May 11, 2004Tuguba Testimony - Full TextFor commentary and analysis, see this post.
Speakers: Senators John W. Warner (R-VA), John Mccain (R-AZ), James M.
Inhofe (R-OK), Pat Roberts (R-KS), Wayne Allard (R-CO), Jeff Sessions (R-AL),
Susan M. Collins (R-ME), John Ensign (R-NV), Jim Talent (R-MO), Saxby
Chambliss (R-GA), Lindsey O. Graham (R-SC), Elizabeth Dole (R-NC), John
Cornyn (R-TX), Carl Levin (D-MI), Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), Robert C. Byrd
(D-WV), Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT), Jack Reed (D-RI), Daniel K. Akaka (D-HI),
Bill Nelson (D-FL), Ben Nelson (D-NE), Mark Dayton (D-MN), Evan Bayh (D-IN),
Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) and Mark Pryor (D-AR). Witnesses: Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba; Stephen A. Cambone, under
secretary of defense for intelligence; Lt. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy commander
of Central Command; Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, Army deputy chief of staff
for intelligence; Maj. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess Jr., director for intelligence
for the Joint Staff and Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, Army judge advocate
general. SEN. WARNER: Before turning to the matters at hand, and a quorum being
present, I ask the committee consider five civilian nominations. Tina Jonas to be undersecretary of Defense comptroller; Donald Obalise to
be undersecretary of the Navy; Jerald Paul to be principal deputy
administrator of the Nuclear Security Administration; Mr. Chatfield to be
director of the Selective Service; Mr. Balkoff (sp) to be a member of the
National Security Education Board. All of these nominations have been before
the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably
report the nominations? SEN.: So moved. SEN. WARNER: So moved. Second? SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ): Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object and
will not object, except to say that I will hold these nominations until we
get the requested information that has been outstanding for a long period of
time now concerning communications on the Boeing issue. And I won't waste the
time of the committee much longer, but we're approaching a time where I will
be asking a vote of the committee to see whether we subpoena these documents
or not. SEN. WARNER: Senator, you have been straightforward in that. I've done my
best to date and will continue to help you gain that material, but you have
kept the chairman and the ranking member informed continuously of your views.
SEN. MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: The issue of the nominations before the committee -- all in
favor, say "aye." (A chorus of "ayes" is heard.) Opposed? (No audible response.) Ayes have it. Nominations are now proceeding to the floor. The committee meets today for the second of a series of hearings regarding
the mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by some elements and certain personnel --
few in number, I hope -- of the armed forces in violation of United States
and international laws. Testifying before us today is Major General Antonio M. Taguba, U.S. Army
deputy commander for Support Coalition Forces Land Component Command. On January 31st, 2004, General Taguba was appointed by General Sanchez,
commander, Combined Task Force-7, to conduct a procedure -- 15 investigations
into allegations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison. General Taguba's
report was received by this committee on Tuesday, May 4th, and its related
annexes were received yesterday, May 10th. As members know, they are in the possession of the committee, and members
and staff worked on those reports until very late last night. Joining General Taguba are Lieutenant General Lance L. Smith, United
States Air Force, deputy commander of Central Command; and Dr. Stephen A.
Cambone, undersecretary of Defense for intelligence. We welcome our witnesses. And, General Taguba, I wish to personally say I
commend you for your public service. GEN. TAGUBA: Sir. SEN. WARNER: Following the testimony of these witnesses we'll receive
testimony from a second panel of witnesses this afternoon, commencing at
2:30. As I stated last week, this mistreatment of prisoners represents an
appalling and totally unacceptable breach of military regulations and
conduct. The damage done to the reputation and credibility of our nation and
the armed forces has the potential to undermine substantial gains and the
sacrifices by our forces and their families, and those of our allies fighting
with us in the cause of freedom. This degree of breakdown in military leadership and discipline represents
an extremely rare chapter in the otherwise proud history of our armed forces.
It defies common sense and contradicts all the values for which America
stands. There must be a full accounting for the cruel and disgraceful abuse
of Iraqi detainees consistent with our law and protections of the Uniform
Military Code of Justice. I'm proud of the manner in which the armed forces have quickly reacted to
these allegations, undertaken an appropriate investigation, and begun
disciplinary actions. We're a nation of laws, and we confront abuses of our
laws openly and directly. We have had an apparent breakdown of discipline and leadership at this
prison and possibly at other locations. I think it important to confront
these problems swiftly, ensuring that justice is done, and take the
corrective actions so that such abuses never happen again. At the same time, it is important to remember that our commanders and
their troops in Iraq are confronted with a very difficult, dangerous, complex
military situation. Defeating insurgents and terrorists who seek to deny
freedom and democracy to all Iraqis and who threaten our troops is the
highest priority, and our troops are working very hard, courageously, and
sacrifices to achieve that mission. Intelligence obtained in the course of
any military action obtained in accordance with proper laws and professional
procedures is an essential element of any military campaign. I was heartened by President Bush's words of support for our men and women
in the armed forces, as he stated yesterday in visiting the Department of
Defense. And I quote our president: "All Americans know the goodness and
the character of the United States armed forces. No military in the history
of the world has fought so hard and so often for the freedom of others. "Today our soldiers, our sailors, airmen and Marines are keeping
terrorists across the world on the run. They're helping the people of Afghanistan
and Iraq build democratic societies. They're defending America with unselfish
courage. And these achievements have brought pride and credit to this nation.
I want our men and women in uniform to know that America is proud of you and
that I'm honored to be your commander in chief." Speaking for myself, I feel our president, our secretary of Defense, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the other officers of our military have very
correctly and properly addressed the (seriousness of these ?) issues, and I
commend them. We must not forget our overall purpose in Iraq. Success there is
absolutely essential. Our men and women in uniform make a remarkable
institution in this great America. And from time to time it must heal itself,
consistent with law and tradition, and that we are doing in this particular
case. We have a responsibility here in the Congress to help them do that, and
that is precisely the purpose of these hearings. Senator Levin. SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing continues the committee's examination of the events at Abu
Ghraib detention facility and the effort to learn what led to the abuses of
Iraqi prisoners, so graphically depicted in the photographs that have shocked
and disgusted the civilized world, and who may have authorized, encouraged or
suggested those despicable actions. Getting to the truth of what happened and who is responsible is important
for our military men and women, for the American people, for the success of
our mission in Iraq and for a watching world. General Taguba, while your report paints a disturbing picture of horrible
abuses and leadership failures at Abu Ghraib, your report reflects an honest
and detailed assessment of the situation there and includes sensible
recommendations on how to begin fixing those problems. I thank you for your
professionalism in carrying out this service to our nation. The hearing we held last week barely scratched the surface of the issues
that this committee must examine. It yielded little in the form of detailed
information as to how these abuses could possibly have occurred and who was
responsible for them, including those within and without the chain of command
whose policy decisions created an environment in which the abuses could
occur. The despicable actions described in General Taguba's report not only reek
of abuse, they reek of an organized effort and methodical preparation for
interrogation. The collars used on prisoners, the dogs and the cameras did
not suddenly appear out of thin air. These acts of abuse were not the
spontaneous actions of lower-ranking enlisted personnel who lacked the proper
supervision. These attempts to extract information from prisoners by abusive
and degrading methods were clearly planned and suggested by others. Today we begin what must be a determined pursuit of the answers to the
questions: Who organized the effort? Who oversaw it? Under what directives
and policies were these actions implemented? All of those up and down the
chain of command who bear any responsibility must be held accountable for the
brutality and humiliation they inflicted on the prisoners, and for the damage
and dishonor that they brought to our nation and to the United States armed
forces, which is otherwise filled with honorable men and women acting with
courage and professionalism to bring stability and security and
reconstruction to Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: I'll ask the witnesses to rise. Raise your right hand. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony that you are about to give before the
Committee of the Armed Services of the United States Senate will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? WITNESSES: I do. SEN. WARNER: In accordance with the time-honored traditions of our
country, the civilian control over the military, we recognize Secretary
Cambone, who's speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense. Mr.
Secretary. MR. CAMBONE: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Members of the committee, we're here
today to continue the discussion on the terrible activities at Abu Ghraib,
begun last Friday by the secretary of Defense, the chairman and other members
of the panel. Before going further, let me say that we are dismayed by what took place.
The Iraqi detainees are human beings. They were in U.S. custody. We had an obligation to treat them right. We didn't do that. That was
wrong, and I associate myself without reservation to the sentiments expressed
by the secretary. To those Iraqis who were mistreated by members of the U.S. armed forces, I
offer my deepest apology. It was un-American and it was inconsistent with the
values of our nation. Now, a number of issues arose related to those events during the hearing
last Friday, which, as Senator Levin has noted, were not fully engaged. And I
wanted to tick off a short list that we have been developing since then as
way of preparation in answer to the questions we know that you have. But
before I go through those, let me say again that, to the -- we will give you
this information today to the best of our knowledge. We do not have -- yet --
all the facts related to this case. There are at least five other
investigations ongoing, and we will need that information in order to come to
a full understanding. So first, with respect to the application of the Geneva Convention to
detainees in Iraq. From the outset of the war in Iraq, the United States
government has recognized and made clear that the Geneva Conventions apply to
our activities in that country. Members of our armed forces should have been
aware of that. If they were not -- if they were not -- Lieutenant General
Sanchez, CJTF-7 commander, reminded them on more than one occasion that the
forces under his commander operated under that obligation. Nevertheless,
there clearly was a breakdown of following Geneva Convention procedures at
Abu Ghraib, and we are in the process, as you know, of investigating why that
happened. As Major General Miller, who is now in charge of detainee operations in
Iraq, remarked on Saturday, "The procedures established for
interrogations in Iraq were sanctioned under the Geneva Convention and
authorized in U.S. Army manuals." All permissible -- permissible --
interrogation activities were within the requirements and boundaries of
applicable provisions of the convention. We are currently investigating why
soldiers -- some soldiers at Abu Ghraib did not abide by those understood
procedures and guidelines. Early in the war on terrorism, long before the war in Iraq, the president
made a determination that the Geneva Convention did not apply to al Qaeda
detainees. That decision was made because the Geneva Conventions govern
conflicts between states, and the al Qaeda is not a state, much less a
signatory of the convention. Moreover, the conventions forbid the targeting
of civilians and require that military forces wear designated uniforms to
distinguish them from noncombatants. Terrorists don't care about the Geneva
Convention, nor do they abide by its guidelines. They deliberately target
civilians, for example, and have brutalized and murdered innocent Americans.
To grant terrorists the rights they so cruelly reject would make a mockery of
the Geneva Conventions. Nevertheless, President Bush did order -- did order -- that detainees held
at Guantanamo be treated humanely and consistent with the convention's
principles. And in fact, those detainees in the war on terror are being
provided with many of the privileges typically afforded to enemy prisoners of
war. The notion that this decision in some way undermined the Geneva Convention
or created a poor climate is false. To the contrary; the administration made
this decision with the objective of assuring that those who would claim
protection under its auspices and not act in keeping with its intent did not
abuse the Geneva Convention. Far from disrespect, the decision was made out
of a notion of respect. The notion of a departmental belief that the alleged
climate created and led to abuse in Iraq is, therefore, not in keeping with
clear and stated determination to adhere to the Geneva Convention. Second, Major General Miller's recommendations. Major General Miller was
sent to Iraq -- it was late August of '03 -- based on his experience with the
flow of information gained by interrogation at Guantanamo Bay. He was sent
under Joint Staff auspices, and as I said on Friday before this committee,
with my encouragement, to determine if the flow of information to CJTF-7 and
back to the subordinate commands could be improved. He laid out an approach to
do this in a series of recommendations to General Sanchez; recommendations to
General Sanchez. He had no directive authority in that visit. One recommendation on detention operations was to dedicate and train the
detention guard force subordinate to the joint intelligence commander that
would, in the words of General Taguba's report, and others, "set the
conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of internees and
detainees." In making this recommendation, Major General Miller was
underscoring the need for military police and military intelligence
personnel, both of whom serve different functions, to act in a fashion such
that the one -- military police -- did not undermine the efforts of the other
-- military intelligence -- to discover during interrogation information that
was important to coalition forces and to the lives of Iraqi civilians.
Consequently, he underscored the need for legal review of his recommendations
by a dedicated Command Staff judge advocate. With respect to detention operations, Major General Miller noted that
their purpose is to provide a safe, secure and humane environment that
supports the expeditious collection of intelligence. In addition, he observed
that detention operations must be structured to ensure the detention
environment focus the internees' confidence and attention on their
interrogators. He recommended training in building the teamwork the
interrogator and detention staffs needed to accomplish the objective. The order placing the military police at Abu Ghraib under the tactical
control of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. And here, for more of the
detail I can defer to General Smith. But on November 19th of 2003, General
Sanchez issued an order effectively placing Abu Ghraib under the tactical control
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. This order was within the
authority of General Sanchez to give. And as I say, Lieutenant General Smith
might elaborate on the reasons that the order was given. But what it did is it gave a senior officer responsibility for the
facility;, for the facility. We needed someone to take care of such matters
as security, force protection, the internal security, living conditions for
the troops, and other things. It did not give, as far as I understand it, the Military Intelligence
Brigade commander authority over military police operations. And as I might
note, if you look at General Karpinski's CNN interview last night, she makes
comments to that effect. Let me stress that the promulgation of the order in
no way changed the rules governing the conduct of military police and
military personnel in Iraq with respect to the laws of war, the Geneva
Convention, CENTCOM directions, or CJTF directions and instructions. Third, the role of contractors. Contractors may not perform interrogations
except under the supervision of military personnel. There may have been
circumstances under which this regulation was not followed. I cannot tell you
that it was followed in all respects. This is a matter that General Fay is
now examining. In addition, contractors may not supervise or give orders or
direction to military personnel, and while contractors are not under military
discipline -- another issue raised on Friday -- they are subject to
suspension from their contracts by the government for cause. Furthermore,
criminal sanctions for any crimes a contractor may commit may be available in
U.S. federal court, and maybe referred to U.S. federal court. Fourth, with respect to the oversight of military intelligence, criminal
investigation and the operations of combatant commanders, I have on page 8 of
the statement that I prepared for you listed the roles of the office I
presently hold, that of the joint commands and that of the services. I then
go on and talk about oversight of criminal investigations and the role of the
DOD IG's office, and the counterintelligence oversight. On page 9 I begin the actions under way. The secretary reviewed those with
you on Friday and I will not take your time here, unless the committee wishes
to return to them -- but to add one development since we were here last and
that is that the secretary is now preparing a personal message for the men
and women of the armed forces underscoring his dismay over the events at Abu
Ghraib, expressing his confidence in the valor and professionalism of the men
and women, stressing once again that the Geneva Convention applies to our
conflict in Iraq, and expressing his confidence in the ultimate success of
our mission in Iraq. Mr. Chairman, this is an occasion to demonstrate to the world the
difference between those who believe in democracy and those who do not. We
value human life, we believe in the right to individual freedom and the rule
of law, and for those beliefs we send our men and women abroad to protect
that right, for our own people and to give millions of others hope for
freedom in the future. Part of that mission is making sure that when
wrongdoing or scandal occurs it's not covered up, but exposed, investigated,
publicly disclosed, and the guilty brought to justice. I believe we can repair the damage done to our credibility in the region
if we hold true to our principles and continue to keep our commitments to the
people of Iraq and Afghanistan. Eventually, the nobility of that mission will
touch the hearts of more people in the Arab world. I am confident of this
because the outstanding service that has been rendered by the vast majority
of the men and women of the U.S. armed forces. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Secretary Cambone. General Smith, do you
have a few opening comments? GEN. SMITH: Senator Warner, Senator Levin, members of the committee. Sir,
I'll stand by the comments that I made on Friday, but add that, once again,
on behalf of General Abizaid and all the men and women of Central Command, we
regret very much that these events ever occurred and apologize for those who
were victims of the abuse. I would like to assure you that, in every case of the -- where the
investigations have had recommendations and findings, that we have either
implemented the recommendations or are in the process of making the fixes
necessary to alleviate the problems there. SEN. WARNER: Can you speak clearly and directly into the mike? Your voice
is being lost. GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. In all cases where we have had recommendations and findings, they have
either been implemented or we are in the process of implementing fixes to
ensure that those gaps that we had either in policy, procedures or leadership
are being fixed. We, at the same time, have a number of investigations that are ongoing
that should give us more answers to some of the questions that we all have
about what actually went on in the Abu Ghraib prison, the most significant of
which is the General Fay investigation over the military intelligence
brigade. We will continue to try to and make every effort to ensure that we
implement the proper procedures, policies and practices to ensure that this
never happens again, sir. Thank you, Senator Warner. SEN. WARNER: Thank you. General Taguba, we welcome you. GEN. TAGUBA: Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the
committee, good morning all. I am Major General Antonio M. Taguba, the deputy
commanding general for support, Army Central Command and Combined Forces Land
Component Command that is headquartered in Camp Arifijan, Kuwait. On 24 January 2004, when directed -- SEN. WARNER: Interrupt you. If you would direct right at -- GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: Get the mike aligned with you, and it -- GEN. TAGUBA: Okay. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. GEN. TAGUBA: My apologies, sir. Let me continue, sir. On 24 January, 2004,
I was directed by Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the commanding general,
ARCENT CFLCC, to conduct an investigation into the allegations of detainee
abuse at Abu Ghraib prison, which is also known as the Baghdad Central
Confinement Facility. And I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the purpose, the findings and the recommendation of that
investigation. The purpose of the investigation. We had specific instructions, were as
follows. First, inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of
maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison. Second, inquire into detainee escapes
and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations
concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib prison. Third, investigate the
training, the standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures
and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade as appropriate. And finally, make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of this
investigation, and make recommendations for corrective action as appropriate.
My investigation team consisted of officers and senior
enlisted personnel who are military policemen, experts in detention and
corrections, judge advocates, psychiatrists, and public affairs officers. At
the onset, I did not have military intelligence officers or experts in
military interrogation in my team because the scope of my investigation dealt
principally with detention operations and not intelligence gathering or
interrogations operations. However, during the course of my team's investigation, we
gathered evidence pertaining to the involvement of several military
intelligence personnel or contractors assigned to the 205th MI Brigade in the
alleged detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib. As stated in the findings of the
investigation, we recommended that a separate investigation be initiated
under the provisions of Procedure 15, Army Regulation 381-10, concerning
possible improper interrogation practices in this case. Again, my task was limited to the allegations of detainee
abuse involving MP personnel and the policies, procedures and command climate
of the 800 MP Brigade. As I assembled the investigation team, my specific
instructions to my teammates were clear: maintain our objectivity and
integrity throughout the course of our mission, in what I considered to be a
very grave, highly sensitive and serious situation; to be mindful of our
personal values and the moral values of our nation; and to maintain the Army
values in all of our dealings; and to be complete, thorough and fair in the
course of the investigation. Bottom line, we'll follow our conscience and do
what is morally right. As agonizing as this investigation was, I commend the
exceptional professionalism of my teammates, their extraordinary efforts, and
the outstanding manner by which they carried out my instructions. I also
commend the courage and selfless service of those soldiers and sailors who
brought these allegations to light, discovered evidence of abuse and turned
it over to the military law enforcement authorities. The criminal acts of a few stand in stark contrast to the
high professionalism, competence and moral integrity of countless active
Guard and Army Reserve soldiers that we encountered in this investigation. At
the end of the day, a few soldiers and civilians conspired to abuse and
conduct egregious acts of violence against detainees and other civilians
outside the bounds of international law and the Geneva Convention. Their incomprehensible acts, caught in their own personal
record of photographs and video clips, have seriously maligned and impugned
the courageous acts of thousands of U.S. and coalition forces. It put into
question the reputation of our nation and the reputation of those who
continue to serve in uniform and who would willingly sacrifice their lives to
safeguard our freedom. Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I
look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, General. I must say that I was very
heartened by your use of the phrase "follow our conscience, do what is
morally right." GEN. TAGUBA: Thank you, sir. SEN. WARNER: I think you've done that. Colleagues, we'll have a six-minute
round. We take note that votes will start at 11:30, but it's the intention of
Senator Levin and myself to continue this hearing on into approximately the
12:30 to 12:45 time frame, in hopes that further opportunity can give members
to questions (sic). SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): Mr. Chairman? SEN. WARNER: Yes? SEN. INHOFE: Will there be one round? SEN. WARNER: I've said that we'll continue to 12:45, and we'll do our
best, given the votes -- SEN. INHOFE: Thank you. SEN. WARNER: -- we will try to keep the hearing going during a portion of
the votes. SEN. INHOFE (?): (Twelve-forty-five ?). SEN. WARNER: Thank you. Secretary Cambone, my understanding is and in my briefings
with you -- and I thank you for discussing these matters with me over the
weekend -- MR. CAMBONE: Sir. SEN. WARNER: -- that your office has the overall responsibility for policy
concerning the handling of detainees in the global war on terrorism. Is that
correct? MR. CAMBONE: Not precisely, sir. The overall policy for the handling of
detainees rests with the undersecretary of Defense for Policy, by directive
-- SEN. WARNER: Wait a minute. Rests with -- MR. CAMBONE: The undersecretary of Defense for Policy, by directive. My
office became involved in this issue primarily from the perspective of the --
assuring that there was a flow of intelligence back to the commands and done
in an efficient and effective way. SEN. WARNER: Then I would presume that it would be incumbent upon this
committee to get the undersecretary for Policy over and let him provide this
committee with such knowledge that he has -- MR. CAMBONE: Sir, and that -- his responsibilities -- and I have talked
with Mr. Feith about this -- he issued any number of statements and
directives to the effect that detainees in Iraq, civilian or military, were
to be treated under the provisions of the Geneva Convention. SEN. WARNER: And did you work with him in that? I'm trying to ascertain --
MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. I was aware of that work and knowledgeable of it
and endorsed it, of course. SEN. WARNER: I'm trying to ascertain the degree to which the civilian
authority in the Department of Defense under the secretary, be it yourself or
the other undersecretary -- MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: -- reviewed the procedures by which the interrogations took
place in our -- places of incarceration -- MR. CAMBONE: Right. SEN. WARNER: -- and most specifically by the -- those doing it in Iraq. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: You did review the procedures that were being followed for
the interrogation of detainees in Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: We gave direction that the -- the department gave direction
that the Geneva Convention was to be followed. The procedures for
interrogation are established via the use of -- and General Taguba and
General Smith can clarify, but they are established on the basis of approved
techniques for interrogation. There is a list of those, and you will find
them in Army doctrine and manuals. SEN. WARNER: Right. MR. CAMBONE: Those are approved for use by the commanding general, and any
exceptions to those activities that he authorizes, he would then set terms
and conditions for exceptions to his guidance. At the level of those
techniques, and so forth, they were signed out at the command level and not
in the Department of Defense. SEN. WARNER: You've had time to reflect on this. In simple and plain
words, how do you think this happened? MR. CAMBONE: With the caveat, sir, that I don't know the facts, it's, for
me, hard to explain. I have spent a good deal of time over the last 10 days
to two weeks looking at the various elements of this issue, and I think what
we did have here was a problem of leadership with respect to the 372nd
Battalion -- that was the group that was the MP unit. SEN. WARNER: Leadership starting -- a failure of leadership starting at
what level? MR. CAMBONE: That is decidedly more difficult to say, sir. Again, in
simple terms, you asked. There was clear direction moving down the chain from
the secretary to General Abizaid to General Sanchez to those people who were
in charge of the military police, and that in this case is General Karpinski.
She had -- I think it's eight battalions -- eight battalions under her
control, lodged at a large number of locations. She, as best I understand it,
was not frequently present at Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib itself -- and let's
remember the time frame that we're talking about. We're coming out of the
period of active combat operations. We have a large number of detainees who
are being moved from a facility -- SEN. WARNER: I'm going to ask you to be brief because I'm holding myself
tightly to my time. MR. CAMBONE: I understand, sir. Move them into a -- from temporary
facilities into permanent facilities. The place is being mortared and
attacked frequently. And the local commander was unable to bring order to
that place. And for that reason, I would argue, General Sanchez looked to
Colonel Pappas, the head of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and gave
him the responsibility, then, for taking care of Abu Ghraib as an
installation. SEN. WARNER: Right. Now, the reports that were developed by international
organizations -- the Red Cross and others -- my understanding, they came to
your office for an assessment and a determination as to what was to be done
in response to those reports? MR. CAMBONE: No, the reports that are issue here is -- ICRC, the
International Committee of the Red Cross -- SEN. WARNER: But you told me, I thought, over the weekend that -- MR. CAMBONE: I've seen the report. SEN. WARNER: You've seen them -- MR. CAMBONE: I have seen it. SEN. WARNER: -- and you took some steps to implement some of their recommendations.
MR. CAMBONE: Steps were taken to implement their recommendations. I saw
those reports well after they were issued. The one in question was issued on
the 6th of November. It was addressed, to my knowledge, to General Karpinski,
and she replied, at her command level, on the 24th of December of '03 to the
ICRC. SEN. WARNER: Now, who else in the building had access to those reports?
Did they reach the secretary's level? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir, they did not. Those reports, those working papers --
again, as far as I understand it -- were delivered at the command level. They
are designed -- the process is designed so that the ICRC can engage with the
local commanders and make those kinds of improvements that are necessary in a
more collaborative environment than in an adversarial one. And so they tend
to try to work these problems at that level. There was, sir, just for the
record, another paper developed by the ICRC which was delivered to the
Coalition Provisional Authority in February of 2004. That paper is a
historical paper. It is a review of activity from March or so of '03 -- SEN. WARNER: My time has run out. MR. CAMBONE: -- through the end of January. SEN. WARNER: Sorry to cut you off. We've asked for those reports -- MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: -- and it's my understanding the secretary is -- MR. CAMBONE: The secretary is going to give them to you, sir. SEN. WARNER: General Taguba, in your orders, were there any restrictions
placed upon you by General McKiernan, General Sanchez or Abizaid in the scope
of your inquiry? In other words, were you given a free hand to do what you
felt had to be done? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the scope, as I described to you, was related to the detainee
abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, because there were detention operations under
the purview of the 800 MP Brigade, we also look at Camp Bucca, the high-value
detention facility at Camp Cropper, and also the MEK facility at -- SEN. WARNER: I ask the same question to you. In simple laymen's language,
so it can be understood, what do you think went wrong, in terms of the
failure of discipline and the failure of this interrogation process to be
consistent with known regulations, national and international? And also, to
what extent do you have knowledge of any participation by other than U.S.
military, namely Central Intelligence Agency and/or contractors, in the
performance of the interrogations? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, as far as your last question, I'll answer that first.
The comments about participation of other government agencies or contractors
were related to us through interviews that we conducted. It was related to
our examination of written statements and, of course, some other records.
With regards to your first question, sir, there was a failure of leadership
-- SEN. WARNER: In other words, in the material that you've now submitted to
the Senate -- or the department has submitted -- GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: -- we will find in there all of your knowledge with respect
to participation by other government agencies? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: It's nine volumes and about almost -- GEN. TAGUBA: (Chuckles) -- Six thousand pages, yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: -- thousand pages, and we just got it yesterday. GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. WARNER: Can you give us a quick synopsis of participation by other
U.S. government agencies? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, they refer to them as OGAs or MIs. And when I asked for
clarification it's because of the way they wore their uniforms. Some of them
did not wear a uniform, and so how would I ask them to clarify further if
they knew any of these people? And they gave us names, as stipulated on their
statements. They also gave us names of those who are MI, uniformed MI in
personnel in the U.S. Army, and that was substantiated by the comments made
to us by other witnesses as we conducted our interviews. SEN. WARNER: Right. In simple words, your own soldiers' language, how did
this happen? GEN. TAGUBA: Failure in leadership, sir, from the brigade commander on
down; lack of discipline; no training whatsoever; and no supervision.
Supervisory omission was rampant. Those are my comments. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Senator Levin. SEN. LEVIN: General Taguba, the ICRC said that the military intelligence
officers at the prison confirmed to them that this was all part of the
military intelligence process, these activities. Would you agree with the
ICRC that coercive practices such as holding prisoners naked for extended periods
of time were used, in their words, in a "systematic way" as part of
a military intelligence process at the prison? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I did not read the ICRC report. SEN. LEVIN: Would you agree with that conclusion? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir, based on the evidence that was presented to us and
what we gathered and what we reviewed. Yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: That's more than a failure of leadership. That's an active
decision on the part of leadership. It's not just oversight or negligence or
neglect or sloppiness, but purposeful, willful determination to use these
techniques as part of an interrogation process. Would you include that in
your definition of failure of leadership? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. They were. SEN. LEVIN: Secretary Cambone told us earlier, a few minutes ago, that the
shift in command at the prison did not mean that the military intelligence
commander had command authority over the MPs, but your report says the
opposite; that the decision to transfer that command to the military
intelligence commander did effectively put that commander in charge of the
military police. Do you stick by your statement? GEN. TAGUBA: That to me, sir? SEN. LEVIN: Yes. GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the -- I did not question the order that was given to
Colonel Pappas on the fragmentary order that he received on the 19th of
November. That was not under my purview. I did ask him to elaborate on what
his responsibilities were. SEN. LEVIN: Your report states that that change in command, quote,
"effectively made a military intelligence officer rather than an MP
officer responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that
facility." Is that your conclusion? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir because the order gave him tactical control of all
units that were residing at Abu Ghraib. SEN. LEVIN: All right. Secretary Cambone, you disagree with that? MR. CAMBONE: Tactical control is the question here. I -- SEN. LEVIN: Do you disagree with what the general just said? MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: Pardon? MR. CAMBONE: I do. I do not believe that the order placing Colonel Pappas
in charge gave him the authority to address the MPs' activities in direct
op-con conditions. (To Gen. Taguba.) Is that true, General? SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. No, it's okay. Let me just keep going then. You
have just a disagreement over that. Secretary Cambone, in an article in last
Sunday's Post -- in April 2003, the Defense Department approved about 20
interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo that permit reversing normal
sleep patterns of detainees, exposing them to heat, cold, sensory assault;
and the use of these techniques required the approval of senior Pentagon
officials and, in some cases, of Secretary Rumsfeld, according to that
article. These procedures, according to the Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman,
are controlled and approved on a case-by-case basis. And then it says that
the Defense and intelligence officials said that similar guidelines have been
approved for use on, quote, "high- value detainees in Iraq, those
suspected of terrorism or of having knowledge of insurgency operations."
Is that true? Were those techniques adopted for Guantanamo and were they then
used or accepted or adapted for Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: There are command-level guidelines for the use in
interrogation. They are in some cases the same and in many cases not. SEN. LEVIN: Not the same in Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: Not the same. SEN. LEVIN: In Iraq. Can you give us a copy of the guidelines? MR. CAMBONE: I can do that. SEN. LEVIN: Both. So there were specific guidelines for Guantanamo, and
they were different from the guidelines for Iraq. MR. CAMBONE: I believe that they were, and I will give you the
comparisons. SEN. LEVIN: All right. And you'll give those to the committee, then. Do
you know that -- well, let me go to another issue, and that has to do with
whether or not the -- let me start it this way. There was an interview in the
Times last week, in which Major General Miller said that 50 techniques that
the military officially uses in prisoner interrogations, including hooding,
sleep deprivation and forcing prisoners into stress positions, have been
adopted. Are you familiar with those 50 techniques? MR. CAMBONE: There is in -- as I said in my opening statement, there are
those techniques in Army doctrine. Yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: Those are 50 techniques? MR. CAMBONE: I don't know that it's 50, sir, but there is -- SEN. LEVIN: But it includes stress positions? MR. CAMBONE: I believe they do. SEN. LEVIN: All right. And is that something that you will also supply to
the committee? MR. CAMBONE: We can supply the manual to you. Yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: All right. Now it says here the following: that the
interrogation officer -- excuse me. This is an annex in the Taguba report,
says the following as being a permissible technique for use in the Iraqi
theater: The interrogation officer in charge will submit memoranda for the
record requesting harsh approaches for the commanding general's approval prior
to employment: sleep management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer than
30 days, and dogs. Secretary Cambone, were you personally aware that
permissible interrogation techniques in the Iraqi theater included sleep
management, sensory deprivation, isolation longer than 30 days, and dogs? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. That list, both in terms of its detail and its
exceptions, were approved at the command level in the theater. SEN. LEVIN: That was a command-level approval? MR. CAMBONE: As far as I understand it, yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: And finally, Secretary, you said that the -- you have decided
right from the beginning that the Geneva Conventions would apply to our
activities in Iraq. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. LEVIN: And yet Secretary Rumsfeld repeatedly has made a distinction
between whether or not those Geneva Convention rules must be applied, whether
people -- prisoners will be treated, quote, "pursuant to those rules or
consistent with those rules." And he said -- and this is just a few days
ago -- that the Geneva Convention did not apply precisely. MR. CAMBONE: Sir. SEN. LEVIN: You this morning said, again, the Geneva Convention applies to
our activities in Iraq, but not precisely. MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. I think what the secretary -- I -- let me tell you
what the facts are. The Geneva Convention applies in Iraq. SEN. LEVIN: Precisely? MR. CAMBONE: Precisely. SEN. LEVIN: (Inaudible) -- MR. CAMBONE: They do not apply in the precise way that the secretary was
talking about -- Guantanamo and the unlawful combatants -- SEN. LEVIN: Well, he was talking about Iraq -- let me cut you right off
there. This -- the whole interview here was about Iraq and the conditions at
that prison. MR. CAMBONE: And I -- SEN. LEVIN: That's what this whole, entire interview was about. It was on
NBC. It was May 5th, 2004. It was an interview about Iraq. No longer
Guantanamo is the issue here. And the secretary said something he said
elsewhere, and I've heard this with my own ears recently -- that -- he said
that the Geneva Conventions apply not precisely; that prisoners are treated
consistent with but not pursuant to. Now he did say the other day -- this is
a quote saying that the Geneva Convention did not apply precisely. Are you
saying that the secretary misspoke on -- MR. CAMBONE: I can't speak for the secretary. I can only tell you what my
understanding is, Senator, and that is -- SEN. LEVIN: You don't know what he meant by that? MR. CAMBONE: I can tell you what I understand -- SEN. LEVIN: No. Do you know what he meant by that? MR. CAMBONE: -- and that is that the Geneva Convention applies. Sir, I
can't speak for the secretary on that issue. But I will take -- SEN. LEVIN: And you've not talked to -- MR. CAMBONE: I will take the question for the record and I will ask him. I
can't -- SEN. LEVIN: It was the May 5th interview. Thank you. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Levin. I think at this juncture,
Secretary Cambone said the question of the utilization of dogs and other
things were at the command level. Can you speak to that -- respond to that
important question? GEN. SMITH: Sir, I can't. The rule on dogs that I'm aware
of is that they can patrol in the areas, but they have to be muzzled at all
times. SEN. WARNER: Have you examined the exact language that your command
promulgated down to these prisoners? GEN. SMITH: Sir, I have -- I have the
Army techniques that are authorized, which is what they lived by. SEN. WARNER: All right. We have to clarify this. Secretary Cambone said it
came from your command. So I ask you to focus on it. Senator McCain? And
provide it for the committee. SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ): Thank you. General Tabuga (sic), I want to thank
you for your excellent report, and I think it's been very helpful to this
committee, as well as to the American people. General Miller -- first of all,
we know that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are not subject to the Geneva
Conventions because they're al Qaeda -- at least those that are al Qaeda, and
therefore, being terrorists, they are not subject to the Geneva Conventions
for the treatment of prisoners of war. And I don't disagree with that
assessment, and I don't think you do either, do you? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. No. SEN. MCCAIN: And yet, General Miller was quoted in your report, when he
arrived in Iraq -- I believe Secretary Cambone was one of those who urged his
transfer there -- that he wanted to "Gitmo-ize" the treatment of
prisoners throughout Iraq, including Abu Ghraib prison. What do you make of
that statement? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I'd defer that to General Miller, sir. But for the
record, I've never been to Guantanamo. I'm only knowledgeable of my
experience and my observations at Abu Ghraib, which is a detention operation,
along with the other detention operations under the command and control of
the 800 MP Brigade as under combat conditions, separate and distinct of what
I consider to be a sterile environment at -- SEN. MCCAIN: But you found clearly in your report violations of the rules
for the -- Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war, right? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. MCCAIN: Including moving prisoners around to avoid International Red
Cross inspections? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. That was conveyed to us by those that we
interviewed and comments that we assessed in the written statements. SEN. MCCAIN: In your report, General Karpinski says that General Sanchez
said that in the case of problems in the prison -- there was uprising and
riot and escape; an American, I believe, was killed -- that they should use
lethal means immediately and not non-lethal means to start with. Isn't that
according to your report? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. They changed their rules of engagement I believe four
times, to use lethal and then to -- non-lethal to lethal force based on the
level of the events. I believe the last time they changed that rules of
engagement, sir, was in November of last year. That's contained in one of the
annexes that we have. SEN. MCCAIN: In your judgment, were these abuses a result of an overall
military or intelligence policy to, quote, "soften up" detainees
for interrogation? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, we did not gain any evidence where it was an overall
military intelligence policy of this sort. I think it was a matter of
soldiers with their interaction with military intelligence personnel who they
perceived or thought to be competent authority that were giving them or
influencing their action to set the conditions for successful interrogations
operations. SEN. MCCAIN: According to your report, these abuses were very widespread,
correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the manner by which we conducted our investigation in
collecting evidence was that they were between mid- to late October, and as late
as December, perhaps early January. SEN. MCCAIN: Mr. Cambone, the media report that complaints were made by
Ambassador Bremer and Secretary Powell concerning the treatment of prisoners
in Iraq. Do you know anything about that? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. I am not aware of those complaints. SEN. MCCAIN: In your opinion -- maybe I'd better ask General Taguba. How
far up the chain of command did awareness of these ongoing -- let me ask
this. When someone says that they're going to Gitmo-ize a prison, wouldn't a
subordinate think we're going to change the rules? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I'd rather not speculate on that, and I don't exactly
know what General Miller meant by Gitmo-izing Abu Ghraib because of a
different situation there. SEN. MCCAIN: I think it's pretty obvious, but I thank you for your
testimony and your report. Tell me again about your view of General
Karpinski's role in this. She says that she was excluded from certain parts
of the prison and certain areas where some of these abuses took place. Do you
have anything on that? GEN. TAGUBA: I disagree with that. SEN. MCCAIN: Do you agree or disagree. GEN. TAGUBA: I disagree, the fact that she was excluded from certain areas
of the prison. In my interview of her, she was still in charge of detention
operations in theater, and it's hard for me to believe that she would be
excluded from any of those facilities or any portions of those facilities. SEN. MCCAIN: What evidence did you find that these individuals who -- had
received any training in the Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of
war? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the evidence that we gathered were training records from
the training that they received at the mobilization station and home station,
their mission-essential task list that they developed to prepare them for
deployment, that sort of thing. And several of these soldiers intimated to
us, at least conveyed to us that they were never trained on internment or
resettlement operations. But as far as I was concerned, sir, they were --
their leaders should have, could have provided the necessary resources to
which they are expected to do so in training their soldiers. SEN. MCCAIN: But they did not receive it. GEN. TAGUBA: No, sir. SEN. MCCAIN: Mr. Cambone states that they did, and the secretary of
Defense stated they did. I thank you, General. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. MR. CAMBONE: Mr. Chairman, could I just be a little more clear with
Senator McCain? SEN. WARNER: Yes, please. MR. CAMBONE: You asked if I was aware of concerns expressed by Ambassador
Bremer and the secretary of State, and I assumed you meant specifically on
these cases. I mean, that's what I intended to answer. SEN. MCCAIN: No, I -- on the treatment of prisoners of war. MR. CAMBONE: Yeah. Let me give you a broader answer, which is -- SEN. MCCAIN: Thank you. MR. CAMBONE: -- Ambassador Bremer had been concerned about the number of
people who were in custody and was anxious to see them move through the
system and released as rapidly as possible, as was Secretary Powell. So on
the broad question -- SEN. MCCAIN: But my question was, and I'm sorry to interrupt -- my time's
expired -- MR. CAMBONE: Forgive me. SEN. MCCAIN: -- were you aware of the complaints about treatment of
prisoners were made by Ambassador Bremer? MR. CAMBONE: Per se in that sense, no. That he was worried about prisoners
of war, that I knew. SEN. MCCAIN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GEN. SMITH: Sir, could I
also add that I have all the standard operating procedures here for Gitmo,
and in every case it is very specifically and clearly written that the humane
treatment of prisoners is first and foremost, and inhumane treatment of
detainees is never justified, and it is all in the spirit of the Geneva
Conventions. So -- SEN. MCCAIN: I thank you, but clearly there's a difference between
adherence to the Geneva Conventions for treatment of prisoners of war and --
GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir, but we were operating under the Geneva Conventions in
Iraq. We clearly understood that. SEN. MCCAIN: I thank you. Thank you -- SEN. WARNER: Now, those apply to the prison in Iraq? GEN. SMITH: Sir, when
he went over there and he talked -- SEN. WARNER: When who went? GEN. SMITH: When General Miller went over there
and he spoke and addressed this with each of the commanders, he gave them the
special operating procedures that they were using at Gitmo to use as an
example on how they should generate their own operating procedures. SEN. WARNER: And that included the phraseology that you just -- GEN.
SMITH: Exactly, sir. I just read it to you. SEN. WARNER: Secretary -- GEN. SMITH: Sir, may I also just mention, on
your question on promulgation of policy. The policy regarding dogs and stuff
was established and put out by CJTF-7 on the 12th of October, and it
specifically says that "Interrogators must ensure the safety of security
internees, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will
ensure that security internees are allowed adequate sleep, that diets,"
et cetera, et cetera. And it says, "Should military working dogs be
present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a
handler at all times to ensure safety." So General Sanchez, through his
things, very specifically addressed what was allowed in the interrogation
room and what was not allowed, and those things that required his approval,
such as segregation from the population in excess of 30 days. SEN. WARNER: Can you throw any light, then, on where this thing broke
down, given that you started in the proper way? GEN. SMITH: Sir, given the
guidance that was put out there, I can't -- I have to agree with General
Taguba's assessment of it and that these rules and regulations were out
there, and somewhere in the leadership chain, execution and implementation of
these policies broke down. SEN. WARNER: Is CENTCOM trying to find out where that happened? GEN.
SMITH: Absolutely, sir. SEN. WARNER: All right. Thank you. Senator Kennedy. SEN. TED KENNEDY (D-MA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Taguba, we want
to -- I want to join others in commending you and thank you for the service
to this country. Dr. Cambone, I hope when you have a chance to read through
the 2004 report, which according to the ICRC was given to the -- Paul Bremer,
General Sanchez and the U.S. Permanent Mission in Geneva, according to
Christopher Gerard (sp) from the ICRC, it talks about the ICRC collected the
allegations of ill treatment following the capture that took place in
Baghdad, Basra, Ramadi and Tikrit. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. KENNEDY: It isn't only just focused on this one prison camp, but
lists the others as well, and I think we have to be aware of that. Let me
just go quickly to this report. There was a Newsweek magazine report that
since 9/11, Secretary Rumsfeld has insisted on personally signing-off on the
harsher methods used to squeeze suspected terrorists held at U.S. prison
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He's approved such tactics as the use of stress
positions, stripping of detainees naked, prolonged sleep deprivation. Have
you advised the secretary, Rumsfeld, on these issues? And what other
officials of the department have participated in these decisions? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I can't -- SEN. KENNEDY: And has the general counsel been involved -- MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. And if I -- SEN. KENNEDY: -- in giving advice? He's been involved? MR. CAMBONE: If I may, sir, with the permission of the chair and yourself.
The secretary has a deep regard for the well-being of those being held in
Guantanamo and their well-being and their care. Therefore, any procedure
which is of the type that General Smith suggested, which are within the
approved rules but are harsh, he has withheld to his approval first.
Secondly, when the issue of how these prisoners -- detainees in Guantanamo
were to be treated, there was convened, under the GC, the general counsel of
the department, a working group whose objective it was to work through all of
these issues. So that matrix that has been reported is the product of that
effort. SEN. KENNEDY: All right. Let me -- because the time is short -- has the
secretary -- so he has evidently approved these kinds of -- MR. CAMBONE: I don't know in detail, sir, but those that he -- there is a
list that he has approved. SEN. KENNEDY: He has approved. What about on Iraq? Has he approved signing
off on harsher methods of interrogation on Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: Answer no. That, as General Smith said, is a CJTF- 7
promulgation. SEN. KENNEDY: If not, who has -- someone have that authority in Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: If there is anything that exceeds General Sanchez's
direction, he is, as I understand it, to sign off on that exception. SEN. KENNEDY: So he has the authority -- General Sanchez. Do you know
whether he's used that or not? MR. CAMBONE: General Smith? GEN. SMITH: Sir -- SEN. KENNEDY: Just quickly. GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. Just in that policy that
I told you, were separation of greater than 30 days, he would be the approval
authority. To the best of my knowledge, he has not used anything beyond that.
SEN. KENNEDY: Let me ask you, Dr. Cambone, about rendering. A number of
reports about detainees in U.S. custody, U.S. Military Intelligence officials
being transferred for interrogations to governments that routinely torture
prisoners. December 2002, Washington Post -- detainees who refuse to
cooperate with Americans have been rendered to foreign intelligence services
-- Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Syria and other countries. Can you assure
the committee that the administration is fully complying with all of the
legal requirements and that all reports of U.S. officials engaging in the
practice of rendering are false? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, to the best of my knowledge, that is a true statement. SEN. KENNEDY: We are not -- we have not -- your statement -- sworn
statement now -- to your knowledge, the United States has not been involved
in any rendering, any turning over of any personnel to any other country. MR. CAMBONE: No, no. You said that they were turned over for torture and
mistreatment. We have returned, for example, individuals to the U.K. There
may be three or four of them that have been returned from Gitmo. SEN. KENNEDY: Have you turned over, to your knowledge, any suspects to
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco or Syria, to gather information? MR. CAMBONE: From those people in DOD custody, not that I'm aware of, sir.
SEN. KENNEDY: So -- well, you would know if they -- MR. CAMBONE: I am not aware of any that have been transferred for that
purpose. And if there -- SEN. KENNEDY: For any other purpose. MR. CAMBONE: If there are, I will come back to you and tell you. As best I
know, there are not any persons under our custody that have been transferred.
SEN. KENNEDY: Do the interrogators for Military Intelligence, the Central
Intelligence Agency and also the contract intelligence, do they all have
identical rules and regulations in terms of interrogating the detainees or
prisoners of war or combatants? Or is there any distinction between the
three? MR. CAMBONE: Within Iraq the rules of the Geneva Convention apply. So
therefore, the rules obtain for all three. SEN. KENNEDY: I'm not -- that isn't my question. That's not my question. MR. CAMBONE: Sir. SEN. KENNEDY: My question is, do they have different kinds of rules of
questioning? Do each of those services have rules? If they do have rules, how
are they different? MR. CAMBONE: I can speak for the DOD, contractor and military personnel,
and those rules are the same. SEN. KENNEDY: Identical. MR. CAMBONE: The people we hire, in most cases, are required to have had
that training in the military in order to become interrogators. SEN. KENNEDY: And they are bound by the same set -- MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. KENNEDY: So your testimony is the private contractors, Military
Intelligence and military interrogators all operate -- and the CIA -- all
operate with the same rules of interrogation. MR. CAMBONE: I can only speak for the last inside of Iraq, sir. SEN. KENNEDY: You're going to provide those rules to us? MR. CAMBONE: I can do that. SEN. KENNEDY: Let me just ask you -- finally, in the opinion of General
Taguba, the setting of conditions for favorable interrogation is not
authorized or consistent with Army regulations. You seemed to reach a
different conclusion in your testimony today. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. KENNEDY: Could you -- do you agree -- you and General Taguba there
differ on that, the issues. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. KENNEDY: Is that correct? MR. CAMBONE: We do, and in this sense -- SEN. KENNEDY: Well, I think it's important that we understand, when we
were talking about the abuses that are taking place with the Military Police
-- and you have two entirely different kinds of viewpoints on this issue --
how in the world are the military police that are supposed to implement going
to be able to get it straight, particularly when you have General Miller
there that is following what you believe, Mr. Secretary -- MR. CAMBONE: Sir. SEN. KENNEDY: -- how are we -- how do you expect the MPs to get it
straight if we have a difference between the two of you? MR. CAMBONE: Well, let me try and explain it. As far as I understand it,
there is doctrine relative to the Military Police which gives them the
responsibility for conveying to the interrogators the attitudes of their --
those who are going to be interrogated, their disposition, who they've been
talking to, and so forth; and it's the interrogators, in turn, under
doctrine, Army doctrine, ask the Military Police those kinds of questions. So
there is designed in the system a collaborative approach with respect to
gaining that information. With respect to the issue of Gitmo-izing, if I may
return to that, Senator Kennedy, let's go back to the conditions that were in
Abu Ghraib. They were disorderly, as the general just points out. And the
notion, it seems to me, that General Miller had was that order needed to be
established in the processes and procedures. SEN. KENNEDY: Well, just to finish, because my time is up, General Taguba,
why do you believe that there should be a separation between the Military
Police and intelligence officers? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, there's a baseline that we use as a reference, which is
Army Regulation 190-8, which is a multi-service regulation, establishes the
policy and executive agency for detention operations; in there, enumerates in
Paragraph 1-5, the general policy and the treatment of not just EPWs but
civilian internees, retained personnel and other detainees. That's the
baseline that we use. We also use the MPs' doctrine on detention operations,
which is Field Manual 3-3-19.40. And we further referred to the interrogation
operations doctrine by -- used by the MI, which is Field Manual 3452. And
they're all -- SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. SEN. KENNEDY: Thank you. SEN. WARNER: Senator Inhofe. SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I -- well, first of all, I regret I
wasn't here on Friday. I was unable to be here. But maybe it's better that I
wasn't, because as I watched the -- this outrage, this outrage everyone seems
to have about the treatment of these prisoners, I was, I have to say -- and
I'm probably not the only one up at this table that is more outraged by the
outrage than we are by the treatment. The idea that these prisoners -- you
know, they're not there for traffic violations. If they're in cell block 1-A
or 1-B, these prisoners, they're murderers, they're terrorists, they're
insurgents. Many of them probably have American blood on their hands. And
here we're so concerned about the treatment of those individuals. And I
hasten to say yeah, there are seven bad guys and gals that didn't do what
they should have done. They were misguided, I think maybe even perverted, and
the things that they did have to be punished. And they're being punished.
They're being tried right now, and that's all taking place. But I'm also
outraged by the press and the politicians and the political agendas that are
being served by this, and I say political agendas because that's actually
what is happening. I would share with my colleagues a solicitation that was
made. I'm going to read the first two sentences. "Over the past week,
we've all been shocked by the pictures from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. But we
have also been appalled at the slow and inept response by President Bush,
which has further undermined America's credibility." And it goes on to
demand that George Bush fire Donald Rumsfeld. And then it goes on to a
timeline, a chronology, and at the very last it makes a solicitation for
contributions. I don't recall this ever having happened before in history.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this solicitation be made a part
of the record at this point. SEN. WARNER: Without objection. SEN. INHOFE: Mr. Chairman, I also am -- and have to say, when we talk
about the treatment of these prisoners, that I would guess that these
prisoners wake up every morning thanking Allah that Saddam Hussein is not in
charge of these prisoners. When he was in charge they would take electric
drills and drill holes through hands, they would cut their tongues out, they
would cut their ears off. We've seen accounts of lowering their bodies into
vats of acid. All these things were taking place. This was the type of
treatment that they had. And I would want everyone to get this and read it. This
is a documentary of the Iraq special report. It talks about the unspeakable
acts of mass murder, unspeakable acts of torture, unspeakable acts of
mutilation, the murdering of kids -- lining up 312 little kids under 12 years
old and executing them, and then of course what they do to Americans, too.
There's one story in here that was in the I think it was The New York Times,
yes, on June 2nd. I suggest everyone take that -- get that and read it. It's
about one of the prisoners who did escape as they were marched out there,
blindfolded and put before mass graves, and they mowed them down and they
buried them. This man was buried alive and he clawed his way out and was able
to tell his story. And I ask, Mr. Chairman, at this point in the record that
this account of the brutality of Saddam Hussein be entered into the record,
made a part of the record. SEN. WARNER: Without objection, so ordered. SEN. INHOFE: I am also outraged that we have so many humanitarian
do-gooders right now crawling all over these prisons, looking for human
rights violations while our troops, our heroes, are fighting and dying. And I
just don't think we can take seven -- seven bad people. There are some 700
guards in Abu Ghraib. There are some 25 other prisons, about 15,000 guards all
together, and seven of them did things they shouldn't have done and they're
being punished for that. But what about some 300,000 troops have been
rotating through all this time and they have -- all the stories of valor are
there. Now, one comment about Rumsfeld. A lot of them don't like him. And I'm
sorry that Senator McCain isn't here, because I just now said to him,
"Do you remember back three years ago when Secretary Rumsfeld was up for
confirmation, and I said these guys aren't going to like him because he
doesn't kowtow to them, he is not easily intimidated." I've never seen
Secretary Rumsfeld intimidated. And quite frankly, I can't think of any
American today as qualified as Donald Rumsfeld is to prosecute this war. Now
-- oh, one other thing. All the idea about these pictures. I would suggest to
you any pictures -- and I think maybe we should get direction from this
committee, Mr. Chairman, that if pictures are authorized to be disseminated
among the public, that for every picture of abuse or alleged abuse of
prisoners, we have pictures of mass graves, pictures of children being
executed, pictures of the four Americans in Baghdad that were burned and
their bodies were mutilated and dismembered in public. Let's get the whole
picture. Now, General Taguba, many, many years ago I was in the United States
Army. My job -- I was a court reporter. I know a little bit about the
history. The "undue command influence" that is a term that we've
heard, and I'd like to make sure that we get into the record what that is.
I'm going from memory now, but it's my understanding that the commanders up
the line can possibly serve as appellate judges. Consequently, commanders up
the line are not given a lot of the graphic details but merely said, as in
the case of Rumsfeld, serious allegations need to be investigated and they
start an investigation. This is back in January. Now, Rumsfeld said -- and
I'm quoting him now -- "Anything we say publicly could have the impact
on the legal proceeding against the accused. If my responses are measured, it
is to assure that pending cases are not jeopardized." Do I have an
accurate memory as to why they have this particular "undue command
influence" provision that we have been following now for five decades
that I know of? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I'm not a lawyer and -- SEN. INHOFE: But isn't that the reason you were called in? Well, I should
ask General Smith. General Smith, isn't that the reason that General Taguba
was brought in in the first place to keep this from happening? GEN. SMITH:
Yes, sir; to do the investigation and do the fact- finding so that the
commanders could make informed decisions on what actions should be taken
thereafter. And the difficulty in the command influence piece is that should
General Sanchez or should I or General Abizaid say something along the lines
that we must take this action against these individuals, then that is command
influence down the line that those that are making judgment on them would
influence and bias their decisions. SEN. INHOFE: And that, sir, has not changed over the last 45 years? GEN.
SMITH: That has not changed. And that has happened; we have had a number of
folks that have -- their sentences, or whatever, have been impacted by
command influence. SEN. INHOFE: Mr. Chairman, one last question to General Smith. All kinds
of accounts are coming out now that are -- many that are fictitious, I would
suggest. One was about a guy being dragged out of a barber shop. This is in
Washington Post this morning. They talked about the person doing this had AK-47s,
was blindfolded. Are our troops issued AK-47s? GEN. SMITH: They are not, sir.
SEN. INHOFE: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. For the benefit of all members,
the subject of the pictures has been raised, and I'd like to address that. In
consultation with the department over the weekend, the department indicated
its willingness to cooperate in every way to provide these pictures to the
Senate Armed Services Committee. But it occurred to me in my capacity as
chairman that this issue was a Senate institutional issue, it went beyond
this committee, because I think other senators should be entitled to receive
that information in the same way that members of this committee. I thereby
asked the Senate leadership, majority, minority, and invited Senator Levin to
join me, and we discussed this issue very carefully yesterday. We are seeking
the advice of Senate counsel and the respective counsel of the majority,
minority leader and counsel to this committee. And we will before, hopefully,
the end of the day, have adopted a procedure by which that transmission of
further evidence can come to the Senate -- the whole Senate and how it would
be made available to all senators and under what conditions, in compliance
with Senate precedents, rules, and to protect the legal interests of all
parties involved. MR. CAMBONE: Thank you, sir. SEN. WARNER: Thank you. Senator Byrd. SEN. ROBERT BYRD (D-WV): Thank you, General Taguba, for your report and
for your service to your country. In Friday's hearing before the Armed
Services Committee, General Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, said of the
prison abuse this is not a training issue but one of character and values.
It's becoming clear to me that this abuse wasn't just about values, it was
about policies and planning. General Taguba, based on your investigation, who
gave the order to soften up these prisoners, to give them the treatment? Was
this a policy? Who approved it? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, we did not find any evidence of a policy or a direct
order given to these soldiers to conduct what they did. I believe that they
did it on their own volition. I believe that we -- they collaborated with
several MI interrogators at the lower level, based on the conveyance of that
information through interviews and written statements. We didn't find any
order whatsoever, sir, written or otherwise, that directed them to do what
they did. SEN. BYRD: Doesn't the lack of training of our troops for prison duty
actually demonstrate a monumental failure in planning for the long-term
occupation of Iraq? How else could the military and civilian leadership of
the Pentagon explain why this training wasn't even offered? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the training of the Geneva Convention is inherent --
every time -- from the recruit all the way up to my rank level. In terms of
these MPs, as far as internment and resettlement, some of them received
training at home station and the (mobe ?) station, and some did not. And that
was our recommendation, that a mobile training team be deployed to theater to
ensure that they are in compliance with training tasks to do that. And there
was a capacity to do that during the conduct of their operation, because
there were competent battalion commanders -- the battalion commander at Camp
Ashraf was conducting his detention operation to standard. At Camp Bucca --
they did that at Camp Bucca, and also at Camp Cropper. Somehow it did not pan
out at Abu Ghraib. GEN. SMITH: Sir, I might also mention that this
organization, the 800th MP, is a specific task organized internment and
resettlement organization. Their job was this sort of stuff. SEN. BYRD: So you don't agree that there was a monumental lack of
planning, that there was a monumental failure of planning for the long-term
occupation of Iraq? You don't agree with that? GEN. SMITH: Sir, are you
talking to me? SEN. BYRD: Yes. GEN. SMITH: I'm just addressing the specific training
issue for the 800th MP that you related to, that this was their task to come over
and do that. I mean, that's what they did as an organization. So they were
brought over to conduct internment and resettlement issues. MR. CAMBONE: If I may, Senator Byrd, I don't think that the difficulties
that we found at Abu Ghraib indicates that there was a long-term planning
effort. In fact, Major General Ryder, who also did a report, was there
specifically for that purpose. What is the long- term basis for confinement
facilities and training and care and so forth? So no, there was attention being
paid to the longer-term occupation issues. SEN. BYRD: Secretary Cambone, when, if ever, did Ambassador Bremer first
raise any concerns about how the military was running prisons in Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, as I said earlier, the broad question of moving
detainees through the prison system was a concern of Ambassador Bremer early
on. With respect to the specific conditions inside of those facilities, I am
not aware of his having raised them. I don't know when that might have been.
I do know -- I am told that some time in the February-March time frame he
raised this issue. But I would have to check records for you, sir. SEN. BYRD: Didn't Ambassador Bremer have overall responsibility for what
was going on in Iraq? MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir, he was the occupying power, the one in whom that
was invested. SEN. BYRD: Shouldn't he have known how Iraqi prisons were being run, and
shouldn't he have sounded the alert if he thought that the military were
doing something wrong? MR. CAMBONE: And again, sir, the working papers that are issued by the
ICRC are done at the level of the command that they are investigating, and
they don't frequently elevate to that level. They did meet in February of
2004, which is the result -- the resulting paper is the one that has been distributed.
And at that time, the ICRC presented to Ambassador Bremer their findings for
that previous year. And it is my guess that it's that point that the specific
issues that you're addressing may have been raised by Ambassador Bremer. SEN. BYRD: Do you know if Ambassador Bremer made any recommendations to
the Department of Defense? MR. CAMBONE: He was anxious that the department find a way to, as I've
said, move the prisoner detainee more rapidly through the system, provide
addresses for the location to dependents and things of that character; that
is, the general treatment of the detainees within the system in Iraq. SEN. BYRD: Do you know if he made any recommendations with reference to
policy? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir, not beyond what I've said. But he -- that, again,
his concern would have been for the broad population and assuring that we
were moving people through that system, doing what was necessary for
interrogations and releasing those who had either served their time or had no
reason for being in custody. He was anxious to see those people returned to
their homes and families. SEN. BYRD: My time is up. Thank you. SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Byrd. Thank you very much. Senator
Roberts. SEN. PAT ROBERTS (R-KS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my questions are
somewhat repetitive, but at any rate, why, General, thank you for the job
that you've done. Many are called and few are chosen, and you have done an
outstanding job. In your report, you indicated that the 800th Military
Brigade had not been directed to change its policies and procedures to set
conditions for intelligence interrogations, but you concluded indeed such
changes had been made at lower levels. Were these changes made at the
battalion or the company level? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, we didn't find any changes either at the company or the
battalion or even at the brigade -- SEN. ROBERTS: I'm going to repeat the question by Senator Byrd: Did these
changes result from orders or direction from the military intelligence unit
at the prison? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, there were interaction between the guards and the
military interrogators at that level. SEN. ROBERTS: But the changes were not policy? GEN. TAGUBA: No, sir. SEN. ROBERTS: Did you discuss with Major General Miller his recommendation
that the MPs and the military intelligence functions be better coordinated,
to determine exactly what he had in mind? And as a follow-up, this is the
Gitmo-ize question: Is there some level of coordination between the Military
Police and the military intelligence units that is permitted by Army
regulations? You cited a whole series of Army regulations. General Ryder, I
believe, states that we should have a firewall in between the MPs and the
military interrogators. But yet General Miller says, from his experience in
regards to Gitmo, that that basically, if not impossible, is actually
detrimental in terms of cooperation, but insists that if you do have that
kind of cooperation, you must have leadership, you must have discipline, and
you must have training. Were the military intelligence officers at Abu Ghraib
familiar with Major General Miller's recommendations? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I cannot answer that. I was not there for the
debriefing, nor did I discuss in any detail General Miller's report. However
-- SEN. ROBERTS: Did the intelligence officers then at the prison believe
that Major General Miller's recommendations had been accepted and adopted?
And if so, what was the basis of this belief? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I cannot answer that. I was not there, nor did I
question whether the CJTF-7 accepted his recommendations or not. I just read
his report. SEN. ROBERTS: Okay. General Smith, an order to soften up a detainee would
not be a lawful order, is that correct? GEN. SMITH: Sir, that's correct. I
mean, it is -- SEN. ROBERTS: What legal basis, then, would a soldier have for following
that order? GEN. SMITH: Sir, none. And especially if you're an organization
of that type and have read any of the regulations, all of them are replete
with guidance on humane treatment, as well as the number of fragmentary
orders that were put out through General Sanchez telling them that they could
not do many of these -- or take actions that were inhumane. SEN. ROBERTS: Secretary Cambone, thank you for your appearance. And we welcome
you to the Intelligence Committee tomorrow. Some accused of the abuses at the
prison claim they were acting under orders from intelligence officers. Do any
of the Department of Defense regulations or policies encourage, condone or
permit such actions? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. SEN. ROBERTS: In your review of this matter, have you learned of any local
or unit-level policies -- I emphasize the word "policies" -- that
encouraged or condoned or permitted these abuses? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. SEN. ROBERTS: Were you aware of Major General Miller's recommendations
that MPs set the conditions for the interrogations at the prison? Did you
discuss this recommendation with anybody at the Joint Task Force 7? MR. CAMBONE: I did not discuss them with anybody at Joint Task Force 7,
no, sir. SEN. ROBERTS: What did you understand this recommendation to mean? MR. CAMBONE: That there had to be a basis for the transfer of information
from those who had custody on a daily basis of those who were being
interrogated to those who were being interrogated in order that the
interrogators understood personalities, relationships, in order to be able to
gain the information that they were trying to gain from the persons being
interrogated. SEN. ROBERTS: From a pragmatic standpoint, is this a good thing or a bad
thing? Is Ryder right and Miller wrong? Miller right, Ryder wrong? Or is it
somewhere in between? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, this is a matter -- while it is written in doctrine, it
seems to me doctrine is meant to be adapted to circumstance, and that was
what the substance of General Miller's recommendation was. SEN. ROBERTS: When is the Fay report going to come out? MR. CAMBONE: My understanding -- (aside) -- And, General, you can correct
me -- (returning) -- that he is completing his work in Iraq over this week.
He has to go to Germany to see people who have since rotated from Iraq to
Germany. And then will come back here to meet others. So we're looking toward
the end of this month and perhaps the first part of June. SEN. ROBERTS: Is the policy in regards to the military police and the
military intelligence functions at Gitmo, is this being reviewed for
compliance with Army regulations? MR. CAMBONE: If General Fay didn't realize that was the subject of his
investigation, sir, he is now painfully aware of it. SEN. ROBERTS: Was your encouragement to Major General Miller to inspect
the prison in any way prompted or otherwise linked to concerns about any
abuse at the prison? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. To the contrary, it was the desire to make certain
that we had the proper conditions within those places in order for the
information to be gathered. SEN. ROBERTS: When you learned of the abuse and knowing of the
intelligence activities at the prison, did you have any concern about a
possible link to the intelligence unit? MR. CAMBONE: I understood -- it's probably in February that there were
military intelligence personnel who were implicated. I did not know the
nature of that implication, the extent or scope of the abuse that had taken
place. So I didn't make a connection in the sense that there was a
significant issue here until we moved down the path and realized exactly what
was taking place. Furthermore, I still don't know that there is a significant
issue here. SEN. ROBERTS: I thank the chairman. GEN. SMITH: Sir, could I clarify on
the MP/MI regulation here? It is not absolutely clear in this regulation that
the MPs and the military intelligence guys should not have some relationship.
What is absolutely clear in the regulation is that the MPs are not allowed to
be in the interrogation process. So do not take it that there is some Army
regulation out here that says this shall not be. I've got it right here and
I'll be glad to provide it for the record, and it is not -- SEN. ROBERTS: I think that would be helpful. My point was I don't think
you can set up a firewall between those who are interrogating and the MPs. I
don't even think that would be desirable. On the other side of the fence, you
don't want them directly involved -- GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. SEN. ROBERTS: -- and with a lack of discipline and leadership and training
to have something like this happen. GEN. SMITH: I agree with you, and I
believe when you read the document you will see that that allows that sort of
activity. SEN. ROBERTS: Mr. Chairman, it would be helpful if we had Secretary
Cambone's statement. I don't have that. I don't know if it was made
available. SEN. WARNER: It was made just shortly before the hearing commenced. SEN. ROBERTS: All right. Thank you, sir. SEN. WARNER: It's being reproduced. Thank you. I acknowledge, as chairman
of the Intelligence Committee, you're conducting a separate inquiry on this
matter. But I think it's important -- I picked up on something that Secretary
Cambone -- do you have any knowledge of any Central Intelligence
participation in the interrogation process in the cellblocks? MR. CAMBONE: I do know that there were people who were brought by agency
personnel to that place, to the cellblocks. And there may be -- and again,
there may have been interrogations conducted by the agency personnel while
they were there, and that's about the extent of my knowledge of specifically
what they were engaged in in terms of interrogation. SEN. WARNER: General Smith, do you have any additional knowledge? GEN.
SMITH: No, sir. I do not. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Senator Reed. SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Taguba, to the
best of your knowledge, when did this pattern of abuse begin as we've seen in
the pictures? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, to the best of the evidence that we gathered, it
happened sometime after the 15th of October, thereabouts; mid- to late
October. SEN. REED: Fifteenth of October, right. And, General Smith, General Miller
came to Iraq in August with the baseline from Guantanamo, which had series of
coercive measures which was being employed in Guantanamo, and we all
recognize that area was not subject to the Geneva Convention. He briefed, as
you indicated in your previous testimony, individuals at the prison. He also
recommended the establishment of a theater joint interrogation and detention
center there. Is that correct? GEN. SMITH: I believe so. SEN. REED: That's correct. That's August, and then October we start seeing
a series of abusive behaviors, which the accused suggest were a result of
encouragement or direction from these intelligence people in this theater
joint interrogation and detention center. General Taguba has testified that
he did not investigate, talk to or in any way know anything about what was
going on in that joint interrogation center. Is that a fair sort of
chronology? GEN. SMITH: Sir, it's a fair chronology. I would only say that in
talking and speaking with General Miller -- and he has to be the one that
answers some of this -- he spoke directly to the brigade commanders that were
involved here and he had the special operating procedures with him and left
those with him. SEN. REED: And General, to your knowledge, General Miller made it very
clear to these brigade commanders that because of the Geneva Convention many
of these provisions could not be applied? GEN. SMITH: Sir, according to
General Miller, that was very clear to the commanders. SEN. REED: That was very clear. Then why would he bring those procedures
over and brief them? GEN. SMITH: Sir, he -- to the best of my knowledge --
and again, these are questions you're going to have to ask General Miller.
But to the best of my knowledge, he did not bring those coercive procedures
over with him. SEN. REED: Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you encouraged General Miller to
visit -- MR. CAMBONE: I did, sir. SEN. REED: Were you in communication or anyone in your office in
communication with General Miller during his trip or after his trip? MR. CAMBONE: He technically went over under joint staff auspices but with
my encouragement, and that of other senior members of the department, to look
at the issues that we've talked about. On his return, when he completed his
report, I received a briefing on it and then asked for people to look at its
subsequent progress and what had taken place. SEN. REED: So you were briefed on his recommendation to use the guard
force actively to condition the -- MR. CAMBONE: No, sir, again -- SEN. REED: You weren't briefed on that? MR. CAMBONE: No, no, excuse me. I want to phrase this right and that is on
the issue of making certain that we had the kind of cooperative
relationships, I understood that. I don't know that I was being told and I
don't know that General Miller said that there should be that kind of
activity that you are ascribing to his recommendation. SEN. REED: General Taguba -- excuse me, and I'm probably doing -- Taguba
-- I'm doing violence to your name. I apologize. GEN. TAGUBA: (Laughs.) SEN. REED: Taguba. Forgive me. Was it clear from your reading of the
report that one of the major recommendations was to use guards to condition
soldiers -- condition these prisoners, excuse me. GEN. TAGUBA: As I read it on the report, yes, sir. That was recommended on
the report. SEN. REED: But General Miller didn't think it was important enough to
brief you, Mr. Secretary? MR. CAMBONE: That's right, I was not briefed by General Miller. SEN. REED: Who were you briefed by? MR. CAMBONE: My deputy general, Boykin, briefed me on the report. SEN. REED: So General Boykin and General Miller were collaborating on this
exercise? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. Not at all, sir. Not at all. General Miller -- SEN. REED: And he -- so General Boykin didn't think it was important
enough to brief you on that? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. Again, your suggestion that the report on the phrase
"setting the conditions" is tantamount to asking the military
police to engage in abusive behavior, I believe, is a misreading of General
Miller's intent. SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, what I'm suggesting is anyone in your position
should have asked questions. One specifically would be: What does it mean to
set the conditions for these troops under the Geneva Convention? MR. CAMBONE: Sir -- SEN. REED: Did you ask that question? MR. CAMBONE: Well, I didn't have to answer (sic) that question. Why?
Because we had been through a process in which we understood what those
limits were with respect to Iraq, and what those were with respect to
Guantanamo. SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the detainees in that
prison under the Geneva Convention? MR. CAMBONE: I'm sorry, sir, which prison? SEN. REED: What is the -- Abu Ghraib. MR. CAMBONE: Abu Ghraib? They are there under either Article 3 or Article
4 of the Geneva Convention. SEN. REED: Let me recite Article 4. "Persons protected by the
convention are those who at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever
find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party
to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals."
These are protected persons. Let me read Article 31. "No physical or
moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to
obtain any information from them or from third parties." MR. CAMBONE: Sir, we're in agreement here. What -- SEN. REED: Well -- we're in agreement? I don't think we are, Mr.
Secretary. MR. CAMBONE: We are in agreement on the terms -- SEN. REED: General Miller suggested that guard forces be used to set the
conditions, based on the template at Guantanamo, those methods were coercive.
Yet you did not choose to ask about this. You were completely oblivious. MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. Again, what I said was we knew what the
circumstances were with respect to Guantanamo. We knew what the circumstances
were with respect to Iraq. We understood that the Geneva Convention and all
of its articles applied in Iraq. And that -- again, I come back to what I
keep saying here. The notion was that you had to have a cooperation, a cooperative
attitude, team-building, call it what you will -- SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, please. Please. MR. CAMBONE: -- between the MPs and the MIs. SEN. REED: Please. MR. CAMBONE: Sir -- SEN. REED: This is not a cooperative attitude. This is not a guard
observing the comments of a prisoner -- MR. CAMBONE: That is exactly true, sir. SEN. REED: Is that what's happening at Guantanamo? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. What took place -- SEN. REED: Is that what's happening in Guantanamo? MR. CAMBONE: What took place in the prison, we have all said, exceeded the
regulations, laws, and laws of war, conventions of the Geneva Convention and
everything else. General Taguba has said repeatedly that there was no policy,
he discovered no direction; that these were not directed acts on the part of
those individuals -- SEN. REED: Mr. Secretary, people failed to ensure, by asking the
appropriate questions, that these recommendations were transmitted down to
individual soldiers in a way that they would understand -- MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. REED: -- that this just is cooperating, not participating in setting
the conditions, as was done -- as is done in Guantanamo. MR. CAMBONE: Senator, I agree with you on the transmission of those
directions. And as I said to you, and as General Smith has alluded to, there
is a paper from General Sanchez making precisely those points. Moreover, if
you read General Miller's report, he says before you do anything with this,
we need a command staff judge advocate to work this problem and make sure
it's -- SEN. REED: Did the command staff judge advocate issue a legal opinion? MR. CAMBONE: Again, what I have is his report, and it says that that was
an activity in progress. And I have not heard -- what I know is that General
Sanchez -- SEN. REED: So General Sanchez ordered this policy without advice of
counsel. MR. CAMBONE: No, sir, he did not. If you read General Taguba's report, he
will tell you that at the time he was there, he had not seen any actions --
page 12, I think -- to implement the procedures specifically and officially
from General Sanchez down to anyone in the lower ranks of his command. The
activity that was taking place was not authorized. SEN. WARNER: I have to ask that if the witness -- GEN. SMITH: Sir, I would
add that there were numerous fragmentary orders out there that direct other
than what you are suggesting. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. If there's further amplification to the
senator's questions, please provide it for the record. Senator Allard? SEN. WAYNE ALLARD (R-CO): Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for moving
forward on this investigation quickly here at the committee level. I think
it's something that we need to move off our agenda so that we begin to
concentrate on many good things that are happening in Iraq as far as moving
them towards the sovereignty, their own sovereignty. And I do have a
statement I'd like to have put in the record -- SEN. WARNER: Without objection. SEN. ALLARD: -- I ask unanimous consent -- prior to my questioning. I'd
also share my shock and dismay that Mr. -- Senator Inhofe mentioned in the
fact that this unfortunate situation at Abu Ghraib prison is actually being
used as a fundraiser by the Kerry campaign. I just find that appalling. And
now I'd like to move forward and have a question to you, General Taguba. In
my statement I find that your reporting supports that the Army has taken the
initiative and following through appropriately on our own affairs. Now, just
so that I am clear in my own understanding, were you directed by any of your
superiors to remove any findings that you felt were credible or relevant? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I was not directed by my superiors. SEN. ALLARD: Were you directed by any of your superiors to withhold or
remove recommendations for any adverse personal actions regarding subjects of
your investigations? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, none whatsoever. SEN. ALLARD: And just so I am clear also about the makeup of the prison
population, my understanding from some of the testimony that we received here
today, that if somebody is classified as a terrorist -- in other words,
they're not associated with any country officially -- then there is a
difference -- they don't fall under the Geneva guidelines. Is that correct? MR. CAMBONE: The president designated the al Qaeda as being unlawful
combatants, sir. SEN. ALLARD: So just that particular terrorist organization, or any
terrorist organizations? MR. CAMBONE: I know for a fact it's al Qaeda, and my guess is that,
depending on the circumstances, if we found ourselves in armed conflict with
some other organization such as, the president would take that under
advisement. SEN. ALLARD: Okay. Now, did we have terrorists in the population at this
prison? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, none that we were made aware of. SEN. ALLARD: So as far as we know, these were all related to those
guidelines that generally you're complying with as far as the military is
concerned on how you handle prisoners. GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, they were either classified as security detainees or
other detainees, criminals, things of that nature. SEN. ALLARD: But no terrorist classification -- GEN. TAGUBA: None that we were given, no, sir. SEN. ALLARD: Okay. Secretary Cambone or General Smith, in your estimation,
why was anyone taking pictures in the security detention facility at Abu
Ghraib? And is there any explanation from a physical security or prisoner
security or military intelligence perspective? GEN. SMITH: Sir, the
photographing of prisoners, especially with private cameras, is against -- SEN. ALLARD: Private cameras? GEN. SMITH: -- by private cameras is against
the rules. The rule -- SEN. ALLARD: Uh-huh. And so these were taken by private cameras? GEN.
SMITH: Sir, I believe they were taken by digital cameras that belonged to the
individuals. But I don't know that. SEN. ALLARD: I see. GEN. SMITH: Maybe General Taguba does. GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, they were personal cameras. SEN. ALLARD: They were personal -- GEN. SMITH: This specifically says
photographing, filming and videotaping of individual EPW/CI, other than
internal internment facility administration or
intelligence/counterintelligence purposes, is strictly prohibited. SEN. ALLARD: And so this didn't have anything to do with the way you
manage the prisoners or any of their interrogation or any physical security
of the prison; this was taken on by individuals, unknown to those in command
at the time? GEN. SMITH: That is my belief, but I don't know specifically -- GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, as far as we know, based on the evidence and the
interviews and the statements, they were taken by -- with personal cameras. SEN. ALLARD: Individuals taking that on their own, without any instruction
from command? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. ALLARD: Okay. Now, General Smith, in General Taguba's report, he
recommended that a mobile training team be assembled and dispatched to your
area of operations to oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all
aspects of detainee and confinement operations. Were these teams dispatched
as recommended? GEN. SMITH: Sir, they were dispatched before the report was
actually approved. About 50 percent of the training is complete, and they
will continue and have all of this completed by the end of June, although
everybody that's out there is getting training weekly, awaiting the mobile
training team specifically getting down there. That will be followed by
sustained required training every week in all of these rules. Additionally,
the Geneva Conventions are required to be briefed at every change of shift. SEN. ALLARD: And your point is that when you got General Taguba's report,
even before it was finalized, you were beginning to take corrective action,
and so action was -- you were responding immediately to concerns about how --
what was being reported in the camp of Abu Ghraib. GEN. SMITH: That's
correct, sir. SEN. ALLARD: Okay. General Smith, General Taguba, I understand the
necessity and significance of maintaining a strategic interrogation
exploitation process. After all, our primary goal, along these lines, is to
save the lives of Americans, Iraqis and other partners in the region. Can you
share with us whether or not your command is actually developing good
intelligence based on your approved interrogation techniques? In other words,
are we saving lives? GEN. SMITH: Sir, my belief is that we are. We absolutely
have built the networks and what they look like and who the players are,
based on intelligence information from human intelligence. A portion of that
is this kind of activity. And so, sir, I would say absolutely that there have
been lives saved because of the people that we have been able to go out and
pick up because of the human intelligence process. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Akaka. SEN. DANIEL AKAKA (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General
Taguba, I want to commend you and your team for submitting a very -- what I
consider a candid and thorough report. Your task was not an easy one.
However, your honesty and your integrity reflect the character we expect from
soldiers in our military. General Taguba, in your report you reference the
lack of supervision over U.S. civilian contractor personnel, third country
nationals and local contractors within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib.
During your investigation, did you determine how many civilian contract
personnel were working there? Who supervised these individuals? And can you
describe what you observed in terms of type of access these individuals had
to the detainee areas? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, we did not make a determination of how many civilian
contractors were assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and operating at Abu
Ghraib. I personally interviewed a translator and I also personally
interviewed an interrogator, both civilians, contractors. There was also a
statement, and substantiated by the witnesses that we interviewed, of another
translator, a third-country national in fact, that was involved. And there
was another third- country national who was acting as a translator for the
interrogators that was involved in one of the interrogation incidents where
dogs were used. Their supervision, sir, from the best that we could determine
or discern from the information that we gathered, was they were under the
supervision of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, the JIDC, who
is then under the supervision of one, a lieutenant colonel, who was also
supervised by the brigade commander, the MI brigade commander. That was the
chain, sir. SEN. AKAKA: What access these individuals had to the detainee? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, they had an open access to the detainees. SEN. AKAKA: General Taguba, your report finds that two contractors were
either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Were
either of these contracted personnel supervising soldiers or in a position to
direct soldiers to take specific actions? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, they were not in any way supervising any soldiers, MP or
otherwise. However, the guards, those who were involved, looked at them as
competent authority as in the manner by which they described them, as the MI
or by name or by function. SEN. AKAKA: Secretary Cambone, what kind of training did the U.S. civilian
contractors have prior to going to Iraq? I've been informed that the training
for interrogators including training tactics and techniques used by other
countries. Did such training occur? And if so, are these tactics and
techniques approved by DOD intelligence officials? MR. CAMBONE: The only tactics and techniques that would be approved, sir,
are those that are approved by the command for use in that situation. As I
said earlier, the recruitment -- and if you look at the advertisements for
the recruitment, they look for people who have had the experience of being
interrogators. And I am told that in fact some of the retired personnel and
those who have since left the service are quite capable and are, in terms of
the interrogator's art, better able to conduct those interrogations than the
younger individuals who are new to that activity. GEN. SMITH: Sir, most have
gone through the 19-and-a-half week training at Fort Huachuca either while
they were in the service or afterwards. SEN. AKAKA: General Smith, who is keeping a record of all the employees
that work for all the contracted firms in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is it the
contracted firm or DOD? GEN. SMITH: Sir, you're beyond my knowledge there.
Except that the contracting officer who contracts with the company is
responsible for ensuring that they comply with the contract. And by name, I
suspect he has who those contractors are, but I can't tell you that for sure.
SEN. AKAKA: Thank you for responses. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. Senator Sessions. SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you. I first want to again state my
appreciation for the superb work of our soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
many, many instances, some of which we've seen on television, they
demonstrate restraint day after day. They -- sometimes under very intense
pressure, and they've maintained their poise and their professionalism.
They've risked their lives, as we've seen a soldier going to the bridge to
save an Iraqi woman under hostile fire. They have, on their off hours, built
schools and hospitals and treated the sick. And so this is particularly
painful for all of us to have this experience. But I absolutely have visited
those soldiers there, and I know them who've been there. They've told me of
things that they've done and the relationships they've had with Iraqi
citizens. Strongly, it's interesting how many want to volunteer and go back
because they believe in their work and they want to see this to be a healthy,
stable country, and nothing we say today should denigrate that. I have been
somewhat concerned at the suggestion that there is a policy of abuse here.
And, General Smith, I think you've read clearly that the explicit statement
from every level of command are in existence that would absolutely prohibit
this kind of behavior. Is not that correct? GEN. SMITH: Sir, that's
absolutely correct. In many venues, in a number of times when fragmentary
orders have been republished for the purpose of doing that, and I would like
to present those for the record. I know Senator Reed is very concerned about
it, and I would like to put those in the record. SEN. SESSIONS: With regard, General Smith, of the Geneva Conventions. I
was in the Army Reserve. I, for a short time, had a JAG slot, although I'm
not like Colonel Lindsey Graham over here, who was an actual practicing JAG
officer. But I remember in the transportation unit I had to train the
transportation soldiers, enlisted people, in the Geneva Conventions. Isn't
that done throughout the Army and the military? GEN. SMITH: Sir, that
continues to be a requirement. SEN. SESSIONS: And in basic training every soldier has been trained in the
Geneva Conventions, is that not correct? GEN. SMITH: That's correct, sir. SEN. SESSIONS: And I heard you say that they are briefing the Geneva
Conventions at every shift change now in Abu Ghraib prison? GEN. SMITH:
That's correct, sir. SEN. SESSIONS: And before that occurred, one of the criticisms I think
General Taguba mentioned was they were supposed to be briefing the Geneva
Conventions periodically, but perhaps it was not occurring. Are you familiar
with that part of the report and what the requirement was? SEN. SESSIONS: And, of course, General Smith, military police have more of
this training than others, than the soldiers, I assume, in how to handle
prisoners. GEN. SMITH: Sir, I can't speak to that. But my assumption would be
that certainly they have more training than the average soldier would. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I'll thank you for your comments and would note that
my time is expiring. But this Gitmo-ize issue I think really misses the
point. Yes, we want to use some of the procedures that were working in
Guantanamo and try to share that information to get it up to the people in
authority so we could save lives, get it out to the people who could use it
to identify who these attackers and terrorists were, but I don't think
there's any indication that General Miller would in any way suggest this kind
of behavior was legitimate. GEN. SMITH: Sir, you're absolutely right in both
counts. In a counterinsurgency like this, intelligence is critical, in that
if you want to go find the guys that are making the IEDs, or the ones that
are shooting down our helicopters with SA-7s, or folks that are fomenting the
insurgency, then you have to use human intelligence to do that. You can't do
that by technical means alone. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. GEN. SMITH: So it is a critical
piece of the process. And clearly, time and time again, we are told, humane
treatment in concert with the Geneva Conventions. SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you. SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator. That's a very important inquiry and
response. And I appreciate that, General. Senator Nelson -- Bill Nelson. SEN. BILL NELSON (D-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think General
Miller is where the problem lies, Senator Sessions. I think it lies
elsewhere. General Taguba, in -- on page 16 of your report you state: "I
find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military police personnel
included the following acts" -- and you list a whole number of those
acts. Among them: videotaping and photographing naked male and female
detainees; forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit
positions for photographing; forcing groups of male detainees -- and I will
insert paraphrasing here -- certain sexual acts while being photographed and
videotaped; a male MP guard having sex with a female detainee; using military
dogs without muzzles to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in one case,
biting and severely injuring a detainee; sodomizing a detainee with a
chemical light, and perhaps a broomstick; using military working dogs to
frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance
actually biting the detainee. Is that your report? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. SEN. BILL NELSON: All right. Mr. Secretary, when did you become aware of
the nature of these prisoner abuses and the existence of the photographic and
video evidence? That's two questions. MR. CAMBONE: The photographic evidence -- to be clear, that there were
photographs associated with this inquiry, I knew early in the change of the
year. The nature -- SEN. BILL NELSON: I'm sorry, I didn't understand. SEN. WARNER: We did not hear that answer. Could -- MR. CAMBONE: I'm sorry. I understood at the beginning of this year that
there were photographs associated with the criminal investigative inquiry. SEN. BILL NELSON: Did you know about these acts? MR. CAMBONE: I did not know about these acts, and learned of them in
specificity when I read the report and when I was exposed to some of those
photographs. SEN. BILL NELSON: And you read the report when? MR. CAMBONE: It's got to be in the last week, sir. It was not out of the
command until the end of last month. SEN. BILL NELSON: Now, the secretary of Defense told us last Friday that
he learned about these abuses in the middle of January. MR. CAMBONE: That we had abuses, true. The nature of them I was not aware
of. SEN. BILL NELSON: Did you know that they were horrific? MR. CAMBONE: No, sir. I received a report that there was an inquiry under
-- a number of six or seven, by the way, this being one of them, under way in
which there were people implicated in abuses of prisoners in Iraq. The
character of it, the scope, the scale, I was not aware of. SEN. BILL NELSON: Specific to this prison, what was your role in alerting
others that you work for, such as the secretary of Defense? MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. Again, as the secretary testified, corporately we
were aware, and I was one of those who told him so, that there were
investigations under way with respect to this facility and ultimately the
report that General Taguba has done in the February time frame. I mean, and
so it was a report of an investigation about acts of abuse. SEN. BILL NELSON: And what was your role in alerting the secretary to the
danger posed to our theater strategy and the general perception around the
world? MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. And let me draw gradations here. There are
instances of people having been mistreated in their apprehension,
transportation and interrogation that -- a level of poor performance and
behavior on the part of our people was understood, but it was understood at a
fairly low level of abuse and incidence, rate of incidence. The scale of this
was unknown to any of us. And had we known its scale, scope -- the earlier we
would have known, the sooner we would have been able to come to you, to the
president and to others to talk about it. SEN. BILL NELSON: And you're saying you didn't know about that until last
week? MR. CAMBONE: Scope, scale, until the pictures began appearing in the
press, sir, I had no sense of that scope and scale. I knew of the problem
that there was abuse, that there was a criminal investigation, that there was
an investigation being done by General Taguba, but I had no sense of it, sir.
SEN. BILL NELSON: Okay. Given that fact, why was the secretary of Defense
unprepared, when he came before us in the secure room in the Capitol on April
the 28th, why was he unprepared to share the information that he knew of with
members, probably some 35 or 40 members of the U.S. Senate? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I don't -- I can't answer for the secretary on that
question. He was here; he spoke with this committee and gave his answer, as I
recall. I can't speak for him on why he did not raise it that evening. I
don't know. SEN. BILL NELSON: You had not discussed that with him? MR. CAMBONE: That day I had not discussed it with him, no, sir. SEN. BILL NELSON: Had you discussed it with him any time before, after you
had learned in mid-January about these abuses? MR. CAMBONE: Again, I informed him that there were investigations under
way, of which this is one of six or seven that I was informed of. And I --
again, I did not understand the scope and scale. If I had, I assure you,
Senator, I would have told him. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Talent. SEN. JAMES TALENT (R-MO): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Cambone, very
quickly, one of the things I've wondered about, when you say you didn't
recognize the scope and scale, is it possible that not having seen the
pictures, you didn't recognize what the significance of the pictures would be
in terms of the impact of this internationally? MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. TALENT: General Taguba, your report -- I think if we summed it up,
we'd say that the unit at the prison was underdisciplined, undermanned, and
poorly led. Is that a fair summation? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, very fair. SEN. TALENT: And in the middle of an Army that I think all of us would
agree is very well disciplined and very well led. And so the question in my
mind is, well, how? Why is this particular unit so below the standards and
performance of the rest of the United States Army? And I'm going to make a
comment, and you can comment on it if you want. I was in the other body all
throughout the '90s, during which time the highest civilian authorities here
and on the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue were cutting the size of the
Army, and in my judgment, not funding adequately what -- the end strength
that we had remaining. And what I saw consistently was the Army, in order to
keep the tip of the spear sharp, if you will, allowing some of the rest of
the spear to go rusty. And, you know, sooner or later, those chickens come
home to roost. You get a poor commander, you don't have enough people, the guys
you've got are not trained up adequately because you don't have the money for
it, and then something like this happens. And I'll just say, I wish we'd had
the interest nationally through the '90s about funding the Army adequately,
and maybe we wouldn't all be sitting here. General Smith, let me ask you a
question. I had a phone call, actually, from a constituent who raised an
issue that might help in one aspect of this. As I understand it, one of the
difficulties with getting this up to the very highest civilian levels is that
-- the concern about command influence, because the same people that you'd
want to report this through and to are the people who would be involved in
passing on any court-martials that may emerge from this. And I know this is a
problem. My wife used to be in the JAG Corps. Well, the constituent let me
know that there is an office in the Air Force, the Reporting Office on
Special Interest Cases, which is evidently designed to deal exactly with
this. Are you aware of that office? GEN. SMITH: Sir -- sir, I'm not aware of
this -- of that office. And this was in basically Army channels. SEN. TALENT: Right. And what I'm wondering -- and maybe to recommend to
the secretary -- this office exists for, as I am told -- and we're checking
this out in my office -- in the Air Force to deal with cases like this. So
you can -- if you think something's of special significance, you can get it
up to higher authority, but through a separate, specially created chain of
command, so you don't compromise the command influence. And then you can get
it to somebody who then has the discretion, if they want to, to go directly
to the secretary or the deputy secretary. And we're certainly going to be
looking. And I'd recommend it to you, if you're not aware of it, because
evidently it functions pretty well in the Air Force. You're not aware of it,
though, as of now, I take it. GEN. SMITH: Now that you mention that office, I
-- yes, I recall that there is one. And I can tell you that the secretary has
more than that on his list of ideas, or will have more than that on the list
of his ideas. SEN. TALENT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. GEN. SMITH: Because you are
right; some way has got to be found to do this. SEN. TALENT: Yeah, because we clearly have a defect in this. I mean,
command influence is a problem, and when you think everybody involved in this
probably wishes, they just said, the heck with command influence, we've got
to pick up the phone and call and let people know. GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. Yes,
sir. And, indeed, you know, at least to the extent that the sergeant
delivered the disc to the Criminal Investigative Division, he put in train,
at least, a process that has brought all this to light. SEN. TALENT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Senator Dayton. (Pause.) This says
Dayton. SEN. LEVIN: Where's Nelson in that? He -- no, no, you missed him. SEN.: Senator Nelson. SEN. LEVIN: It's Ben Nelson. SEN. WARNER: We have a different sheet, but I think Senator Nelson is
preceding. SEN. LEVIN: All right. SEN. WARNER: Oops. Thank you very much. SEN.: (Laughs.) SEN. BEN NELSON (D-NE): I hate to cheat my colleague from Minnesota out of
his place, but -- SEN. WARNER: Well, he's been getting here earlier and earlier each time.
(Light laughter.) SEN. BEN NELSON: I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses today as
well for your very strong statements about your opinions as well as the -- as
well as the nature of the investigations. I'm going to ignore some of the
partisan sniping that's been going on from the other side today, because I
don't think it's particularly helpful. Having said that, General Taguba, in
your opinion, this is not a top-down problem. I think what you're saying is
that this was something that may have been spontaneous, but an abuse
involving only a handful -- last week the operative word was "few"
individuals, but I think that right now -- I think that perhaps it's a
limited number of people. Is that accurate? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. Based on the -- based on the interviews and the
statements that were given to us by both the detainees, MP personnel, and
those that we examined -- there were others, but we just could not track them
down. SEN. BEN NELSON: Well, what's the highest-ranking officer you
interrogated? GEN. TAGUBA: My interview, sir? Brigadier General Janis Karpinski. SEN. BEN NELSON: You didn't talk to General Sanchez or -- GEN. TAGUBA: No, sir. SEN. BEN NELSON: Did you talk to Colonel Pappas? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. I did. SEN. BEN NELSON: What's the highest-ranking official -- not officer,
official -- you may have talked to? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, none. I stopped at General Karpinski. SEN. BEN NELSON: So what may have happened above General Karpinski is an
open book; in other words, it's not -- or it's a closed book. No one knows
what may or may not have occurred above that level. Is that accurate, insofar
as your investigation's concerned? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. She did intimate to me other officials from the
Coalition Provisional Authority that she interacted with in terms of the
prison system, the Iraqi prison system, but I did not go after that. I did do
a mid-course brief to General Sanchez and General McKiernan, but only in that
we were proceeding on the timeline without any great details. SEN. BEN NELSON: But General Karpinski says that her command was severed
by the infusion of military intelligence dealing with certain detainees. Is
that accurate, or an approximation of her statement? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I don't understand where her command authority -- her
command was severed from Abu Ghraib. SEN. BEN NELSON: Well, because others were put in and she was given the
instruction. Colonel Pappas appeared on the scene and military intelligence
not under her command were there as well. Is that accurate? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, it's contained in my report that when I asked her if she
had known about the FRAGO 1108, dated 19 November, the first time -- or the
only time I interviewed her, she had no knowledge about that until about two
days afterwards, of which I asked her what did she do after that. And then
she wanted clarification from her chain of command, where she was told that,
you know, that the FRAGO was indeed in effect and that the MI brigade
commander was the commander, the forward operating base commander. SEN. BEN NELSON: Well, under those circumstances, if her command wasn't
severed was it at least interfered with, in your judgment? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, truthfully she challenged that. SEN. BEN NELSON: She -- in what way was -- GEN. TAGUBA: Challenged the authority that was given to Colonel Pappas. SEN. BEN NELSON: And what was the result of the challenge? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, it created a confusion and friction between those two
commanders. SEN. BEN NELSON: So what we have now is confusion, a lack of clarity of
command. We've got a handful at least of spontaneous abusers as it related to
detainees. So we know whether in that prison or in other prisons where there
were criminal prisoners as well, not detainees, whether there was any abuse
that carried over into their lives? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, the fragmentary order only affected Abu Ghraib. Camp
Bucca was still under the 800th MP Brigade exclusively. So was Camp Cropper
and Camp Ashraf. SEN. BEN NELSON: Well, were the abuses there anywhere similar? Were there
photographs there, as in the case of Abu Ghraib? GEN. TAGUBA: None that we gathered in terms of evidence. No, sir. SEN. BEN NELSON: And those other prisons were under her command, is that
correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. They were -- you might consider abuse, but that was
in terms of slapping a prisoner, and they were (dealt with ?). SEN. BEN NELSON: But not similar type abuses as we have here. GEN. TAGUBA: Not to the gravity that was exposed, no, sir. SEN. BEN NELSON: And not photographs. GEN. TAGUBA: Not photographs, no, sir. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. SEN. BEN NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Senator Chambliss. SEN. SAXBY CHAMBLISS: (R-GA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Taguba,
it's refreshing to those of us who deal with the military every day not only
to look at your report but to see your frankness here today. And I think
every military officer can certainly walk a little taller and a little straighter
because of the work that all of you gentlemen are doing, but particularly,
General, with respect to the way you have handled yourself and being willing
to be critical where you need to be critical. Now, General Smith, you made
the statement earlier that this particular unit, the 800th MP Brigade, they
were trained -- their job was "this sort of stuff." Now, I'm
assuming you mean from that that their job was to go over there and run this
prison. GEN. SMITH: Sir, and maybe General Taguba can jump in on this a
little bit, but I believe there are only one or two organizations of its type
in the United States Army, and it is an internment and resettlement brigade. SEN. CHAMBLISS: Okay. GEN. SMITH: (Speaking aside) Is that correct, Tony? SASC-PNL-ONE-IRAQ PAGE
89 05/11/2002 GEN. TAGUBA: That's correct, sir. SEN. CHAMBLISS: And Genearl Taguba, while General Schoomaker took
exception to a comment I made the other day relative to the lack of training
of this unit, they just happened to be a Reserve unit, the fact of the matter
is there were a few dysfunctional individuals within this unit that,
according to your report, was a very poorly trained unit that didn't have
knowledge of what they were supposed to do. In fact, as I read your statement
here, there's a general lack of knowledge, implementation and emphasis of
basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal and command requirements within the 800th
MP Brigade and its subordinate units. Do you still stand by that statement? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir, I stand by that statement. SEN. CHAMBLISS: In fact, your report is replete with comments relative to
the lack of training of this particular unit that was supposed to be highly
specialized and trained to do exactly what they were sent there to do; isn't
that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, when I interviewed the company commander and asked him
to outline for me what training he received at the mobe (ph) station, he
basically gave me the typical basic requirements only, marksmanship, things
of that nature. When I asked him, did you get any additional training prior
to your deployment and into deployment with regards to internment and
resettlement or anything that has anything to do with detention operations,
he said he did not. I did not interview the battalion commander, the 320th MP
Battalion commander, because he invoked his right. However, those that we
interviewed within that chain of command also concluded that. SEN. CHAMBLISS: Okay. General, there's something that has puzzled me
throughout this process that's evolved over the last -- or been made public
over the last 10 days or so. MORE And one thing is the fact that Major
General Ryder went in there in October and November of 2003 and did a report.
And his report, according to your report, his objective was to observe detention
and prison operations, identify potential, systemic and human rights issues
and provide near-term, mid-term and long-term recommendations to improve
operations in the Iraqi prison system. Yet he -- during the time that he was
there in Abu Ghraib, some of these instances were occurring. I think your
report confirms that; certainly, when he testified the other day in the
Intelligence Committee, that was obvious. I have asked the question privately
and publicly, why didn't somebody come forward and tell Major General Ryder
about this during the time that he was there when these incidents were going
on? Do you have any -- can you shed any light on that particular question? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I read General Ryder's report; I did not discuss it with
him. I know that it's in -- within the content of his report he visited quite
a bit of the detention centers, not just exclusively Abu Ghraib. The results,
of course, were -- his recommendations I agreed with in terms of putting
things under a single command and control, things of that nature. And I don't
want to speculate about anything with regards to any knowledge of detainee
abuse having not been reported or being reported up the chain of command. It
was apparent in our investigation that these things were happening, but we
were puzzled also with the fact, sir, that none of this stuff was going above
the battalion commander level. And that's what we concluded, that none of
this stuff was going above the battalion commander level. SEN. CHAMBLISS: Thank you, General. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. The committee will continue
right through the first vote, and if there's a second, likewise, until every
senator's had their opportunity to ask a question. Next week we have our bill
on the floor, according to the current schedule. So in all likelihood we'll
have to suspend this series of hearings until after the bill has been
considered. SEN. BILL NELSON: Mr. Chairman, may we continue with a second round, or --
? SEN. WARNER: No, Senator, because I think we would be infringing on the
policy councils for both parties. Thank you very much. Senator Dayton. SEN. MARK DAYTON (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding today's hearings, and for your resolve to face these
atrocities. You're an honorable man, and would that everyone shared your
resolve to find the truth rather than to deny it or deflect it.
Unfortunately, we in this committee were overshadowed yesterday by President
Bush's words and actions traveling to the Pentagon with the vice president to
tell the secretary of Defense, the country and the world, quote, "You're
doing a superb job." The president looked at a dozen more pictures of
abuse and reportedly shook his head in disgust, but the apologizes, regrets
and mea culpas are now history. It's back to business as usual. And if
anybody missed those subtleties, the vice president was even more direct over
the weekend when he said people ought to get off of his case and let him do
his job, referring to the secretary of Defense. In other words, we should
stop meddling and interfering and let them go back to running the war. This
morning illustrates the difficulty in a hearing to get beyond the words to
the realities. General Taguba's report and directness here today are notable
exceptions. But it shows why the pictures made such a difference; they showed
us the truth. Most of the words today have managed to obscure that truth.
We're told there were papers and procedures, policies and protocols; there
were directives given, conditions set, and everyone followed the Geneva
Convention, international law, United States principles, except for a few
people who did very bad things, unbeknownst to anyone else, all of whom were
doing what they were doing to save American lives. So let's dispense with
this and get back to our good intentions, the great progress going unreported
in 95 percent of Iraq; the upcoming handoff of democracy to whoever the
recipients shall be. And that's why those pictures are disruptive, because
they defy that sanitizing. They can't be obscured by non-descriptions like,
quote, "the inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature," close
quote, which were words used to describe the forced masturbation of one
detainee or the rape of another. That's why Pentagon officials are reportedly
preventing the additional pictures from being publicly released. The White
House communications director said that the president wants the Pentagon to,
quote, "use its best judgment about the release of the photos."
Close quote. Well, we've seen where that best judgment has gotten us so far,
and I think it's deplorable that -- SEN. WARNER: Senator -- SEN. DAYTON: -- they intend again to try to suppress the truth and all the
truth from the American people. SEN. WARNER: Senator, having worked on that question with the department,
at this point in time, the decision as to public release is an ongoing
review. To the best of my knowledge, as of late last night, no final decision
has been made -- SEN. DAYTON: Well -- SEN. WARNER: -- by the Department of Defense, the White House or others. SEN. DAYTON: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If you were to go
elsewhere -- and thank goodness for a free and vigilant press, because I
don't think we would find most of this out any other way, but there's a Red
Cross report which describes excessive patterns of -- patterns of excessive
force used by U.S. soldiers in prisons, and not just the one subject to this
investigation, but throughout the country. The Red Cross wrote that ill treatment during capture was
frequent. It often included pushing people around, insulting, taking aim with
rifles, punching, kicking, striking which seemed to go beyond -- seemed to
reflect a usual modus operandi and appeared to go beyond the reasonable,
legitimate, proportional use of force required to apprehend suspects or
restrain persons resisting arrest or capture. The published reports say that as many as 43,000 Iraqis
were detained at various times, and that an estimated 90 percent of them were
determined to have not had any involvement in the matters under -- that were
of concern to U.S. authorities; that only 600 were turned over to -- for
prosecution; that 8,000 that remain in detention now for indefinite periods
of time, although I gather that there is now steps being taken to release all
but 2,000 of them. My time is up, but I'm just going to complete here by just
referring to one individual that said he was taken from a barber shop where
he was getting a shave and he was beaten with pipes, starting at his legs and
back and moving to his head. He was bleeding from his mouth and ears. He
fainted. When he woke up, he was in a dog's cage at a local military base. He
was left naked in the cage for several days, receiving only scant food and
water until soldiers hung him from a tree by his cuffed hands. "They
told me they would bring my wife and hang her next to me." I don't take any pleasure in recounting these incidents,
but I take umbrage that there are still those who want to deny that they
occurred to any degree or those that want to ascribe other motives to those
of us who are just trying to face up to them. I want the United States to succeed in Iraq. I'm deeply
concerned that what's occurred there is going to cause further violence that
will come down on our troops, who will bear the brunt of this, and set back
our ability to meet our objectives there. But I don't see how that's going to
be served by trying to obscure or deny what's occurring there or what has
occurred there, and make sure -- try to make sure it doesn't happen again
there or anywhere else in the world. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired. SEN. WARNER: I thank you, Senator. Senator Cornyn. SEN. JOHN CORNYN (R-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Taguba, Chairman Warner asked I believe earlier
the question what went wrong, and you answered there was a failure of
leadership from the brigade level on down -- and down. In your investigation,
did you find any evidence -- any evidence whatsoever -- that culpability
extended beyond the brigade level? GEN. TAGUBA: No, sir. We did not. However, we did recommend, based on some
evidence that we gathered of the complicity of MI interrogators, and we
recommended that would be -- a separate investigation be provided under
Procedure 15 of 380-10. SEN. CORNYN: How many individuals do you believe were involved in this
abuse at Abu Ghraib? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, directly there were those six or seven, I believe. I
know that the ongoing investigation continues under Article 32. Don't know of
anybody -- of any others. In terms of those soldiers' supervisors and
leaders, I enumerated that on my report. I believe there was a total of 17
there that I identified. SEN. CORNYN: So there was seven -- there was disciplinary action taken
against the seven supervisors, and then there was the actual criminal charges
that have now been brought, I guess, against another seven; is that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. Those were the criminal investigation. You know,
I'm not involved in that whole process. But my investigation was purely
administrative, to gather facts and circumstances that were related to the
detainee abuse and the other things that I mentioned to you earlier,
principally their leaders. SEN. CORNYN: I ask those questions because I am concerned that there are
those who are suggesting that somehow what you have said was exceptional
misconduct on the part of these guards and their superior officers was
somehow the norm. Indeed, there was a question asked earlier attempting to
suggest that this was the implementation of polices and procedures that are
in existence at Guantanamo Bay. There was a question asked about whether
Guantanamo Bay was somehow the base line, and that now that represented the
norm and this was the logical conclusion of those policies and procedures at
Guantanamo Bay. I have to tell you that like other members of the
committee, no doubt, I've traveled to Guantanamo Bay because of my interest
in the detention of the individuals there who -- of course who plan, finance
and execute terrorist acts against Americans and other innocent civilians.
And I had an opportunity to meet General Geoffrey Miller, who was the
commander of the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo. And I was very impressed
with the treatment, with the policies and procedures that allowed the humane
interrogation of detainees there. And let me just ask you, whether they're enemy combatants
or unlawful combatants or common criminals, is there any policy that you're
aware of in the United States military that allows for less than humane
treatment of detainees? GEN. TAGUBA: No, sir. Did not find that anywhere. SEN. CORNYN: And of course we are concerned about the atypical conduct on
the part of these individuals who committed these crimes and those who failed
to see that they got the supervision and the leadership necessary in order to
avoid these crimes. But I must add my voice to those of others that say,
while we are absolutely committed to getting to the bottom of this, and your
report gets us a long way there, and to making sure that the guilty are held
accountable, we can't forget the context in which all of this is taking
place, and that is in a larger context of many other military troops serving
honorably in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, and the need to get
essential information from some of these detainees that could well protect
America from the next 9/11. And so I want to commend you and the others for the
wonderful service that you're performing and thank you for helping us get to
the bottom of this. And I hope that we will ultimately be successful in doing
so, holding those accountable who were responsible and then making sure we
focus on our greater and more important job of making sure that America's
safe in this war on terror. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Clinton. SEN. HILLARY CLINTON (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join
in thanking you, General Taguba, for your service and for this report. You
know, I don't think anyone disagrees with the last comment by my colleague
that our objective is to prosecute this war on terrorism successfully and
also to ensure the safety and security of our own people from future attacks.
The question is whether behavior and conduct and decisions with respect to
the treatment of these detainees undermines the potential success that we all
agree is essential to our national security. I am still confused. And my confusion is this: with
respect to the actions that are described in your report, General Taguba, you
also included a number of other problems at other detention facilities. But
is it your best information that no detention facility that was in any way
connected with the 800th MP Brigade, had the level of problems that you
reported in this unit at Abu Ghraib? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes ma'am. I -- the scope, again, was within the context of
those facilities that the 800th MP operated. SEN. CLINTON: And the 800th MP Brigade was under the command of General
Karpinski, is that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes ma'am. SEN. CLINTON: Now, if the problems were severe and located principally in
this one unit, then I think it is appropriate to follow the chain-of-command
up to the decision to send General Miller to that prison, whereas I
understand the testimony thus far, he set up a specific joint interrogation
unit. He did, however one wants to describe, either coordinate or direct the
MPs' involvement in the conditioning of the detainees. Is that a correct
statement, General? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes ma'am. SEN. CLINTON: All right. So, it seems to me that if indeed General Miller
was sent from Guantanamo to Iraq for the purpose of acquiring more actionable
intelligence from detainees, then it is fair to conclude that the actions
that are at point here in your report are in some way connected to General
Miller's arrival and his specific orders, however they were interpreted, by
those MPs and the Military Intelligence that were involved. Therefore, I, for
one, don't believe I yet have adequate information from Mr. Cambone in the
Defense Department as to exactly what General Miller's orders were, what kind
of reports came back up the chain-of-command as to how he carried out those
orders, and the connection between his arrival in the fall of '03 and the
intensity of the abuses that occurred afterwards. Now, we know that General
Karpinski has been rightly singled out for appropriate concern about her
behavior and her failure of command, but I just want to read to you a comment
she made in an interview, which I find extraordinary. And I quote, "But
when I looked at those pictures, and when I continued to see those pictures,
I don't think that there was anything that was improperly done because this
wasn't something that was a violation of a procedure. This was something they
were instructed to do as a completely new procedure. I'm not sure that those
MPs had ever been confronted with any instructions like this before." General Taguba, can you explain for us the disparity
between holding this brigade commander completely accountable and the
comments that I just read to you, in light of the fact that certainly the
20th Military Intelligence Brigade was given tactical control over that
prison? Can you explain the General Karpinski's comment? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes ma'am. During the course of our investigation, there was
clear evidence, based on my interview of General Karpinski and Colonel
Pappas, that there was friction between those two commanders in the operation
of Abu Ghraib. This tension was that who was in charge of when and at what
time. They could not explain, so that's the context of the ambiguity of the
order that was given to Colonel Pappas. It was clear that he was directed to
be the forward-operating base commander there for security of detainees and
force protection. However, General Karpinski challenged that, and she noted
that in her recorded testimony, point one. I held her accountable and
responsible, not exclusively and solely for the abuse cases there at Abu
Ghraib, but the context of her leadership, the lack of leadership on her
part, overall in terms of her training, the standards, supervisory of
mission, the command climate in her brigade. Those were all, in totality, why
I held her accountable and responsible, ma'am. SEN. CLINTON: And just one last follow-up, General. Did Colonel Pappas
report directly to General Miller? GEN. TAGUBA: That I did not know, because General Miller was not there. He
reported to, I believe, to CJTF-7. SEN. CLINTON: General Smith, do you know who Colonel Pappas reported
directly to? GEN. SMITH: Yes sir, through CJTF-7. Sir -- ma'am, General
Miller had no command relationship in this at all. I mean, he came over to do
an investigation and make some findings and recommendations on how to
improve. Nobody reported to him. Nobody -- he had no relationship whatsoever
other than to report details. SEN. CLINTON: (Inaudible) -- SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Senator Clinton. Senator Graham. SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Thank you, Senator. I think they've left, but
just a few minutes ago, there were some foreign military officers that came
to the hearing, and I would -- just want to say for the record that I'm very
proud of the fact that our military command system, civilian and military,
comes out in the open, is asked hard questions, has to appear before the
public. And you've documented, General Taguba, some failings. I think we're
failing the country ourselves up here a bit. I think we're overly criticizing
this. This should be what binds us, not what tears us apart. I think
Republicans and Democrats have a different view of a lot of things, but it
seems to me that investigating a prison abuse scandal, when you say you're
the good guys, should pull you together, not tear you apart. And I would just
hope my colleagues can understand that when you say you're the good guys,
you've got to act as the good guys. So, General Taguba, how long have you
been in uniform? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, this is my 32nd year. SEN. GRAHAM: Saddam Hussein is in our control. How would you feel if we
sicced (sp) dogs on him tomorrow? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, on Saddam Hussein? SEN. GRAHAM: Yeah. GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, we still have to follow the tenets of international law.
SEN. GRAHAM: As much as you and I dislike him, as mean a tyrant as he is,
and you know he'd kill us all tomorrow, I am so proud of you. What are we
fighting for, General Taguba, in Iraq? To be like Saddam Hussein? Is that
what we're fighting for? GEN. TAGUBA: No sir. SEN. GRAHAM: Our standard, General Smith, can never be to be like Saddam
Hussein, can it be, sir? GEN. SMITH: No sir. SEN. GRAHAM: How long have you been in the service? GEN. SMITH:
Thirty-four years. SEN. GRAHAM: Is it okay with you if the International Red Cross comes and
looks at our prisons? GEN. SMITH: Absolutely, sir, and they should. SEN. GRAHAM: Okay. God bless you both. General Taguba, it comes down to
this for me. You've got one prison that was run differently than other
prisons. The photo we see of the detainee on the stool, wired up, was that
just six or seven people having a good time in a perverted way at that
person's expense, or was there something deeper going on there, and do you
know? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, based on the evidence, it was six or seven people that
created that type of a scenario, a situation. SEN. GRAHAM: Okay. To the dog scenario, where you see the detainee with
two dogs, was that a couple of guards with dogs in a perverted way having a
good time, or was there something else going on? GEN. TAGUBA: No sir. The dogs were invited in there, according to witness
statements, and collaborated by interviews by the two MP guards. SEN. GRAHAM: The way these people were stacked up in sexual positions and
the sexual activity, was that just individual guards, or was that part of
something else going on? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, those actual acts, based again on interviews and
statements and collaborated by the detainees' statements as well. SEN. GRAHAM: Part of the defense that we're going to be hearing about in
these court martials is that the people that we're charging are going to say
this system that we see photographic evidence of, was at least encouraged if
not directed by others. Do you think that's an accurate statement? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I would say that they were probably influenced by others
-- SEN. GRAHAM: Okay -- GEN. TAGUBA: -- if not necessarily directed specifically by others. SEN. GRAHAM: For those -- we're not going to have a seminar in military
law today, but I have a different view of command influence than some people
have suggested, in terms of what we can disclose and how it would affect court
martials. There -- another level of accountability in the military beyond
just participating in out-of- bounds behavior, Geneva Convention or
otherwise. Do you agree with me that the Uniform Code of Military Justice
prevents this conduct, regardless of the Geneva Convention? GEN. TAGUBA: Absolutely. SEN. GRAHAM: So, ladies and gentlemen, what we're here today is to show
the world that our military is governed by the rule of law, just like all of
us. And having been a JAG officer for over 20 years, a prosecutor, a defense
attorney, now a Reserve judge, I've got great confidence that we will get to
the bottom of this. Do you agree with that, General Smith? GEN. SMITH: Yes sir, I do. SEN. GRAHAM: Now. Dereliction of duty is a concept unique to military law.
Probably should apply to us in politics. A lot of us would be in trouble,
probably me included if that was the case. But in the military, as a
commander, it can be a criminal offense if you derelict your duty to maintain
good order and discipline in a way that crosses the line, is that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes sir. SEN. GRAHAM: You interviewed a general officer, and in your report you
indicated that you thought the general officer misled you about how many
times that person had been to the prison system, is that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes sir. And that was collaborated by her own aide. SEN. GRAHAM: I would suggest to you, General Taguba, that out of this
investigation, not only should we focus on the privates, and the sergeants,
and the specialists who did criminal activity, but we also should have a hire
accountability that if a general officer misrepresents what they did in terms
of command and control, that a letter of reprimand may not be the appropriate
sanction. But I will leave that discussion for others. Colonel Philabaum
(ph)? GEN. TAGUBA: Colonel Philabaum(ph), yes sir. SEN. GRAHAM: Your description of his time there was classic dereliction of
duty. You have recommended a letter of reprimand for him. GEN. TAGUBA: And relief from command, sir, and to be removed from a
promotion list. SEN. GRAHAM: My point is that Secretary Rumsfeld should not be held
accountable for the criminal activity of others. It would be unfair to any
military commander, politician or otherwise, to have to take a fall when
people break the law and take the law in their own hands. However, those of
us in responsibility do have a burden to bear. SEN. INHOFE: Senator Graham, your time has expired. SEN. GRAHAM: Could I just end with this one thought, Mr. Chairman? SEN. INHOFE: Yes, sir. SEN. GRAHAM: Secretary Rumsfeld has to manage the whole war. I think it
would be unfair for him to take a fall if this is just a limited activity of
a few people or a prison poorly run. At the end of the day, General Taguba,
responsibility, command and otherwise, is very much part of the military law
and culture. And I appreciate what you've done to expose the failings. Thank
you very much. SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Senator Graham. Senator Bayh. SEN. EVAN BAYH (D-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen,
for your presence here today. Two quick questions for you, Mr. Cambone, then
one observation that if any of you want to react to, I would appreciate it.
And I apologize for moving expeditiously, but there is a vote that is about
to expire. Mr. Cambone, I'd like to follow up on the questions of some
others; I think Senator McCain started, and then it was touched upon a little
bit later with regard to Ambassador Bremer's warnings. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. BAYH: Published reports indicate that he began raising these warnings
in about August of last year. And as I understand your testimony, these were
sort of general in nature about the overcrowding and the concern for
transiting people through there and returning them to their civilian
situation when they didn't need to be retained any longer. The Red Cross
report came to his attention in February or March, and you seemed to imply
that perhaps his warnings became more specific with regard to activities in
the prison thereafter. Is that the case? MR. CAMBONE: With respect to the first part of your question, sir, or your
statement, I believe that to be the case. That is to say, I was not in
communications with Ambassador Bremer nor know of any statements by him
specific to these -- SEN. BAYH: So in his meetings with the secretary, you were never present. MR. CAMBONE: I did not know of those. I did know of his general concern,
as you said, for the prison population. SEN. BAYH: What about following the Red Cross report? MR. CAMBONE: With respect to the 2004 report, I can only tell you again
what I know, and that is that there was a meeting in that time frame of
February at which senior members of the CPA staff met with members of the
ICRC and this report was made available. And from that, there were some
communications from CPA to the State Department and elsewhere with respect to
these concerns. SEN. BAYH: About these abuses. MR. CAMBONE: That's what I think I know. SEN. BAYH: Did that make its way into -- MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I did not see the ICRC report until I began working my
way into this problem over the last two weeks. SEN. BAYH: My second question involves the dispute between you and the
general about who had tactical control at the prison. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. SEN. BAYH: As I understand it, he believes that the military intelligence
individuals did exert practical tactical control. And it's your opinion that
they did not. As I understand your position, the intelligence authorities
were given control over the facility but not control over the individuals
running the facility. What exactly does that mean? How do you have control
over a facility but not the people who are running it? MR. CAMBONE: The same way that -- SEN. BAYH: Were they in charge of the plumbing or the -- MR. CAMBONE: No, sir -- well, in the same way that you have a building
supervisor who doesn't tell the tenants how to do their business. In other
words, you do require someone who is senior in command to be able to be
responsible for the facility; that is, for its security from outside
activity, internal security, the care and feeding of folks, all of those
administrative and logistics tasks that go with running a large facility.
Then there are, within that facility, a number of operations and activities
that take place which are under the command of other individuals. And those
individuals are responsible for the exercise of command over those
activities. SEN. BAYH: A layman's opinion, General; I'd be interested in your opinion.
It seems to me the attempt here to draw this line may have contributed to
confusion about who was in charge, which may have led to some of these
troubles. General, is that a fair comment? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir. We followed doctrine in the context of our
investigation as a matter of our base lines. We used those as references.
Doctrinally, (Daycon?), as given to Colonel Pappas, was that his mission was
for security detainees and force protection. Doctrinally, if you (Daycon?) to
him, he establishes priorities. SEN. BAYH: My comment -- MR. CAMBONE: That doesn't go, sir, though, to the heart of his being able
to give what would have been -- and General, correct me -- unlawful orders to
the commander of that military police battalion. GEN. SMITH: Sir, nor did it allow him to change their mission. In other
words, they're trained to a specific task. It's the person with operational
control that is allowed to change how they do business and the like. So, as
General Taguba said, he can change the priorities for these folks, but they
still have to operate within the guidelines and the doctrine that they are
trained to. So they are still cops doing cop business. SEN. BAYH: General? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, there were established standards -- two, in fact -- that
were signed by Lieutenant General Sanchez that stipulated what you can and
cannot do. Those were clear. However, the feeling here was that some leaders
just did not comply with it. They were posted for a purpose, sir, and there
were certain standards that they have to follow. SEN. BAYH: Compounded by a number of other things, including lack of
uniformity in training. My last comment -- and this gets to the dilemma; we
face this repeatedly in the intelligence arena, Mr. Chairman -- and that is
the following. Timely and accurate intelligence information is essential to
protecting our troops, civilians, winning the war against this insurrection
and the larger war against terrorism. At the same time, preserving our honor and our moral integrity is also vitally
important in the longer term to winning this struggle, because that, at the
end of the day, is what differentiates us from those with whom we fight. Now, it seems to me you've laid out, all of you, in your testimony, we
begin taking our instruction about how do you draw the line. How do you draw
the line between vigorous but acceptable interrogation versus morphing into
abuse? We start with the Geneva Convention and general principles. I think, Mr.
Cambone, you then used the term "approved interrogation
techniques," of which there were 20 or 30. So we try and refine that
general guidance into more specific guidance. Then exceptions are allowed at
the behest or the direction of the commander. I assume in this case it would
have been General Sanchez. Is that correct? I assume he didn't authorize any
exceptions. No. That's the process that we go through in trying to determine where the
line is, what you can do and what you can't do. And I'd just like to conclude
by saying I think it is absolutely critical that we enforce the line as we
defined it -- vigorously; hold those who crossed it to account, to show that
we don't tolerate this kind of thing. But let's learn the lessons of the past as well. We are currently trying
to overcome some past intelligence abuses 20, 30 years ago and our reaction
to those abuses that have hamstrung us in the covert arena and otherwise. So let's draw the line bright and clear. Let's institute training. Let's
hold commanders who don't insist that the line be followed to account as well
as the foot soldiers. But let's not throw the baby out with the bath water,
because gaining access to appropriate information is also important, as we
also preserve our moral integrity and our honor. MR. CAMBONE (?): Thank you for that, Senator. And if I may say, in trying
to answer the committee's questions today on these issues, if in any way I
suggested that if we find that there was misconduct or misbehavior or
inappropriate behavior on the part of anyone associated with the military intelligence
side of this, which General Fay is now looking at today, I can assure you and
other members of this committee that we will be back here and we will tell
you that. SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Senator Bayh. Senator Lieberman. SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses. In absentia, I wanted to thank Chairman Warner and Senator Levin
for the speed and intensity with which they have convened this series of
hearings. And I thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We've got a real challenge here, which is to deal with this inhumane,
immoral, unacceptable, un-American behavior that happened in this prison and
maybe others -- I want to ask some questions about that -- and to do it as
quickly as we can so that we can get back to fighting the war on terrorism,
and to do it in so comprehensive and aggressive a way that we do not allow or
even facilitate unintentionally the erosion of public support in this country
for the critically important mission our troops are performing in Iraq and
the broader war against terrorism. And that's why I appreciate these
hearings. In that regard, I think the comprehensiveness of our investigation
-- yours, really -- is critically important. General Taguba, I just want to
make clear, when you were asked to investigate, you were asked to investigate
conditions at Abu Ghraib and two of the other most populated prison
facilities in Iraq. Is that correct? GEN. TAGUBA: Yes, sir, with matters related to training standards,
internal policies and the like. Yes, sir. SEN. LIEBERMAN: Are there other prison facilities in Iraq beyond those
three, therefore, that have not been reviewed? Or are they being reviewed now
for conduct that we're concerned about? GEN. TAGUBA: Sir, I did not go beyond the four that I looked at during the
course of the investigation. And I believe a subsequent investigation by the
Army inspector general conducted that following my investigation. They looked
at other facilities. SEN. LIEBERMAN: Is that General Ryder's (sp) investigation? GEN. SMITH: No, sir, there's an independent investigation put in train by
the acting secretary of the Army that covers all -- as I understand it, not
only facilities in Iraq, but in Afghanistan as well. SEN. LIEBERMAN: That was my next question; Afghanistan as well. MR. CAMBONE: Yes, sir. GEN. SMITH: That's ongoing, Senator. SEN. LIEBERMAN: That is ongoing -- GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. SEN. LIEBERMAN: -- in the sense that it pre-dates this scandal? GEN. SMITH: No, sir. It was directed and it continues today. They are
still -- SEN. LIEBERMAN: So that -- I got you. Would it be fair for you to say
through us to the American people that we are essentially looking everywhere
throughout the American military prison system to make sure that nothing like
what happened at the Abu Ghraib prison is occurring anywhere else? GEN. SMITH: I'd have to look at the specific charge that the Department of
Army IG was given, but I believe that to be the case. Certainly they are
looking -- well, go ahead. MR. CAMBONE: No, with respect to the CENTCOM AOR and the handling of
prisoners there and terrorists who are in detention, the secretary of Defense
has asked the secretary of the Navy to take a look as well at Charleston and
other places where there may be internees. SEN. LIEBERMAN: Okay, that's very important. Let me come back -- and
obviously you will continue to report to us on the conclusions of those
investigations. I had an exchange with Secretary Rumsfeld on Friday that
reverberated in my own mind over the weekend. I think one of the other
senators may have asked one of you a question about this. And it is about the
relevance of the Geneva Convention to the prisoners being held in Iraq. I had
read various statements by the secretary and others that confused me on this,
because I didn't think the Geneva Convention was being applied precisely to
detainees. And in response to -- in Iraq -- my question on Friday, Secretary
Rumsfeld said, "The president announced from the outset that everyone in
Iraq who was a military person and was detained is a prisoner of war;
therefore the Geneva Conventions apply." And second, continuing with the
secretary's statement, the decision was made that civilians or criminal
elements that are detainees are also treated subject to the Geneva Convention,
although it is a different element of it. In an earlier point, in an
interview he did on television, he -- and this is, I think, what was asked
before -- he said that they're not entitled to the Geneva Convention -- oh,
I'm sorry, here it is -- the decision was made that the Geneva Convention did
not precisely apply, but that every individual would be treated as though the
convention did apply. So, first off, my staff can't find the statement that the
president made announcing that policy. And Secretary Cambone, I'd ask you -- MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I'd be happy to get that for you. And I'm happy to ask
the secretary this afternoon what indeed he had in mind in that expression.
Senator Levin asked that question earlier. And I will ask him and I will get
you an answer. SEN. LIEBERMAN: I would appreciate that. And as part of that -- and I'd
ask General Taguba or General Smith to respond to this part of it -- how do
we -- there's a report in one of the papers today based on an International
Red Cross report that 70 to 90 percent of the detainees, according to the Red
Cross, were captured without solid evidence of their guilt. And the numbers
are large. Is there a process for determining, considering what Secretary
Rumsfeld said on Friday, who is a prisoner of war and who is a detainee --
who's military and therefore treated as a prisoner of war, and who's a
detainee, and therefore who gets the higher level of rights legally? MR. CAMBONE: We have at the moment very few, as I recall, enemy prisoners
of war left in the system. What we have primarily are those who have posed a
threat to the security of the coalition forces, the Iraqi government or the
Iraqi people or other who may have committed crimes of one kind or another
against Iraqi citizens. There are some of those latter who are, as I
understand it, in custody and being in the custody of Iraqi security police
and things of that sort. And they are in a process to be brought forward
before an Iraqi judicial process, which itself is slowly and painfully
standing up. SEN. LIEBERMAN: Okay. So my final question -- I think my time is up; maybe
I should ask you to bring it back to the Pentagon and then respond, sir, if
you could, is the status which is -- because as I read the Geneva Convention,
I think the detainees have rights under the convention. They are a lot lower
than the rights of prisoners of war. So, I'm confused by what seems to be the
policy that Secretary Rumsfeld articulated on Friday, that though they're not
entitled to the rights of Geneva that we're giving it to them. MR. CAMBONE: I will take one more step on behalf of my general counsel,
and I will over you him for a period of time to come by and brief you and
other Senators as you might which, Mr. Chairman, on precisely how this has
unfolded, and so that there is no confusion left in the committee or in the
American people about where we stand on the Convention. SEN. LIEBERMAN: I appreciate that. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. SEN. WARNER: And thank you, Senator. And I will be discussing with the Secretary of Defense and others the
other witnesses that I think should come before the committee, and I'm
considering general counsel given his expertise in this area, so we'll do
that. And, again, I wish to thank the Secretary of Defense through you, Mr.
Secretary, for the cooperation in putting together this series of hearings
that we're holding today. I would ask now, do you or any other witness have a response to a
question, or wish to make any added statement before we close out this morning's
record? MR. CAMBONE: Sir, I ordinarily begin my presentations here by saying that
it's a pleasure. This is not. It is a duty, and a responsibility. We take it
seriously. To General Dayton's point, we will get to the bottom of this. More
over, I would like to thank you for your courtesies. They are important to
all of us who are grappling with a very difficult problem, and in the end we
will answer this committee's questions, and those of the other committees of
the Congress, to the best of our knowledge, with as much knowledge as we have
at the time that we are asked the question. And, sir, therefore, I say to you
if we read through this record and we find we have made a mistake, I have
misspoken on a convention, or I have told you something about command
relationships that is incorrect, I would beg your indulgence to allow us to
correct that record as quickly and as accurately as we can, and make any
changes known to every member of the committee when we do so. SEN. WARNER: And I thank you for that offer, and it will be done. This after noon we'll be having Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, he's a Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, United States Army, handling intelligence matters. Major General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., Director of Intelligence, J2, the Joint Staff. And Major General Thomas J. Romig, Judge Advocate General, United States Army,. If there are no other comments, I thank my colleagues for the sincerity, the tremendous time that each of them are putting in to prepare for this hearing, and I think it has been a very successful hearing. And I thank you, Secretary Cambone, General Smith, and General Taguba. MR. CAMBONE: Thank you, sir.
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