Saddamists at Core of Iraqi Insurgency
The Baathist “dead enders” that Don Rumsfeld often talked about in the early days of the Iraq counterinsurgency effort comprise half the leadership and 40-50 percent of the membership of the insurgency even today.
The Iraqi government’s list of the 41 most wanted fugitives suggests that former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime form the backbone of the insurgency despite attention paid to the role of religious extremists such as al-Qaida in Iraq. The list, released last weekend, includes at least 21 former regime figures, among them Saddam’s chief lieutenant, his wife, eldest daughter, two nephews and a cousin — allegedly financiers of the insurgency. Only five of the 41 names are clearly identified as members of al-Qaida’s local branch.
That reinforces the impression shared by a number of analysts that ex-Baath party members and former regime figures still play a key role in the insurgency. “I believe that former regime members form 40 to 50 percent of the insurgency,” said Diaa Rashwan, an Egyptian expert on militant groups. “Operations by al-Qaida and the Mujahedeen Shura Council make between five to 10 percent only, a maximum of 10 percent.” Rashwan said there was “no doubt” that veterans of Saddam’s intelligence and security network form “an important part of the Iraqi resistance at the command level.”
U.S. officials have also said that the percentage of insurgents belonging to al-Qaida in Iraq was relatively small, although the organization has drawn more attention because of its worldwide image and its tactic of spectacular suicide attacks against civilians.
Brig. Gen. Jalil Khalaf, who leads Iraqi forces in western Iraq, said the large number of ex-regime figures on the list may be due in part to the fact that U.S. and Iraqi officials have more intelligence on them than on shadowy religious extremists.
Some insurgents could be part of both camps — ex-Republican Guard fighters and Saddam militiamen who gravitated to al-Qaida under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed June 7 in a U.S. airstrike.
Many former intelligence and security officials are believed to have joined the insurgency after former U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer disbanded Iraq’s 350,000-member military on May 23, 2003, a month after the regime collapsed. “Saddamists are the largest group of insurgents and they give protection and shelter to other terrorists,” deputy parliament speaker Khalid al-Attiyah said. “They finance them and supply them with weapons. They are the most dangerous.”
It remains clear that disbanding the Iraqi army–or, at least, failing to ensure that the soldiers had incomes while we sorted the wheat from the chaff–was the biggest mistake made since invading Iraq.
We’ve long known that the foreign terrorists comprise a tiny fraction of the “insurgency.” It doesn’t follow, however, that they’re irrelevant. From a morale and public relations standpoint–which is to say, the key elements in counterinsurgency–they are the most important faction. I’m quite sure that Saddam’s former soldiers aren’t a significant part of the cadre of suicide bombers.
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Related:
It remains clear that disbanding the Iraqi armyâ??or, at least, failing to ensure that the soldiers had incomes while we sorted the wheat from the chaffâ??was the biggest mistake made since invading Iraq.
Yeah, whose idea was that, anyway?
Paul Bremer’s, apparently.
WaPo, 11/20/03:
Seems unlikely that “Some at the Pentagon” included any actual military officers.
The WaPo account fits Bremer’s own insistence that Wolfowitz and Feith okayed the dissolution.
Slocombe is quoted, though not credited as mastermind, on the subject in Packer’s The Assassins’ Gate, p. 194.
Of course, any notion that anything of this moment happened w/out Rumsfeld’s signing off on it would be silly. Packer comments (195) that the order “had [its] origins in the Pentagon, and, probably, the vice president’s office.” Interesting if true; given Rummy & Cheney’s close cooperation, it’s plausible, though I would like a source.
Anderson: Yeah, that article was the first one I pulled up Googling, too. But the lede emphasized Bremer’s role:
No doubt Rummy had at least some say in the matter, though.
Christopher Hitchens points out, too, that this was not a slam dunk:
As I noted at the time, though,
Given the post-WWII occupation experience, we should certainly have anticipated the consequences of trying to run a government without the locals with expertise, too.
Given the post-WWII occupation experience, we should certainly have anticipated the consequences of trying to run a government without the locals with expertise, too.
You would think. On the whole, it seems this was another brilliant brainwave from the Feith-Wolfowitz wing of the Pentagon, with Rumsfeld & maybe Cheney not really giving a damn either way, and of course no input from both the relevant civilian (at State) and military personnel who might have brought “reality” into the picture.
So what you are suggesting was that keeping a large armed military force intact, one that was loyal to Saddam was supposed to be a good idea? Considering how well we understand Arabic, that would seem as wise as keeping the Waffen SS intact because they were an effective military force and would have prevented insurgencies. As long as Saddam is alive, those troops could not be fully trusted.
ZR:
As opposed to the 100% trustworthy forces we’ve since recruited?
And, while I understand not taking the equivalent of the Waffen SS, we wound up inviting back the equivalent of the Wehrmacht within weeks.
So what you are suggesting was that keeping a large armed military force intact, one that was loyal to Saddam was supposed to be a good idea?
The bolded assumption marks the flaw in the argument.