To Find an Answer
I guess this post is a variation on the tiresome “why do they hate us?” question. It’s not uncommon to run into statements along the following lines: Islamist radicalization and the hatred for the United States (or, at least, hatred of the U. S. government) among Muslims are solely or primarily due to our policies there and, in particular, to the presence of the U. S. military in the Middle East (which predates the invasion of Iraq). Here’s an example of such a statement that, I think, is typical of the genre from Jeb Koogler of Foreign Policy Watch (he’s also an associate blogger at the great blog, The Moderate Voice, which directed me to Jeb’s post):
Indeed, it’s important to remember that this phenomenon of radicalization has occurred overwhelmingly since 9/11, despite the fact that “multiculturalist” social policies had been in place long before that. Since this radicalization has occurred almost exclusively in the past few years, and since most British Muslims claim to be adopting a harder line because of western policies in the Middle East, I think it’s safe to say that it is aggressive US and British foreign policies that have caused this crisis.
I think that the narrowest possible construction of Jeb’s statement, that the increase in radicalism among Muslims in Britain since 2001 is largely due to the the U. S. invasion of Iraq and British participation in it, is probably a fair one. However, in the form in which it’s presented Jeb’s post is quite problematic. It is riddled with fallacies and other logical problems notably, appeal to authority (those cited as authorities aren’t), appeal to unnamed authorities (“most analysts agree”), over-generalization, and unsupported assertions and assumptions.
I’d like to consider a couple of broader questions. First, is violent radical Islamism rising? If so, is it increasing due to (mostly) American foreign policy with respect to the Middle East?
Answers can be distilled into several distinct currents
- violent radical Islamism isn’t rising
- violent radical Islamism is rising and it’s a consequence of U. S. foreign policy (an extension of Jeb’s position cited above)
- violent radical Islamism is rising, mostly due to factors other than U. S. foreign policy and, particularly, due to factors within Islam itself (an extension of Michael van der Galien’s position alluded to above)
- It’s more complicated than that.
My own view is #4. I think that violent radical Islamism has probably been around for more than a thousand years and I don’t honestly know whether it’s increasing or not. It’s possible that it may merely appear to be increasing to Western eyes. Modern communications, transportation, and the migration of peoples may simply be bringing out into the light something that was already there.
If, indeed, it’s increasing, I do think that U. S. policies with respect to the Middle East contribute to the increase. Unfortunately, as I’ve mentioned before, those policies have evolved over time and the people of the Middle East haven’t allowed much else in the way of acceptable alternatives. Either everybody is going to have to accept those policies and deal with them and their consequences or the U. S. must disengage from the Middle East in a major way. That will have profound economic consequences for the entire world, I can’t imagine that happening, and, frankly, I doubt it would slow whatever rise there is in violent radical Islamism.
Here’s what I’d like to open up for discussion. Let’s narrow the conversation to the period between 1968 and 2000 inclusive i.e. from the Six-Day War to the day before the attacks on September 11, 2001. How, specifically, should the U. S. have acted or reacted differently? Please be specific e.g. not “stop supporting Israel unconditionally” but rather how should we have changed our reaction to a specific incident during the period. Please limit the recommendations to things that were actually possible including politically possible in the United States. Also, please include what you believe would have been the consequences of the change.
Don’t critique Jeb’s post here—go over to Jeb’s place via the link and do that.
I’m searching sincerely here. Please be civil.
Cross-posted from The Glittering Eye
The best opportunity for the US government to have attempted a real solution was at the end of the first Gulf war. Earlier today I read this column by Amir Taheri
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.aip?
In the context of criticizing those who assume that the solution of the Israel-Palestine conflict is critical for changing everything else, Taheri starts by asking himself your question:
“Fifteen years ago, after the first defeat of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State James Baker faced the question of how best to exploit the American victory as a means of stabilizing the Middle East. The obvious course would have been to deploy the immensely enhanced prestige of the United States, backed by its unprecedented military presence in the Persian Gulf, to help create new and durable security structures in a region regarded as vital to American national interests.
How might this have been done? The U.S. could have urged its Arab allies to introduce long-overdue reforms as a step toward legitimizing their regimes and broadening their domestic political support. At the very least, the U.S. might have urged the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council to end their decades of intramural feuding and forge a broader alliance with Jordan and Egypt. This, with American support, might have helped create a new balance of power in the region to counter the ambitions of adventurist regimes like Iran, Iraq, and Syria.”
Although a new balance of power is still needed, its purpose will have to go beyond countering the ambitions of Iran. It will also have to draw a line at the regional level about the activities of radical groups that would be legal. I believe that a necessary condition to bring about that new balance is for the US to win decisively in Iraq, meaning the formation of a coalition central government with limited powers and the military defeat of all insurgent groups (I’m not American and I live in Chile). This win would recreate a situation similar to that of September 1991.
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To at least some extent it did precisely this. However remember the geopolitical situation of the day; we were following the lead of the United Nations. Which, I should add, is why Saddam Hussein was still in power.
In line with #4, has violent radical Islamism really gotten more pervasive and threatening or is it merely our perception that it is more pervasive and threatening? How much of this might be due to perceived weakness or passivity on the part of violent radical Islamism’s enemies?
I guess what I’m trying to get at is that it may no be what we’ve done, but what we haven’t done, i.e., not responding in a clear, aggresive, and unambiguous manner, that has led to the perceived increase in violent radical Islamism.
Your limitation is for me too restrictive, since I cannot say what is possible at all, and possible in the political climate of the US then. I agree with Edgardo, however, simply because we had the force on the ground and the wind at our backs then. Great things could have been done in Iraq at that moment, and we blew it. Even if we had faced an insurrection at some time later, it would have been together with quite a few partners, allowing, of course, for some withdrawals by Islamic countries.
My hawkish nature will come out now with the statement that we could have then tackled
Syria and Lebanon, and piled up on Iran, to intimidate them, if not go for Teheran as well.
Saudi Arabia would be intimidated also just by our presence in force. We end up with control of the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, Damascus, Beruit, Teheran, Rhiad, and all that oil too. (The British and French may have had the same idea in ’53 or so, that Eisenhower managed to stop) With “enlightened” administration, the region could have been pacified and suppressed to this day, but with far better lives for all of the people there.
Globally, the two bad guys–The USSR and China–could have been neutralized, in my opinion, since the USSR was just about broken anyway, and China was not close enough to do anything rash. Present them with a fait accompli and they go along, especially if they are assured of oil supplies.
Further to my earlier post, I believe that the two main reasons why Bush Sr. failed to take advantage of the opportunity I wrote about were (1) James Baker’s view of the situation (this is A. Taheri’s point), and (2) the lack of Democrats’ support to go beyond the limited and strict mandate he got from Senators (remember how close the vote was for this mandate with almost all Democrats opposing the war). I think both reasons are still relevant: (1) Baker, as the visible face of a much larger group of Republicans, has just shown that his view of the Middle East has not changed, and (2) Democrats are not willing to support anything that resembles a US military win in the Middle East. To this I would add (3) the worse Senate that you have had for a long, long time (everyday I ask myself how you managed to get the current 100 Senators; the show they are putting together these days about the nonbinding resolution is pathetic and it is not explained only by the ambitions of some Senators to be President).