics, given not only their abysmal human rights record but also the ridiculous level of pollution in Beijing which puts the health of the athletes in danger. Boycotting the opening ceremonies would embarrass the Chinese government and send a message, I suppose, although it would likely just increase their intransigence and make them less cooperative.

What strikes me as interesting in all this is that Bush has rather clearly, in his second term, become much more cognizant that symbolic gestures and rhetoric have an impact beyond the domestic audience. A boycott would likely play well at home, since both the Left and the Right are united in their distaste for the PRC government, albeit for different reasons. But China is the key player in Asia and their cooperation is essential in addressing many issues of strategic concern to the United States in that region. Thinking through the consequences of thumbing our noses at them, therefore, is important.

John Bolton, President Bush’s former UN ambassador, is not at all pleased with last week’s deal with North Korea on the nuclear stalemate.

With much fanfare and choreography, but little substance, the administration has accepted a North Korean “declaration” about its nuclear program that is narrowly limited, incomplete and almost certainly dishonest in material respects. In exchange, President Bush personally declared that North Korea is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism or an enemy of the United States. In a final flourish, North Korea has undertaken a reverse Potemkin Village act, destroying the antiquated cooling tower of the antiquated Yongbyon reactor. In the waning days of American presidencies, this theater is the stuff of legacy.

North Korea has consecutively broken every major agreement with the U.S. since the North’s creation. The Bush administration provides no reason why this one will not be added to that long list except the audacity of hope. Where have we heard that recently? Barack Obama and John Kerry both announced support for the deal, and Mr. Obama said he intended to apply Bush’s policy to other rogue states, thus confirming the early start of the Obama administration.

I have a sneaking suspicion that Bolton will suddenly become a legitimate authority on international diplomacy among his former enemies on the Left while his cheering section among Bush Republicans will quiet considerably.  (See-Dubya, blogging at Michelle Malkin’s place, meanwhile, still adores him.)

While I have no reason to think Kim Jong Il is more trustworthy now than he was two weeks ago, I’m befuddled by the reaction of Bolton and others who dismiss this agreement altogether.  (As to Bolton specifically, Steve Clemons notes that there has been quite a bit of bad blood between him and Ambassador Christopher Hill, who negotiated this deal.  I’m willing to give Bolton the benefit of the doubt, though, and chalk it up to his rather obstreperous view of international diplomacy.) In exchange for some progress in stopping the DPRK from proliferating nuclear weapons technology, most notably getting China on board as a key player, we’ve taken them off of one of our many lists of naughty states.  If they cross us, we can put them back on just as easily.

What’s the harm?  Yes, twenty-one years ago, when Kim’s dad was running the place, they blew up Korean Airlines Flight 858.  That’s, to say the least, old news.  Meanwhile, Pakistan is letting al Qaeda run amok and Saudi Arabia is financing them.   We call them our “allies” in the war on terrorism.  Somehow, I think we can live with the consequences of taking North Korea off the list.  (Technically, as Michael Kraft details at great length, it won’t happen for 45 days, during which time Congress has the right to intervene.

Seen on a beat up Hyundai Sonata driving in to DC this morning: A bumper sticker reading, “Let My People Go! Free North Korean Refugees in China Before the Beijing Olympics.”

That’s rather wordy for a bumper sticker, frankly.

The Washington Post reports that American-style beautification obsessions are starting to make their way into India. Like this:

He’s the rugged type, with sculpted arm muscles. He rides a motorcycle and wears a trendy tank top, wraparound sunglasses and slicked-back hair. There’s only one problem: His skin color is a few shades too dark. His fair-skinned love interest won’t even accept his offer of a rose.

But in this popular Indian television ad, the protagonist is able to buy a magic cream that will change his status in life, turning his brown skin several shades lighter and causing his beloved to swoon.

The new product is called Fair and Handsome, and it’s among the male skin-lightening creams that are exploding in popularity in small towns and cities across India. While such products are nothing new among Indian women, for whom fair skin has long been a symbol of affluence and status, sales of the product for men are growing at nearly 150 percent annually in emerging markets, according to a recent study by Ernst & Young.

“It’s all lower-middle-class men who want the product now,” said Ajay Gupta, 52, a pharmacist, who said the creams often sell out. “What it really means is that the young and up-and-coming Indian male wants to look fair and therefore rich. He wants to be smart and good. The cream is now part of many men’s grooming routine and very popular at barbershops.”

It’s nice to know that bizarre beauty products are not the sole province of American marketing.

(link via Human Nature)

GWU political scientist John Sides is the latest individual to dispute the thesis that Ron Paul is a revolutionary figure in American politics. My working guess (given the givens about social scientists generally, but not knowing him personally) is that Sides is less sympathetic to Paul’s agenda than a libertarian (on the big L/little l boundary) like me, but all of his points about Paul’s prospects are in line with my thoughts; in brief:

1) He is introducing few new ideas that are gaining any traction, which I will define as “earning the support of a substantial fraction of the American public.” His opposition to the Iraq War and immigration already tap into healthy veins of American public opinion and indeed the views of many Democrats (re: Iraq) and Republicans (re: immigration). So it is unclear that he is having any independent impact. His opposition to federal government programs is in line with Americans’ skepticism of government, but this general skepticism tends to give way to broad support for many specific programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, and most forms of gun control. The American public is not consistently libertarian and Ron Paul’s doctrinaire species of libertarianism is unlikely to win favor. …

2) His ideas and electoral support are not causing the other Republican candidates to change their strategy. Independent candidates and third parties can sometimes force the two major parties to tack in their ideological direction. If so, even if they lose, as they almost always do in American politics, they can still have an effect. Paul is if anything, having the opposite effect. His opposition to the Iraq War and the Patriot Act only encourages his fellow Republican candidates to defend Iraq and the War on Terrorism by beating up on Paul. If Paul runs as an independent, this could change, but I suspect that either party’s nominee can respond effectively with cheap talk — i.e., they will minimize defections to Paul with rhetoric rather than with any substantive shift in their goals or issue positions.

3) Most importantly, he is not building any infrastructure that would ensure his impact can survive the 2008 campaign. By infrastructure, I mean a formal organization, and one that is committed to something other than Paul himself. Indeed, he is doing the opposite. His campaign is driven by grassroots supporters, who, taking advantage of the Internet’s ability to lower transaction costs, raise money and organize events. Such a “bottom-up” campaign is a noteworthy departure from traditional campaigns, but different does not mean better in this case. What will remain when his campaign folds? Little, it would appear, unless he is planning a new political organization or party. Will his supporters constitute a political force? If he is not going to lead an organization of some kind, then likely they will not, especially those of his supporters who are otherwise politically alienated or inactive.

I think the third point in opposition to Paul is the most salient to many libertarian-leaning voters. We’ve consistently seen libertarian presidential candidates run for office without leaving behind any infrastructure for the future success of the movement; arguably the only libertarian figure of any stripe to have a meaningful impact on national politics in modern history is Barry Goldwater, and the support infrastructure he and his supporters built was hijacked by the statist-conservative Richard Nixon in the late 60s and the Christian Right in the 70s after Nixon’s fall from grace. Paul has shown none of the wherewithal in his past Libertarian Party presidential run or during his two decades of congressional service, other than building a reputation as “Dr. No” and having his snout at the trough for his district like all 534 of his other colleagues.

On another (related) Ron Paul note, I think those conservatives who took Paul’s comments on Meet the Press about the possibility of Iran invading Israel as coming from ignorance about Iranian military capabilities miss the point; it’s not that Paul doesn’t think Iran is a threat to Israel, it’s that Paul doesn’t care whether or not Iran is a threat to Israel. If nothing else, his isolationism is consistent. Oh, and he’s at best a neoconfederate sympathizer too. What’s not to love?

I’ve written a review of The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of Al Qaeda, a riveting retelling of the events of November, 1979, when a group of around 500 Islamic extremists (including at least two American Black Muslims) seized the Grand Mosque at Mecca. The author concludes that this action, taken along with other events of that momentous month, led to the Islamic extremism we’re experiencing today. He notes how the Saudi Ulema, in return for their continued support of the state, extorted a high price: the rolling back of many of the modest reforms and modernizations the government had achieved.

I think the book misses the target on some analysis, particularly in drawing conclusions from contested ‘facts’, and he simply gets some of the history wrong. But the book is very much on target when it comes to the siege in Mecca and the way it was resolved. It also goes into the role of French commandos, the utter failure of Jimmy Carter’s White House, and the way rumor could spread internationally, even in pre-Internet days. Definitely worth reading.

You can read my full review here.